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PATRICK JOHNSTON, CHAIRMAN

CHAIRMAN PATRICK JOHNSTON:

Good morning, I'm Pat

Johnston, Chairman of the Assembly Finance and Insurance Committee

•

and the Subcommittee on Savings and Loan Law and Regulation.
me is Assemblyman Bill Lancaster.

With

This is the third Subcommittee

hearing on Lincoln Savings and Loan and the fifth hearing on the
savings and loan crisis in California.

We're here this morning to

hear testimony concerning the cease and desist order issued to
Lincoln Savings and American Continental Corporation on
December 21, 1988 and to hear testimony from Mr. Lawrence Taggart,
former Savings and Loan Commissioner.

The State Department of

Savings and Loan was the primary regulator of Lincoln Savings
until it was taken over by federal regulators.

Lincoln Savings

was acquired by American Continental Corporation in February of
1984.

American Continental Corporation is controlled by Charles

Keuting, Jr.

At the time of acquisition, Lincoln was a

traditional savings and loan engaged in making horne loans.

After

acquisition, Lincoln turned completely around and began to make
higher risk investments, deemphasizing residential real estate
lending.

Lincoln Savings took full advantage of California's

liberal and investment lending powers.

Federal and state

requlators identified numerous problems in Lincoln Savings,
1
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including overvaluation of assets, improper or questionable
accounting practices, self-dealing, excessive investments in junk
bonds, overconcentration of loans, lack of

underwriting

practices for investments in loans, and other violat

of law.

Lincoln Savings

The State Department of Savings and Loan e

or participated in examinations with federal regulators six
times between 1984 and 1989.

Lincoln's failure will cost over

$2 billion and investors in American Continental Corporation
subordinate debentures stand to lose over $200 million. The
subordinate debentures, which were so

in Lincoln Savings

branches, were rendered nearly worthless by American Continental's
filing for reorganization under
Lincoln Savings.

In regar

ruptcy laws

to the cease

the failure of

desis

order iss

to American Continental Corporation and Lincoln Savi

s on

December 21, 1988, there have been disagreements as to the
deletion of language concerning mis

ing o

information in public disclosure documents.

e roneous
Prior drafts of the

cease and desist order included language which

r

American
tting

Continental Corporation and Lincoln Savings from

erroneous, incomplete, misleading or inaccurate information in
public reports, offering circulars, proxy materials and other
public information.
investors.

The cease

include the language

This informat
desist

is the
r final

eli
is

upon
did not

rbidding Lincoln and American Continental

from including such information in the public disclosure
documents.

This

of the deleted

ttee has heard testimony that inclus
would have put a s

to the subordinate

2

00

debenture sales, which ended in February 1989, and that this
language was removed at the request of the Deputy Attorney General
assigned to work with the Department of Savings and Loan on this
matter.

The Subcommittee has also received information that the

language was removed by the Department of Savings and Loan after
internal discussions.

We have requested persons involved in this

matter to testify before the Subcommittee today.

Following that

portion of the hearing related to the cease and desist order, we
will invite Mr. Larry Taggart, who was Savings and Loan
Commissioner in 1983 and 1984, which were years of great change
and upheaval in the savings and loan industry.

In 1983 and 1984,

the Department approved over 200 applications for new state
savings and loans and began to supervise institutions under
California's more liberal savings and loan law.

At the same time,

Department staffing dropped considerably, to a low point of 55
personnel in July of 1983.

In February of 1984, the Department

approved the acquisition of Lincoln Savings by American
Continental Corporation.

We wish to hear from Mr. Taggart today

about his role as regulator of state savings and loans.
As has been the custom in these oversight hearings, we
will ask Legislative Counsel to make some advisory comments and to
swear in our witnesses.

I'd ask those witnesses that have

prepared remarks to provide them to the Sergeant and as copies
allow, we'll make them available as well to the press and the
public.
MR. ROBERT MILLER:

For purposes of advising you of your

rights before a legislative committee, I need to determine which
3
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witnesses are in the hearing room at the present time.
Thayer here please?

Is Ms.

Mr. Rehm, Mr. Newsom, Ms. Sakamoto, Mr.

Harvey, Mr. Stelzer, Ms. Mori, Mr. Davis, and Mr. Crawford.
Mr. Crawford is absent?
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

He must have stepped out, he is

here.
MR. MILLER:

And Mr. Taggart, is Mr. Taggart available?

Well, with regard to those witnesses that are here, the Government
Code contains provisions which explain your rights as a witness
before a legislative committee, and I'm going to read the required
statement that is to read to witnesses as they appear before
committees.

When you come up and testify, at that time I will ask

you if you understood what I read, and then we will swear you in
as a witness.

Section 9410 of the Government Code provides that a

person sworn in and examined before the Senate, Assembly or
legislative committee cannot be held to answer criminally or be
subject criminally to any penalty or forfeiture for any factor or
act touching which he or she is required to testify, other than
for perjury committed in testifying or contempt.
Committee will not require your testimony.

However, this

The Committee does not

wish to be placed in a position where it would be claimed that you
received immunity from any possible criminal prosecution because
of your testimony before the Committee.

Because you are not being

given immunity from criminal prosecution, you have a
constitutional right to refuse to testify before this Committee.
If you desire to waive this right and to testify voluntarily, you
will be given that opportunity subject to all of the following

4
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conditions.
so state.

If you do not wish to answer any question, you will
In the absence of such a statement, your answer to each

question will be entirely voluntary.

If you choose to testify,

you will be sworn under oath and will be therefore subject to
criminal prosecution for perjury committed in testifying.

If you

choose to so testify voluntarily, you are reminded that any
self-incriminating statements you make can be used against you in
criminal proceedings.

•

That's it, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
statement.

Mr. Crawford came in during that

You've heard this before, I think.

All right, good.

I'd like to begin, then, with Shirley Thayer, Counsel for the
Department of Savings and Loan.

Ms. Thayer if you would come

forward to the podium please, and Mr. Miller will swear you in.
MR. MILLER:

Good morning, Ms. Thayer.

Did you

understand the statements that I read to you regarding your rights
as a witness?
MS. SHIRLEY THAYER:
MR. MILLER:

I did.

Do you wish to testify voluntarily under

those conditions?
MS. THAYER:

I do.

MR. MILLER:

Would you raise your right hand, please?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you're about to give
before the Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth?
MS. THAYER:

Yes.

MR. MILLER:

Would you state your name and position for

the record please?
5
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MS. THAYER:

My name is Shirley Thayer.

I'm Senior

Staff Counsel Specialist for the Department of Savings and Loan.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Ms. Thayer and the other witnesses

to follow, we appreciate your written statements.
has them, they'll be entered into the record.

The Committee

I would prefer if

the statements are long, that you highlight in your testimony
those portions that you want us to particularly focus on, make any
remarks that you feel are appropriate, but it is not necessary to
read every word of your statement unless you feel it is important
to our understanding of this issue.
MS. THAYER:
what I have.

All right, thank you.

I do elect to read

I think it takes about ten minutes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Okay.

MS. THAYER:

I am Senior Staff Counsel Specialist

Okay.

for the Department and in this capacity I am asked to look at,
review and make comments and suggestions on a variety of matters
to staff and to the Commissioner.

I am not in a job

classification that authorizes me to make final decisions or
policy decisions.

I do provide legal advice and give opinions

From prior testimony given by Commissioner Crawford, you are aware
that the Department has taken a vigorous stance with Lincoln
Savings and Loan and American Continental Corporat
examination and enforcement actions.

through

I also do not need to tell

the Committee again how much effort the Department made to curta
the sale of the bonds.

As I understand it, the purpose of today'

hearing is to accept testimony regarding the cease and desist
order issued by the Department on December 21, 1988 to Lincoln
6
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ACC because there have been inconsistent statements as to who
made the decision to remove certain language from that order.
Mr. Newsom, an examiner with the Department, gave testimony on
November 29, 1989, that reportedly certain language was removed at
the request of Deputy Attorney General C. H. Rehm.

Mr. Newsom

also indicated that he was informed indirectly through me that the
reason for the request was because Mr. Rehm felt he lacked
securities law expertise to effectively deal with any court

•

challenge by ACC of the Department's Order.

He also testified he

was very upset about it and stated, "This would have dropped an
atomic bomb on their subdebt sales program."

Please keep in mind

that this order was issued December 21, 1988, and the bond sales
were discontinued in February of 1989.
already occurred.

Most of the sales had

I want to say that although Mr. Newsom was only

repeating something that someone else had told him, he did not
verify whether or not what he was saying was accurate.

I say now

that the reasons communicated to and by Mr. Newsom are not
accurate.

I also disagree that the deleted language would have

significantly affected ACC's subdebt program.

Obviously there's a

dispute concerning memories of what happened over a year ago.
Your attention is also called to the fact that no one had
requested a follow-up on the deleted language and the
dissatisfaction with this order was raised for the first time at
the hearing on November 29, 1989.

I'm saying that perhaps, if

research had been done to determine what specific securities law
was being violated, another order could have been issued.

The

Department was not ignoring the information deleted from the
7
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order, as all findings had already been sent to the Secu iti s
Exchange Commission in November with a cover
Davis, Chief Deputy.
throughout 1989.

r

Additional information has

But, as of December 15, 1989

still under investigation by the SEC and no

l

fo

r

tt

is

rm

has

i

made as to whether or not the findings are a securiti s law
violation.

By naming ACC in the order, this could have trigge ed

the requirement to file an B(k) with the SEC, which

ld make

order available to the public, and alert anyone inte

he

sted in

finding out that Lincoln was being ordered to divest the loans
that, the specific loan that was associated with the
securities law violation.

Had the language relat

tential"
to the

r, it

"potential" securities law violation remained in the

ts that a

would have been easily challenged and I have grave

most

court would have enforced a "potential" violation. ACC wou
likely have requested the court to seal the reco
depriving access by the public.

, thus

If it was not chal

and had the Department tried to enforce the o

r thr

a cou

action, I would surmise a similar result from the cour
tried to use it as a basis for a conservatorship,
whether a court would have confirmed it.

The SEC

publicly traded companies to report what are

1

report on March 30, 1989.

ACC did not f

I think it might be

ires
if
ts,

a s gnificant

is left up to the company and it's not mandat
time limits for filing the 8(k)'s.

ong

nnual r

events" and this is done on 8(k)'s or quarter
but what is reported, what is considered to

s

Had

are
its annual
ficial to

8
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describe the mechanics of issuing and enforcing an order and the
background leading to this particular order.

By statute adopted

by this Legislature, the Commissioner is authorized to issue an
order when an association, holding company or subsidiary is
violating or has violated a law or is engaging in or has engaged
in an unsafe or unsound business practice.

And just as an aside,

this past tense language was added effective January 1, 1989.

The

order must first state the violation of practice and then facts
must be stated in support of the violation of practice.

The

Commissioner then orders discontinuance of the violation or
practice and then orders conformance with all requirements of law.
The order is a two-pronged document with the "order" portion of
the order linked to the violation.

You can't order someone to

stop doing something if there is no violation.

The order is a

confidential document and not available to the public unless taken
into court.

An order is considered to be a very serious action

and is to be issued only as a final resort to stop specifically
identified violations or practices.

The decision to issue this

order during the examination of Lincoln and ACC was, as I
understand it, without precedent and there was a considerable
amount of concern with taking this action before the standard
examination procedures were completed.

The seriousness of the

situation related to certain loans created a great sense or
urgency to get an Order out as soon as possible, but it was
extremely important to issue an Order that would be enforceable if
taken to court and which complied completely with the law.

This

Department takes regulatory actions and issues orders, but is not
9
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authorized to litigate.

Therefore the Attorney Gene

l's office

is contacted when litigation is anticipated or cont

ted.

my knowledge no Deputy Attorney General has ever

invol

~n

the merits of a regulatory action, but

ovi

advice

the

give opinions on what has a chance of being
Since a Deputy Attorney General is requir

r .

fend

r

enforce this Department's orders if we go to

r

sometimes

ask for review of drafts of the order to see

t

vJOuld be a

problem defending or enforcing it, and I'm awa e
requests during the year of 1989.

When the d aft

issue was given to me for review, it contained
"potential" securities law violation as the

The

the Or

0

order.

si

rience

nvolvi

Universal Savings in a conservatorship action which

be a problem in this situation.

1

The Cou

the appointment of the conservator, so I

I

en ia

Department had some prior

language about a potential violation.

r

sc

expressed concern over the ability to enforce
violation.

s

othe

rm

t

r

Orders is

have always been for violations, not "pote
draft of the Order was sent to Deputy Attor
for review.

, H.

conversat on

Since there was only a brief tel

with him over a year ago, I have no recollect

exac

was said, but remember generally that we di

s

defending a "potential" violation.

about

specific.

I

We talk

p ob ems

do recall that he mentioned that he

in securities law, but I made no request to h
to determine whether the omissions were in

t

he
t

to

an

any resear

t a securities law

10
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violation because this would take time and the Commissioner was
very anxious to issue this order.

There was no discussion related

to specific language being removed or left in; therefore, I can
conclude that Mr. Rehm made no request to remove language from the
order.

I would also like to add that it is my belief that a

litigator does not need to have preexisting expertise in an area
of law to be a good litigator, because research and preparation
will enable an adequate defense.

The allegation that I said

something that a reasonable person would conclude that Mr. Rehm
requested the language at issue to be removed because ''he lacked
securities law expertise to effectively deal with any court
challenge by ACC of the Department's order" is just simply without
merit.

At a subsequent meeting with management staff linked to

San Francisco on a conference call, all arguments pro and con for
leaving in or taking out the "potential" violation language was
discussed.
members.

There was support for both positions from staff
I did communicate that Mr. Rehm said there would be

problems with enforcing a "potential" violation.

The Commissioner

made the final decision to remove the language about "potential"
violations and the attendant order language after listening to and
considering all input from the staff and not upon instructions
from the Deputy Attorney General.

Additional language was also

added to the order after Mr. Rehm reviewed it which would make
Lincoln divest itself of the loans at issue.

In my opinion, the

removal of the language that could be easily challenged and the
language added made the order much stronger, not weaker.

After

the November 29th hearing, since the Deputy Attorney General had
11
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not made a request to remove any language from the or
since it was I who supposedly made the allegat

t he had,

t

that this

I felt it was imperative that the press be info
information was not accurate.

r, and

The Commissioner and Chief Depu

authorized me to make appropriate contacts.
Steve Suchil the following morning.
Channels 2 and 7 on November 30th.

I a so

tacted

I read a statement for TV
I specifical

s ated that

''Mr. Newsom only repeated what he had been told, but what he had
been told was not accurate.''

A press release was al

dr Et

the

same day which clearly said Mr. Newsom had no first-hand
knowledge.

This press release was drafted by Duane

terson

Press Secretary for the Attorney General, for release to the news
media.

Our Department is small and has no press office and no

capability to contact a central news release agency.

We have

always used other agencies to send out our news releases.
Mr. Peterson faxed us a copy, a draft, and Mr. Dav s

nd

e

reviewed it, edited it to our satisfaction, and
be distributed.

to

In a printed submission from Mr. Newsom to Steve

Suchil and labeled as additional testimony da

ember 5, 1989,

allegations were made that, "I have reason to bel eve a cover
is in process."

In addition to Mr. Newsom's references

the order which he alleges created a conflict of i
Attorney General, I am accused of having att

elated to

erest with the
tamper with

his testimony to be presented before the Congressional Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs Committee on October 31,
stated that I attempted to discourage him from inc
of pages of supporting exhibits.

989.

He

ing hundr

Since an attempt to tamper with
12
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or any actual tampering with testimony before a legislative body
is a very serious matter, I wish to make a short statement
relating to the extent of my involvement with
Mr, Newsom's testimony.

Briefly, I had helped Gene Stelzer and

the Commissioner edit their written statement without changing
content, and was requested to look at Mr. Newsom's statement on
October 26, 1989, in a time period before a subpoena had been
served and it was unknown whether it would be a subpoena for
testimony only or a subpoena duces tecum.

The only conversation

that I recall having with him was over the phone and was related
to what appeared to be a draft of his statement.

I told him that

it needed to be cleaned up, but after he protested I said I
wouldn't touch it.
language to him.

At no time was reference made to specific
Sheila Sakamoto worked with Mr. Newsom to

finalize his statement which was considerably different from the
draft, and I did include these in the exhibits to the Committee.
I also participated in a discussion that same day and gave an
opinion that it would be a violation of California Financial Code
Section 8009 to voluntarily submit confidential documents without
a subpoena duces tecum.

This is a position I have consistently

taken with this Committee, and I'm sure Mr. Suchil can confirm
that.

In fact,

in my opinion the confidential documents

Mr. Newsom had submitted to the Committee without a subpoena duces
tecum had violated Section 8009, and I have expressed that
opinion.

Later that day, after this discussion took place, a

subpoena duces tecum was served by the Congressional Committee and
there was no longer an issue of him submitting whatever documents

13
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he wanted to.

My actions most certainly should not be considered

to be an "attempt to tamper" with testimony.

In closing, I wou
Loan

like to say that the Department of Savings

participated in a cover-up on any matters involvi
ACC.

t

Lincoln or

We have at all times tried to do what we could to s
w~

sale of the bonds being issued by ACC, but a
framework of the law.

If you have any quest

,

I

in the
ill

gl

to answer them.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Ms. Wright.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN CATHIE WRIGHT:

I

have a

r

em in

several areas and one of them is, do you always have the Attorney
General public relations staff write your press releases?
MS. THAYER:

This was the first time in this instance,

but we have always used other agencies.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

So you've never wri

n any

f

your own press releases?
MS. THAYER:

All right, we have written press releas s,

but we've used other agencies to disseminate them, to send them
out.

And in this instar,ce, although they drafted a

ess release

just for expediency purposes, we had another very critical issue
going on in the office on that very same day in a receivership
situation, the fact that they drafted the initial language,
Mr. Davis and myself went over it and made rna

cha

es so that it

conformed with what we wanted to go out.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

My understand

Attorney General had some conversations or interview with

rs

that were subpoenaed before this cormnittee on the 2 th of

14
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November?
MS. THAYER:

I'm sorry, what was the question again?

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

I said I was also informed that

the Attorney General's office had either discussions or interviews
with members who were of the Department who were subpoenaed to
ap9ear before this Committee?
MS. THAYER:

My understanding is that they came into the

office to look at certain documentation, but I also understand
from the paper that they are starting an investigation of their
own.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Well, Ms. Thayer, why don't you

answer Ms. Wright's question to the extent of your knowledge and
if you don't know about any other contacts, then perhaps
Ms. Wright's question can be answered by another witness.
MS. THAYER:

Okay, no one interviewed me from the

Attorney General's Office.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

I just think it's strange that

the Attorney General and other witnesses probably can address it,
that the Attorney General would suddenly come in and request to go
over testimony before coming before this committee.

I think it's

strange that they do press releases for your agency, whether you
are part and parcel of it, I think you should do your own, no
matter how lacking of expertise you seem to think you have, and I
am concerned that there seems to be conflict between your
testimony and testimonies we received on the 29th also under
subpoena and in sworn testimony.
MS. THAYER:

That's why I'm here to give my side of the

15
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story which I feel is accurate.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

be

e

So you feel t

conflict and yet both of you could be accurate?
MS. THAYER:

I think that I have said that I don't agree

with the prior testimony which apparently was g
testimony.

th r

He admitted that it was not, that he had no first-hand

knowledge.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

I'm not an a to

but

his

duces tecum, you said .
MS. THAYER:

Subpoena duces tecum .

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

Is that basi

1

ing

broad, in layman's terms, that's a broad
MS. THAYER:

It is a subpoena that r

be provided this Committee.

to

e

You can either is ue a

testimony only or a subpoena which includes
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

t

'

s

In my te

I

an attorney, I would call it a broad .
MS. THAYER:

That requests documen

t wa

Congressional hearing, when I was asked for

we

didn't have a subpoena at all, and we did not know whether it was
going to be just for testimony only or whether it was
for documents.

As soon as we found out

I had no problems.

i

to be

t it was for documents,

But as a lawyer, I had to call

tention to

the fact that we have a Financial Code Section that prohibits th2
giving out of confidential documents or informat
of a subpoena duces tecum.

in the

So as an attorney I'm obliga

to

give that opinion, which I did and I have to Steve Suchil on

16
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numerous occasions, that we're more than happy to submit the
documents once we have the subpoena, but if we don't have the
subpoena requesting documents, we can't do it or we would be in
violation of the law this Legislature has adopted.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
Chairman.

Just one more question, Mr.

And you feel that if the cease and desist order had

been issued in December of 1988 as requested by your examiners or
your Department, that it would not have prevented any sale of
these bonds?
MS. THAYER:

That's correct.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

You feel all the bonds were sold

before that December date?
MS. THAYER:

Not before.

The sales didn't stop until

February, but my testimony is that this cease and desist would not
have had any impact on those sales.
WRIGHT:

ASSEMBLYWOMAN

I think if we prevented one sale of a bond it would have

protected one of our constituents here in the State of California
from investing money and losing it.

So I think the cease and

desist order in December would have made some impact.
MS. THAYER:
state a violation.

But it was not, all right, an order has to

If a policeman pulled you over and said you're

going 55, but I think you are going to speed and I'm going to give
you a ticket for a "potential'' violation, I don't think you would
like that, and I think that would be considered an abuse of power,
so by trying to issue an order that only contained a "potential''
violation that was not identified, I think that we were subject to
real strong challenge and perhaps even sanctions.

17
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

invo

You were so

savings and loan agency, you were so deep

as a
s

i

thing, I don't see why you didn't see there

1

on for

s

simple reason it seems to Attorney General now

s

ng

hat

didn't have license to sell these bonds

e

re

ti

lar

violations, and you being involved in it, I
didn't notice this back in 1988.
MS. THAYER:

But this order only re at

bond transaction, and the failures to disclos
believe, the Ponchartrain loan situation.

relat

t

These o

not brought into, there was no awareness of

ssue

r

s

0

having happened that the Attorney General is
that the order was only alleging "potential"
a particular loan, but no one had provided any resea
anything in writing to identify the securit
violated.

In fact, the SEC as of

r

them, have taken all of this information,

ent a 1

of this information to them in November of 19

s i

have not been able to determine whether ther

lat on

They are people who have a tremendous amount o
expertise.

This Department does not,

secu ities law
no e fort

the

to try to determine what the specific law
very, and this didn't real

s.

become an issue

draft, and we were very anxious to

t th

r

r

these loans to tell them to not make anymore loans

se

borrowers and also to divest those loans, so there was an u
As I indicated, we've never, ever issued an

r

ing an

18
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examination.

This was totally Nithout precedent.

It's only as a

last resort.

We issue orders after an examination has been done

and management has been notified as to what the findings are,
they've had a chance to respond, but here we were in the middle of
an examination, and these loans to these particular three
borrowers were so flagrant that the Commissioner was most anxious
to get an order out immediately, and it v1as felt like to put
something in that was a "potential" violation that could be easily
challenged, just was not an appropriate thing to do.

The staff

that recommended taking it out, today looking at that language,
they would still make the same recommendation, and I would too.
Because the law just requires us to identify the violation.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Mr. Lancaster.

ASSEMBLYMAN BILL LANCASTER:

Yes, Ms. Thayer, I have a

couple of thoughts that have come to mind during your testimony
and I would like to clarify them if I might.

You were made aware,

I guess, by Mr. Rehm, is that correct that the Department
regulatory aspects have asked for language of a cease and desist
order and you have advised the Department that it would not be a
wise move, is that what you're saying?
MS. THAYER:

I'm saying when I was given this order and

I saw language that said a "potential" violation, that I had
problems as an attorney.

To me it did not comply with Financial

Code Section 8200.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

My question is, did you advise

the Department of Savings and Loan that this would be an irregular
act, that it should not happen.
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MS. THAYER:

Yes, my advice in the staff meeting with
that it be take

management, it was my opinion, and I r
out, as did other management staff.

They

the same

some

feelings.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

s

Let's tal

t

with management staff.
MS. THAYER:

All right.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

When we're

i

l

t

management staff, are we talking about Attor

nagement

staff or Department of Savings and Loan and the At

r

Gene al

staff?
MS. THAYER:

No, absolutely not.

Department of Savings and Loan.

No

j

The only contac

st the
with

Attorney General was sending the documents to, as i
was C. H. Rehm that was assigned to the case, ther
conversation on the phone with him, myself and h

, i

That was the end of the Attor

i

s one b ief

discussed the problems of the "potential" violation
to be specific.

turned

which
the

General's

involvement.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

So you're saying that the

Department of Savings and Loan did not have a written request for
a cease and desist order that you could hang

on 1

1

and defend, is that what you're saying?
MS. THAYER:

That's what I felt.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

of Savings and Loan, is that a fact, in
MS. THAYER:

r

And you
r

n

That's my opinion.
20
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ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

I see, and your opinion was

based upon a "potential" violation which you say at this point the
Securities and Exchange Commission has not determined whether or
not there was a violation or not?
MS. THAYER:

That's correct.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

But the fact of the matter is,

there was a potential violation, you then were alerted to the fact
that there was a problem?
MS. THAYER:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

My next question goes along the

line just exactly what the Attorney General's office did after
they were alerted to the fact there was a problem, and the
Department was concerned enough to try to issue a "potential"
cease and desist order, which you say is unorthodox.
that any

11

I don't know

potential" cease and desist orders have been issued

before, but you say that's .
MS. THAYER:

We're not aware of any.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

That's not the proper way to go,

but what did the Attorney General's office do after they became
alerted to the fact there was a "potential" problem?
MS. THAYER:

I have no idea, I can't respond for them,

because we made no further request to them to do research.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:
reading.

Well, that's not what I've been

Some place along the line, the Attorney General's office

was supposed to do some research, in fact, Mr. Rehm I believe was
going to look into the matter.
MS. THAYER:

We made no request of them.
21
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ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:
MS. THAYER:

So you just dropped it?
sent all

It was just dropped in that we

of the information to the SEC
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

So, therefore

at

hat point the

Attorney General's office, your Department, was out

the picture

?

as far as the Lincoln Savings and Loan problem was concer
MS. THAYER:

Well, I don't think we're out of the

picture.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:
MS. THAYER:

?

At that t

Well, no, because we were still the pr

regulator and I have said that if anyone had

a r

ry

st to

follow-up on it, that we could have issued an order the next
two days later, if someone would have done re
with a specific violation.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

I got the direct

i

though, at the previous meeting that the At

1

is the one that ordered the cease and desi

r

and you say he advised it be removed.
MS. THAYER:

He did not advise.

i

talked about the problem of enforcing a "potent al
violation.

that we
securities law

At no time did we even talk about specific language.

At no time did he advise removing any language.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

And you carne

w th no

substitute language that you could legally defend?
MS. THAYER:

No.

There was such

sense

ur

get this Order out that to delay it, to do research at that

to
int

in time, just didn't seem practical.
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ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

As you know, Ms. Thayer, we have

a definite conflict in remarks.
MS. THAYER:

That's why this hearing is being held.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Thank you very much.

Ms. Thayer, the Department of

Savings and Loan, as you indicated, was the primary regulator of
Lincoln Savings, is that correct?
MS. THAYER:

That's correct.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

And Mr. Keating purchased Lincoln

Savings in February of 1984?
MS. THAYER:

Yes, that's correct.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

And from 1984 forward to 1989, it's

been the responsibility of the Department to examine and supervise
Lincoln Savings?
MS. THAYER:

Correct.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

When did Mr. Newsom assume his

responsibilities in the examination of Lincoln?
MS. THAYER:

Since I have no personal knowledge on the

assignments, but just from listening to the testimony, I believe
it was in late fall of 1988.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

•

Of 1988.

The bonds were approved

for sale by the Department of Corporations in November of 1986 and
May of 1988, is that correct?
MS. THAYER:

Just again, it's from memory, those just

seem to be the appropriate dates.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Approximately $200 million of the

bonds were sold by the late fall of 1988, is that right?
23
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MS. THAYER:

to.

I don't know, that I can't r

don't know the dollar figure.

do know that the fi

I

t issuance
the bonds

of bonds that we issued the order to stop the sal

s

the branches by August the lst, and they never
sell the bonds that were qualified for sale

I

n

988.

bonds were never qualified to be sold in the off ces.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

The Department

f

and Loan

Savi

specified that they had to be sold at another location, but not in
the branch offices, is that correct?
MS. THAYER:

That's correct.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

a cease and

In the decision
i

desist order, what staff persons would be invo

that

decision?
MS. THAYER:

res the document

The examination staff pr

and all .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

n the cease

By the document

and desist order?
MS. THAYER:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

But how would it come to be
estion or

document would be drawn up, would that be at the
instigation of the examiner, or .
MS. THAYER:

ssione

Usually the Cornmissione

takes that action.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSON:
MS. THAYER:

How did this one

Again, since I have no

t

rs

nd

knowledge, only hearsay, that
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Well, I just want to know what
24

were involved in.

Is it fair to say you're the chief attorney of

the Department?
MS. THAYER:

No, I'm senior counsel, there is a chief

counsel.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Okay.

So your responsibilities with

respect to the issuance of the Cease and desist order were to
review it, is that correct?
MS. THAYER:

•

This particular order, because the

Commissioner had asked a northern examiner to draft it, the
northern attorneys were involved in the drafting process.
only peripherally involved in looking at it.

I was

I did not read it in

total until that final draft was ready to go to the Attorney
General.

That's when I read it through and raised the issue of

the "potential" violation.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

All right, that draft, on page 3 of

the draft that was submitted as an exhibit, I believe, by
Mr. Newsom in his testimony before the House Banking Committee in
Washington, says in part, "Furthermore, public disclosure
statements lack complete and accurate disclosures regarding the
above-referenced Ponchatrain transaction which, in addition to
being "potential" securities violation laws, may result in

•

liability to ACC and thereby may adversely affect the safety and
soundness of Lincoln."
MS. THAYER:

That is part of the finding, is it not?
That's correct.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MS. THAYER:

That then leads to the actual order?

That's correct.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

And it is the use of the term
25

as an attar

"potential" and "may result" that concerned
MS. THAYER:

Yes.

le

le

I felt that would

o sanctions

very challengeable, and actually perhaps subject us
because we had not identified the violation.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Page 6 listi

and desist provisions, number 4, "permitti

f

the actual ceas

erroneou ,

incomplete, misleading or inaccurate information of any kind to be
included in public reports, including Form l
MS. THAYER:

I

s Fo

personally don't

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

l

n

A reporting r

reme

quarterly reporting requirement?
MS. THAYER:

That's what I surmise, p

so

do not know specifically.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MS. THAYER:

Okay.

But it's interesting to not

with the SEC this week, that there's a cat

r

i

cal

"significant events" and it is optional as to what
considers to be "significant events" and when

r

tor

would report a cease and desist order issued
agency, they really couldn't give me any answe

vJhether that

a

would be considered a significant event.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

We're going to hear

rom Mr. Newsom

but from his prior testimony and I believe the test

t he's
as I

going to give today, I don't want to misstate it,

t

understand it, Mr. Newsom felt that the issuance

a cease

desist order, even one that was going to be challenged, inevi
by ACC and Lincoln, would be worth doing as a strat

, I think
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"strategy" is his word, in order to raise the issue ultimately
publicly in a court of law, and to encourage or compel federal
regulators to act more aggressively with respect to Lincoln.

Was

there any discussion that you're aware of, of the use of the cease
and desist order with this unusual provision dealing with
"potential" violation of law, as a strategy?
MS. THAYER:

Subsequently, I know, I can't recall

specifically at that point in time whether that argument was
presented, but I know subsequently I've been told that that was
what was discussed.

But since our law requires us to do certain

things and I find it legally offensive to deliberately violate our
law, even though it might have a positive effect, I think that
we're obligated to comply with our law, regardless of the fallout,
and I still sincerely feel that.

I feel the Legislature adopts

laws and they anticipate that the regulatory agency will comply
with that law.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

It's your testimony that the

Department of Savings and Loan had independent, clear authority to
issue a cease and desist order, is that correct?
MS. THAYER:

Yes, it's under Financial Code Section

8200.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Did the Department of Justice limit

you or fail to provide information or opinion that you requested
that interfered with your ability to make a decision with respect
to the issuance of the cease and desist order?
MS. THAYER:

Absolutely not.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Thank you very much.
27

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Just one more ques

Ms. Wright.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

I just noticed in one of the

newspaper articles, it stated that, and I'll just r

the

paragraph and you can respond to it, because you're sayi

that

you advised not to go forward the cease and desist order?
MS. THAYER:

As did several other management members of

the staff.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

Because it

here in this

article that "But, S&L Department Counsel Shirley

r, who

discussed the order with Rehm, confirmed that Rehm d scour

the

proposed order."
MS. THAYER:

And that's an absolute

I don't

believe everything I read in the paper, do you believe everything
you read in the paper about yourself?
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
that's under oath.

No, I don't

lieve

thi

and

(laughter)

MS. THAYER:

I was aghast.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MS. THAYER:

You're welcome.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
Deputy Attorney General.
MR. MILLER:

Okay, thank you ver

I'd like to call Mr. C. H. Rehm,

Mr. Miller.

Mr. Rehm, you were in the room earlier when

I read you the statement regarding your ri

s as a witness

for

this committee?
MR. C. H. REHM:
MR. MILLER:

Yes, sir, I was.

Do you understand the particular statement?
28
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MR. REHM:
MR. MILLER:

Yes.
Do you wish to testify voluntarily under

the conditions?
MR. REHM:
MR. MILLER:

I do.
Would you raise your right hand, please, do

you solemnly swear that the testimony you're about to give before
the Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth?
MR. REHM:
MR. MILLER:

Yes.
Will you please state your name and

position for the record, please.
MR. REHM:

My name is C. H. Rehm, I'm a Deputy Attorney

General with the Department of Justice of the State of California.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
us.

Mr. Rehm, thank you for being with

Let me just ask you, since this is your first appearance

before this Committee, how long have you been with the Attorney
General's office?
MR. REHM:

Approximately seven years.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Seven years, and prior to that, what

place were you employed?
MR. REHM:

I was employed in political public relations.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. REHM:

I see.

Various candidates.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Various candidates.

you name one that we would be familiar with?
MR. REHM:

Gerald Ford.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Okay.
29

Evelle Younger.

Okay.

Could

I have an opening statement, Mr, Johnston.

MR. REHM:

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. REHM:

All right,

hear that.

don'

I'm a Deputy Attorney General i

Division, Business and Tax Section, in Los

the Civil
is sect

le .

serves client agencies which include the Stat

f

Equalization, Franchise Tax Board, Employment Deve
Department, and the Departments of Insurance, Real Estate and
Savings and Loan.

The Attorney General's

ffice pr

lled

litigation services to these client agencies and
defend them in court.

The office does not

des
to

ss on client

activities in the sense that it approves or disapproves the
regulatory actions.

When requested, the office does rev ew

proposed actions to provide the client with a view of the
likelihood of success from a litigation sta
free to accept or reject our view.

int.

The client i
Shirley

In Decembe

Thayer, Legal Counsel for the Department

n,

l

I had a telephone conversation to discuss a p
desist Order concerning Lincoln Savings and
forwarded a copy of the proposed order and
which I have reviewed.

Ms. Thayer asked if I

s

hared her concern
iolations.

over language regarding "potential securities l
told her that I did because these violations were no
alleged.

I

order.

direct the deletion of any language in the pr

defend a challenge to the order.

specifically
did not

was not asked to research any matter

not state that I or the office lacked securit

law

did

I

rtise to

I told her that we would

in court any action the Department was to take.

I

f

I was not
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contacted again by the Department concerning this matter, and
returned their materials on December 22, 1988.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Mr. Lancaster.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

How did you, or if you did not,

say so, how did your Department, which is a legal advisor to the
Savings and Loan in this circumstance, how did you transmit this
concern the Attorney General's office had regarding the use of
"potential" violations, how did you transmit this information to
the Department?
MR. REHM:

Ms. Thayer and I discussed it during our

telephone conversation.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

Well, how did it get to the

Department of Savings and Loan?
MR. REHM:

Ms. Thayer is with the Department of Savings

and Loan.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:
MR. REHM:

And it got through to her?

Yes, Sir.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

I see, so basically you advised,

did you advise her of the potential problem?

In other words,

according to your testimony, you said, in effect, I told her we
would defend any court action the Department decided to do.
MR. REHM:

That's correct.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

But the fact is,

did you advise

her that there would be a very difficult thing to defend
"potential"?
MR. REHM:

I told her that nonspecifically alleged

statements, such as ''potential" securities laws violations, was

Jl
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subject to a challenge in court, that's correct.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

r, then,

So basically Ms

was relying upon your advice and counsel, not necessarily yours,
the Department's advice and counsel, that if t
would be at their own risk?

it

pr

You didn't know whether or not

'd

be able to enforce it?
MR. REHM:

I

think they proceeded with the knowledge

that this could be a problem if it was challeng

in

'

t's

inst

is

r

correct.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

And that knowl

e

s

transmitted, I assume, by your Department?

Ms. Thayer during our telephone call, that's
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

And so you

rr
ised

"potential" problem?
MR. REHM:

No, that's not correct.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

I'm tryi

Ei

out whether

you advised not to do it, or to do it.
MR. REHM:

I understand The Attor

Gene a 's office

does not involve itself in the regulatory process.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

Well, you ce tai ly advised them

on the regulatory process, isn't it your job to make sure
don't jump out of line, so to speak?
MR. REHM:

That's correct, we advise them of the risks

in litigation of various actions they are proposi

on taking,but

the client is free to accept or reject our advice and they do so,
so when I explained to Ms. Thayer that there was a risk in doing
32

9

that, I wanted her to understand that this was something that was
subject to a challenge in court.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

So it's clearly, your Department

did advise the Department of Savings and Loan that this language
was at risk, but you at no time said they shouldn't do it, is that
what you're saying?
MR. REHM:

That's correct.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Do you have a question, Ms. Wright?

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

I just have one question for you.

Don't you think, and probably this is more for your opinion, that
if you did not feel that this could be, or it could be challenged
if taken to court, wouldn't it be under the same circumstances,
and I'll go back to the fact that we have these stops for
supposedly trying to check out if people are drunk drivers, and
they have been proven to be legal in court, wouldn't this be the
same?

You're basically assuming that someone is a drunk driver

when you pull them over and they have these, as I call them, traps
along the highways.

Don't you feel this could have been the same

situation?
MR. REHM:

I'm not sure if I follow your question.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

Well, it is an alleged and you're

saying that there wasn't enough information or enough legal basis
to go forward with the cease and desist order?
MR. REHM:
legal basis.

No, I didn't say that there wasn't enough

I said that based on the unspecified language of

"potential" securities laws violation, that this was subject to
challenge in court.

It's the regulator's decision whether or not
33
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to accept or reject our advice.

And as far as whethe

this is
s

some kind of, should be some kind of an analogous

to

traffic stops for drunk drivers, I really think that's somethi
for the Legislature to address, not the Attorney General's office.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

That's

ese.

1

Thank you.

Well, I mean, the Attorney General is going to jump in now and do
an investigation.

When this was raised in December of '88, why

wouldn't you have jumped in and started an investi
seems something was going on that wasn't ri
MR. REHM:

then?

t

It

t.

Try and recall that no matter

much

Lincoln is emblazoned on everyone's consciousness

so much

so that you probably look twice at a $5 bill, at this t

Lincoln

was just another name of another troubled savi

ent

s and l

and it was one of a number in the State of California,

the

clients that the Business and Tax Section

ith

e

individuals and companies involved in confli t

ith

business laws every day.

a

If we did a sepa ate and

investigation of every case that we were prese
get anything done.

y,

wou

It just isn't feasible to

s

never

ra e

investigation of every case that comes across our desk.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

Well, do you know, o

a

savings and loans that might be just another case

other
ing

through your office that could possibly all of a

n

another Lincoln Savings and Loan.
MR. REHM:

No, Ma'am.

And obviously if we

hindsight, this would never have happened.
never have come to our office.

It

20-20

obably would

The regulators, if

knew then
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what they know now, they probably would have closed Lincoln years
ago.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Mr. Lancaster.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

Mr. Rehm, I have to ask this

question, because one of the things I've detected throughout this
whole hearing process is the hesitancy on the part of the
regulators because of the fact that Lincoln Savings or ACC have a
history of challenging in court the regulators, and I have a
difficult time, frankly, in understanding why any agency would be
that gun shy and not recognize the potential danger.

I mean, it

is difficult for me to understand how they could be, I'm not
saying they were scared off, because I don't think that is
necessarily the case, but you're obviously cognizant of the fact
that you were going to be challenged?
MR. REHM:

That's correct.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:
became gun shy.

And so, therefore, everybody

You can talk about the Department.

You can talk

about the Attorney General's office, everybody became gun shy of
having to go to court.
MR. REHM:

I don't think . . .

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

•

And what could we do, you see,

that's part of the process of this hearing process, is what can we
do as a legislative body to try to eliminate that fear, because
you can see what happens when the regulatory thing breaks down, in
effect.

It's inconceivable to me, frankly, that a "potential''

problem out there, you don't have the ability to go out and say,
potentially this could be at risk.

I just don't understand that
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because it's done all the time, you can label everything in the
world around here, potentially something is going to
MR. REHM:

n.
General's

Well, I don't think the Attar

office was gun shy and the Department of Savings and Loan
certainly wasn't gun shy because they did issue the ceas

a

desist order.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

Yes, they issued the cease and

desist order lacking what you felt would be challe
MR. REHM:
activity.

Well, I that's prudent

any kind

1

f

rtment

If you want some suggestions, I'm sure the

of Savings and Loan could provide the Legislature w th lots
suggestions as to how laws could be c

r ss the e kinds

to

of problems.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

sis

So the cease

r

that was issued was not challenged.
MR. REHM:

Not that I know of.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:
MR. REHM:

And it also d

n't s

it.

Didn't stop

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

As I under tand

went ahead

again and violated it, is that right?
MR. REHM:

Didn't stop what?

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

Didn't s

them

om se l

ng

their instruments.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

I think they violated the cease

desist order.
MR. STEVEN SUCHIL:

They violated the one that was

issued.
36
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MR. REHM:

Well, I wasn't part of the final cease and

desist order.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

My problem really is one, here

we have a potential problem out there and obviously everybody was
aware of it, they tried to make the public aware of it, and all of
a sudden, boom, nothing happened and they just went on.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Mr. Rehm, you're an attorney in the

Civil Division of the Department of Justice?

•

MR. REHM:

That's correct.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Yes, sir .

Your responsibilities are to advise

the Department of Savings and Loan and other departments, as well?
MR. REHM:

That's correct.

The Departments of Savings

and Loan, Insurance, Real Estate, as well as the tax . . .
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
MR. REHM:

No.

Corporations?

Corporations we do occasionally, but not

on a regular basis, no, Ma'am.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Is it within your jurisdiction or

your responsibility to conduct an investigation into a problem
savings and loan?
MR. REHM:

If we were requested by any of our client

agencies, we would conduct an investigation.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

How would that occur in the

Department of Justice, who would make that decision?
MR. REHM:

The requesting agency would present it to the

appropriate section and that
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

I'm asking would that be you since

you work with the Department of Savings and Loan?
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MR. REHM:

No.

Deputy

This would be a supervisi

Attorney General above who would make the decision.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

All right, so in

r

le 1

legal advice to the Department of Savings and Loan and

give

ther

departments.
MR. REHM:

That's correct, as do

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

l

of the

ties.

And if an order such as the one

under discussion is challenged in court by the sub ec

of the

order, in this case ACC and Lincoln, then it would
responsibility to represent the State, the

r

rtment

n

defending that order, is that correct?
MR. REHM:

That's correct, but I would not necessarily

have been the deputy who would have been assi ned

s

se had

it been challenged in court and, as a matter of fact .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

But at the fron

assume that Ms. Thayer, Counsel for the

end,

rtment

up is to get your advice before the Departmen

eason I
cal

made a decis

as

to whether to issue that order?
MR. REHM:

That's correct.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

In your experience, have other

orders been challenged either by Lincoln or by other financial
institutions in court?
MR. REHM:
instance.

I'm not familiar with Lincoln,

in this

There was I believe Universal Savings and Loan did

challenge their cease and desist order in court.

that I

can't recall.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Did at any time in

r conversat
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with Ms. Thayer, did you indicate an unwillingness to defend the
State should a cease and desist order be issued, even one that had
language that you thought was problematic?
MR. REHM:

Not at all.

Our responsibility is simply to

inform the client agency of the risks.

They make their own

decision as to accept our advice or not to, and they make both
decisions all the time.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Was there any discussion with you

and Ms. Thayer about Mr. Newsom's strategy of challenging Lincoln
in a cease and desist order that might stretch the bounds of what
was defensible?
MR. REHM:

Absolutely not.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Did you speak to anyone other than

Ms. Thayer about this matter prior to the issuance of the cease
and desist order in the Department of Savings and Loan?
MR. REHM:

I don't recall doing so, it's possible I may

have.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Well, do you recall speaking with

Mr. Newsom?
MR. REHM:

No, I've never spoken to Mr. Newsom with the

exception of just recently.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Recently being just prior to our

last hearing of this Committee, is that correct?
MR. REHM:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Did you discuss with your superiors

in the Department of Justice the cease and desist order prior to
its issuance?
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MR. REHM:

No, not at all.

This was such an absolutely,

low-level, routine contact that I didn't

r

it

supervisory staff or the management staff or the execu
it was just one of those mundane daily things.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Has your test

prepared with the advice or under any cons rai

s

r

supervisor?
MR. REHM:

No, sir, not at all.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Did you coach o

advise

prior to the testimony before this legislativ
MR. REHM:

I

?

That's correc .

Prior to their appearance here, we did offer

them the opportunity because we are their at

r

to sit down

with us and review the process that they could
procedures.

Depa tmen

t

of Corporations and the Department of Savings and

MR. REHM:

sses

Commi tee?

assume you're talking

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

it

c

here,

It's the same sort of review process we provide

anyone who was having a deposition taken.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

What is the reason for talking with

your client agencies in state government before they would testi
before a legislative Committee?
MR. REHM:

To give them an idea of

he process.

to te 1 the

them an idea of the fact that they should be
truth, understand the questions.

As I

said,

give

's

procedure we provide for any of our clients who are

i

deposed.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Did you propose

t

that you
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thought the Committee might ask and did they discuss what their
answers would be?
MR. REHM:

We did propose the type of questions that we

thought the Committee might ask.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Did you ask them to give you their

answers?
MR. REHM:

They gave us sample answers to that, that's

correct.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Did you indicate that those answers

ought to be modified in some fashion?
MR. REHM:

Not at all.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

When you say we, who else, in

addition to yourself, was involved in that process?
MR. REHM:

There were other deputies from our office who

were involved in the defense of the State in the number of cases
that have been filed.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Is the reason for your consulting

with agency personnel prior to a legislative hearing that the
State is the subject of civil lawsuits growing out of the Lincoln
matter?
MR. REHM:

That's correct, the defendants.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

And what is your fear as an attorney

in their testimony, that somehow they will say things that will
jeopardize the State's position in the lawsuit?
MR. REHM:

Certainly there is that fear that they make a

conflicting statement simply because they haven't thought through
things, that they might be tempted not to be forthcoming, the
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usual kind of concerns that you have in preparing any witness in a
case that's going to trial.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Ms. Wright.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

That brings up ano

Did you go through the same process before

po nt.
red before

the Congressional hearing?
MR. REHM:

No, Ma'am.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
MR. REHM:

Why not.

I don't know that the lawsu t

against the State at that time.

been fil

I'm not ce tain about that, but I

don't recall that the lawsuit had been filed

inst

he State at

that time.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

Well, it jus

seems st

to me

that it would be the, say, Commissioner of Savings and Loan, the
Corporations, Ms. Bender, why these people who are

for

committees constantly in the State Legislature, shou
have to be rehearsed before they came befo
MR. REHM:

I don't think rehear

i

a

exactly the same sort of service we prov
Legislature if they asked us, simp

an

the process, experience some of the kinds of

t

prepared for their testimony.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

Only because it was to

iss

under oath, was that the reason?
MR. REHM:

No, the reason was because

the Stat

has been named in the lawsuit, they are defendants.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

What do you think r

t

now, if
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the Attorney General continues with this so-called investigation
that he's going to do on Lincoln Savings and Loan.

How is that

going to influence this case against the State?
MR. REHM:

I don't know that I follow your question.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

Well, you were concerned about

the case before the State in doing your, I call it rehearsal, you
have another term for it, which is fine and we're not going to
play on words, but for them to go through this process before they

•

appeared before the Committee, you were concerned because of the
case.

Now the Attorney General is going to do this great

investigation, both civil and criminal.

Well what bearing is that

going to have upon the case?
MR. REHM:

I

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

Should he not, he should not be

involved in this investigation.

Can't you hire someone or

contract with someone to do the investigation rather than do it
yourself?
MR. REHM:

You're asking me to tell my boss what to do,

is that correct?
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
advisor?

Advise him.
MR. REHM:

Yeah, that's right, aren't you an

[laughter]
I'm sure the office has thought through all

of the aspects of this and made the decision that they feel best.
I'm not in a position to make policy.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

I think the investigation is more

a political one than it is a one of whom is trying to get at the
facts.
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ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Mr. Chairman, if I

Yes, Mr. Lancas

r.

r

i

understand that anybody that has come before a Committee

r

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

You know

e

e

om

anything of this nature, that he should have

so I think that is a proper procedure as far as I am concerned
personally, but to go ahead and let them know at least our
procedures and what potentially could

n.

Bu

one of the

concerns that I have and I use that word

t

ia ly

i

is in

I have

we go, one of the concerns that I have,
all sincerity, your Department was obvious

made

the
I can tell,

fact that there was a potential problem, yet as far
that's as far as it went.

The

here

t of the mat e

s

any further and anything, investigation went to the Securities and
can te 1,

s far

Exchange Commission from the Department, bu

there was no effort to try to come up with some
would fit the need.

t

They just simply said the war

created a problem, and therefore my advice is not

se

t,

because you've lost some cases in the past from that same
language, I don't know, but still, as far as I can tell, there was
no effort made by anybody in the Attorney General's
lem

to come around with a solution to their

because the

Department was trying to come up with a

i

te

can't maybe, I just can't detect any if ther
MR. REHM:

ice to try

f

me
to

First of all, I did not

them was not to use it, to use the word

11

tential "

told them it was subject to challenge in court.

As

in, I
r as .
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ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

Let me respond this way, I can

understand what you're saying, I did not advise you not to do that
and if you do it, I'll defend you, but if I'm asking the attorney,
you know, I hire an attorney to tell me what the problem is with
something and you say, if you use the word "potential" you could
be subject to a very extreme lawsuit circumstance, I would
certainly listen to that advice.
MR. REHM:

That's correct.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

Okay, but the second step is,

once that was made aware of what happened within your Department
or any Department of the Attorney General's office, relating to
this, trying to come up with some language to help the Department,
obviously was aware there was a problem in trying to stop it.
MR. REHM:
language.

We weren't asked to come up with any

As I said before, all of our client agencies regulate

individuals and corporations who are in conflict with business and
tax laws.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

I see, so what you're saying, in

effect, is once you made them aware of the problem, that that was
it as far as you were concerned because you weren't asked to
proceed any further, is that what you're saying?

•

MR. REHM:

That's correct .

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

So the Attorney General's office

at that point was out of the picture?
MR. REHM:

That's correct.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
r your testimony.

Okay, thank you very much, Mr. Rehm,

We're pleased to have Senator

Hart join
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us today who is interested in these issues.

We appreciate the

Senate involvement as well in rectifying some

the p oblems of

the past with respect to the savings and loans.

I'

su e Senator

Hart probably represents some of the investors in those
You are most welcome to ask any questions, Se
have you here.

ner,

I'd like to invite Mr. Richard Newsom

Department of Savings and Loan, to come up.

Mr. Newsom was w th

us at our prior hearing and has submitted for the

ecord a

statement and some background material which is avai
Committee and I think there are some addit
not, Mr. Newsom.

We'll make those avai

ies, are there

l

le.

le to the

Let'

as

Mr.

Miller to swear you in.
MR. MILLER:

Mr. Newsom, you were pr sen

earlie

I

read the statement regarding your rights as a witness?
MR. RICHARD NEWSOM:

Yes.

MR. MILLER:

You understand that par

MR. NEWSOM:

Yes.

MR. MILLER:

Do you wish to testify voluntarily under

l

staterne

the conditions stated?
MR. NEWSOM:

Yes.

MR. MILLER:

Would you raise your right

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you're

ease.
to give

before the Committee will be the truth, the who e truth
nothing but the truth?
MR. NEWSOM:

I do.

MR. MILLER:

Okay, state your name

the reco

your current position.
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MR. NEWSOM:

My name is Richard Newsom.

I'm an Examiner

4 - Specialist with the California Department of Savings and Loan.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Mr. Newsom, you submitted a 22-page

written statement, and I don't want to constrain your ability to
tell this Committee what you feel is important.

We are

particularly looking at the issue that you raised in the last
hearing that we were not previously aware of, you brought to our
attention, and that is the process by which a cease and desist
order was requested and sought by the Department of Savings and
Loan, drafted by you, and ultimately modified before issuance and
the process involved in that approval.

Subsequent to that event

and your testimony, there were conflicting statements about the
process of issuance of the cease and desist order and who met with
whom and what was said to whom and what limitations, if any, were
placed on, or constraints, placed on your testimony, issues that
you raised in a memo to the Coromittee.

We are primarily

interested in covering the ground that you raised on the issuance
of the cease and desist order.

You've had an opportunity to hear

from Ms. Thayer and Mr. Rehm and we would welcome any response you
would have to their testimony.

With respect to the great detail

that you provide, some of which replicates your testimony both in
written form and orally that you gave before, I would just hope
that you would summarize it and know that it is included in the
record and we may ask questions based on it.
MR. NEWSOM:
possible.

I'll try to summarize it as much as

However, new contradictions have come up today and it

will be difficult to take a lot out without leaving more questions
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unanswered and you have a witness panel here who, I think, is in a
position with fresh memories and a once in a

ifet

rtunity

to corroborate or get to the bottom of this, so I

get into

more detail, I may be repetitive because some

the wit

have not heard the detail that it will be necessary
corroborate.

r them to
here in

I have - there are other conce ns

addition to the C&D to certain actions taken

sses

the State Attorney

General's office, as well as the officials of

tme

subsequent to my last testimony that I wou

i cus

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. NEWSOM:

Why don't you p

, then.

It is clear that addit

is

test

necessary because of disputes that have arisen

r

test

relating to the changes made to the cease and desi
eliminating an important clause that in my

also.

r

n on

very well

have directly or indirectly stopped subordinat

sales in

American Continental Corp. in December 198 .

s
1 or

emerging of deliberate attempts by state off
distort the truth, to tamper with Congress
discredit or intimidate witnesses or potent a
contrary to the public interest.

wi

s

As late as three weeks

Commissioner Crawford and Mr. Davis s

to

and public disclosures relative to the Li

t

action

matt

profound seems to have occurred since that t
position.

t

t

Something

to

A series of conflicting, inaccurate and

e that
believe

deliberately misleading press releases and statements have
put out by the California Attorney General's office and the
California Department of Savings and Loan to att

to

in

48

CJ0715

how the change occurred and cast doubt on the credibility of my
previous testimony.

Stories have changed within hours and then

flip-flopped again.

Explanations have been offered that are

inconsistent with multiple witnesses, documentation and standard
operating procedures of the California Department of Savings and
Loan.

The A.G. 's office, which has a serious conflict of interest

in any case drafted a self-serving, misleading press release with
officials of CDS, . . . my Department that attempted to minimize
the A.G. 's role in the mess, at the expense of my credibility,
only to be embarrassed within hours by contradictory admissions by
the A.G. 's office reported in newspapers.
did see the C&D and review it.

Specifically, that they

There now appears to be little

dispute that the A.G.'s office had and looked at the draft order,
and influenced the CDSL to weaken the order.

It is clear to me

that the A.G.'s office exhibited at least incredibly poor
judgment, escalated problems and acted improperly contrary to the
client's best interest.

And that was the California Department of

Savings and Loan and myself as an employee of that Department.
The result has been detrimental to the public interest and a slap
in the face to the subordinated debt holders who are the public
most affected by this disaster.

My previous testimony was very

clear in stating that I was advised indirectly by California
Department of Savings and Loan counsel in San Francisco of Ms.
Thayer's explanation to them regarding the cause of the change in
the cease and desist order.

During the testimony, I clearly

advised Assemblywoman Wright that it would be necessary for the
Committee to talk to others to find out directly their story on
49
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o

what happened.

Mr. Harvey and Ms. Sakamoto are the referenced San

Francisco counsel and hopefully are present to testif
the issue of credibility.

ess

I believe that I have been

t in a

vicious squeeze between public policy concerns warranting

ull

disclosure to the public versus tort liability conce ns and
political concerns which require no disclosure or outright
denials.

My belief is that when 20,000 plus citizens, including

many senior citizens, lose $250 million in a d saster
conditions that existed at Lincoln, public
override all others.

r the

concern should

i

I have no doubt in my mind tha

some of

these victims may end up eating pet food in what shou
their retirement years because of a combinat

have been

of unconscionable

greed and arrogance of the Lincoln/ACC empire and a total
breakdown of the political regulatory process that should have
protected the public.

State employees who try to

something to

protect the public should not be muzzled, smeared or int
when they provide a Congressional or Assemb

dated

tee

information that may be politically or bureaucratical
embarrassing.

In conducting the hearing today, I hope the

Committee understands that the committee's actions may be
scrutinized by other state employees who may wish to
about what they saw, heard and knew.

If these pot

out
tial witnesses

feel that they will face the humiliation, re aliat

la ion

o

for telling the truth to the Committee that I have felt, I

't

need to tell you that this will stifle your invest
information from public scrutiny that should be known.

The

taxpayers and subordinated debt holders have paid their dues and
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deserve to see all the cards face up and uncensored.

The collapse

of the Keating empire and other institutions that have
back-scratching arrangements with Lincoln-Ace is continuing to
create problems for our citizens beyond the obvious damage to the
taxpayers and the wipeout of subordinated debt holders, the shark
victims referred to earlier.

Last week, a sizable insurance

company, Pacific Standard located in Davis, California, only 20
miles from here, was taken over by state insurance regulators with
what was reported in the newspapers as a substantial deficit net
worth.

The National Thrift News, December 18th, 1989, stated

that, "The failure of Pacific Standard Life will result in the
single largest insurance company losses in the state's history,
regulators say."

Further, since California has no insurance

guarantee fund, those losses will be borne largely by the
company's unsecured creditors like Lincoln and its thl·usands of
policyholders.

Pacific Standard was referenced in the unsafe and

unsound Southmark concentration of credit repeatedly referenced in
Congressional testimony and which I included in our cease and
desist order.

I have attached copies of Southmark exhibits which

I've placed in the Congressional record.

Please note that Lincoln

exfended almost $50 million in loans on the security of Pacific
Standard top stock which presumably may now be worthless.
Subsequent to the Lincoln examination, I expressed concern about
Southmark's insurance activities to FHLB personnel, including Mr.
Barabalak, the FHLB examiner in charge of American Continental who
was equally concerned about Southmark and was a tremendous help in
having a regulatory meeting in San Francisco, California.

I
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gathered that Washington was less concerned about Southmark than
we were.

Healthy insurance subsidiaries s

inconsistent with

alluded holding company and a subsequent review of Pacific
Standard's financial statements by myself s
inter-company receivables and investments related to its bankrupt
parent.

At Lincoln, nearly everything was worse than it

looke~.

I drafted the attached warning letter which is Exhibit A-29/30,
dated August 16, 1989, which I drafted for Mr. Davis to the
Department of Insurance.

Receipt was subsequently acknowledged.

This is an example of why this Committee needs to encourage
witnesses to tell what they know about Lincoln.

The pieces of the

Lincoln puzzle and related back-scratching transactions need to be
brought into public view and it may take years to do so.

The

information about Southmark was made available to the

ic

because it was placed in my Congressional testimony on October
31st.

My testimony will focus on three main areas, all that

relate directly and indirectly to the cease and desist or
issues, the self-serving breakdown in professional respons

r, C&D
ility

by the A.G. 's office, tampering incidents involving Congressional
testimony.

Just to ensure that the witnesses who include several

attorneys from my Department are able to answer questions, I would
ask the Chairman at the appropriate time to ask the Senior CDSL
official present to authorize the attor

s to fully answer

questions without concern over attorney-client privilege.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

When we have the other witnesses

appear following you, we'll discuss whether or not there's any
limitation on their testimony.
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MR. NEWSOM:

Okay.

I'll go to drafting the order, that

seems to be the area of particular concern and how this carne
about.

My Congressional testimony, which I put in here as an

exhibit .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

That would be page 6, Mr. Newsom,

you're moving over to?
MR. NEWSOM:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

•

Okay, thank you, we appreciate the

way your going through this .
MR. NEWSOM:

My Congressional testimony, which is an

exhibit in this package, contains considerable information on the
preparation of the C&D and other efforts to stop subdebt sales.
The facts are that this order was drafted by me, starting
approximately November 8, 1988 at the delegated request of
Commissioner Crawford, with the staff legal support of both
Mr. Harvey and Ms. Sakamoto.

This was the day after Mr. Keating

advised state and federal regulators that a takeover of Lincoln
would cost FSLIC $2 billion.

The shark victims were the

subordinated debt holders - had little chance in those waters.
The strategy of the order was that, l) violation of a cease and
desist order would provide legal grounds for conservatorship which

•

we didn't have under existing law .

2) ordering Lincoln-Ace to

cease and desist for making unsafe and unsound loans, engaging in
conflict of interest transactions, and making misleading or
inaccurate public disclosures would likely stop the subdebt sales
indirectly because accurate disclosures are fundamental of
securities laws.

Further, because of Lincoln's pattern of doing
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business, reviewing new loans made after the order would likely
find violations that would quickly reveal grounds for a
conservatorship.

Violation of an order was grounds for

conservatorship.

3) A cease and desist order would help paint the

Federal Home Loan Bank ORA in Washington into a corner.

They hc>.d

the power to stop subdebt sales and we hoped the C&D would
pressure them to do so.

I kept the FHLB holding company examiners

informed of our intentions, including the section dealing with
misleading disclosures as they were allies in attempting to get
ORA in Washington to stop subdebt sales.
here also attached to that effect.

There's an Exhibit in

I also felt that such an order

would put pressure on the SEC and the Department of Corporations.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. NEWSOM:

Mr. Newsom, ORA stands for?

Office of Regulatory Affairs, I believe,

that's the arm under Danny Wall in Washington.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

But prior to the reorganization

under FIRREA, it would be under the Federal Horne Loan Bank Board,
is that right?
MR. NEWSOM:

ORA was then . . . I am not sure.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
Supervision, right?
MR. NEWSOM:

OTS?
FHLB preceded OTS and ORA was . • .

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. NEWSOM:
the essence.

Now we have the Office of Thrift

Anyway, it's the federalies, okay.

Yes. Yes.

Mr. Wall's boys.

Speed was of

Subordinated debt was being sold at the rate of

$700,000 per day and it was obviously worthless.

I have referred
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to pages 848-856 which tells you what we knew in October of 1988
about how bad this place was.

The supervising examiner for the

jou, Mr. Mare, was working at a different speed than Mr. Stelzer,
who is the examiner in charge of Lincoln, and myself, and I
believed it might be months before an examination report went out,
if at all.

And I believed unless I fought it through the system,

no enforcement action would occur at all.

At the outset of the

examination, I was advised that Mr. Mare was relieved of his
duties as supervising examiner of Lincoln for the apparent reason
that several previous Lincoln examination reports had, in fact,
never left his desk or been mailed to the association.

I would

emphasize this is indirect information, everybody out there, so.
He was inexplicably reappointed during examination which created
problems for both myself and Mr. Stelzer in conducting the
examination and in getting a cease and desist order processed.
have references of this documentation here also.

I

Both Mr. Stelzer

and myself took exception with the management about Mr. Mare's
resumption of supervising examiner duties on several occasions.
As detailed in my Congressional testimony, the transactions
supporting the cease and desist order were so appalling that I
felt even an unsophisticated judge would understand Lincoln-ACe

I

was out of control.

Further, if Lincoln thought to challenge the

order, the challenge would likely be in court, open to the public
view.

This and the fact that appallingly unsafe and unsound and

self-dealing transactions would become public would create a
no-lose situation for the public in terms of disclosure, even if
we lost in court to an army of ACC attorneys.
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I'd like to add one

note here that we did discuss the possibility at the time that the
court might be sealed.

The problem is American Continental

couldn't know before they challenged it whether it would be or not
which gave them an additional problem to deal with in terms of our
actions.

The orders themselves appear

so innocuous that I

believed that it would sway a judge in our favor.

My rationale

was that no reasonable judge would block an order that merely told
a publicly traded company to stop including inaccurate and
misleading information in public reports.

Even their own

securities law firm admitted in writing to a $10 million
disclosure error to us.

The Exhibit is attached to that effect.

And there were numerous other documented errors on which
documentation had already been reviewed and

oved by the

Department of Savings and Loan management at the time.

While

state C&D's are supposedly confidential, I saw it discussed along
with the federal directive issued approx

tely the same time in a

newspaper article about ACC in approximately December 1988 or
January 1989.
MR. NEWSOM:

U.S. Representative Na

Pelosi read a

similar L.A. Times article addressing particularly the federal
directive into the record of the House Banking Committee in
approximately January of 1989.
information at that time.

Now there's a lot of public

An important objective of the order was

to stop, if possible, the sale of subdebt by addressing some
disclosure errors in the order.

The relevant excerpt of the

findings which could be described as what they did wrong in the
draft order is as follows:

"Furthermore, public disclosure
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statements lacked complete, accurate disclosures regarding the
above-referenced Ponchartrain transaction which, in addition to
being potential securities law violations, may result in liability
to ACC and thereby may adversely affect the safety and soundness
of Lincoln.

Material omissions and/or inaccuracies in these

reports include:

l) Failure to disclose that the Ponchartrain

Hotel was heavily encumbered by a $35 million mortgage with
another lender.

2) Failure to disclose a $5 million guarantee by

ACC of the $35 million first mortgage held by another lender on
Ponchatrane

Hotel.

An additional $9 million secured guarantee

was later provided by ACC in 1988.

3) Failure to disclose the

below market interest rate, the preferential terms and the unsafe
and unsound risk characteristics of the above-referenced
Ponchartrain loan.

I should note that that's the section dealing

with those characteristics survived in the order.

There's a

footnote that relates to where we found these errors in
disclosure.

There's a proxy material dated April 8, 1988, a lO(k)

report dated December 31, 1987, and

offe~ing

circulars for $300

million in subordinated debt filed with the SEC on April 14, 1988.
4) Investors and potential investors were advised in one report,
footnote number four, that the management believes the terms of
the transaction set forth in the preceding paragraphs were as
favorable to the company as those which could be obtained in
similar transactions with unaffiliated parties.
misleading given the facts of the transaction.

This statement is
One thing that

should be noted is American Continental in its securities public
offerings had the practice of incorporating by reference many,
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many other documents so that the problem they had was once they
incorporated a lie into it, it was spread throughout the system
like the computer virus.

5) Due to an error descri

as

typographical by American Continental's counsel, ACC's proxy
statement dated April 8,

1988~

that ACC and

erroneously disc

a subsidiary advanced a total of $6 million to a 1

t

partnership in which officers and directors had an interest when
in fact the total amount was $16 million under the $20 million
line of credit hereinbefore referenced.

These findi

specific and linked to multiple documentary support.

s are very
Further, the

serious conflict of interest findings on the same transaction, the
Ponchartrain transaction, survived legal review and were included
in the final order.

This added to my surprise regarding the

reason for the change in the order.

In essence, if it is accepted

that the evidence shows that you can prove that insiders
misappropriated $20 million contrary to federal regulations in an
unsafe and unsound transaction, proving disclosure problems given
all the evidence doesn't seem that difficult.

Please note that

the underscored section in the written testimony relative to
"potential securities law violations" was really superfluous to
the order and could have been taken out without effect and not
altering the rest of that section.

The relevant excerpt from the

order part of the C&D, what they are supposed to stop doing,
follows:

4) Permitting erroneous, incomplete, misleading or

inaccurate information of any kind to be included in public
reports, including Form lO(k), offering circulars, proxy materials
or any other public information.

This order includes, but is not
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limited to, material omissions regarding related or affiliated
parties.

Please note that there is no reference to securities

laws in this section.

Therefore, the findings, what they did

wrong, supported the order, what they are supposed to stop doing
without regard to securities laws.

This had been repeatedly

expressed to Ms. Thayer by Mr. Harvey, Ms. Sakamoto and myself
prior to the draft order going to the A.G. and Ms. Thayer did not
seem to like this section.

The strategies of the order were all

known to myself, Mr. Harvey, Ms. Sakamoto, and communicated to
CDSL's management in L.A. at the time.

While we did not bring

this up at the time, Mr. Keating was already a one-time loser with
a previous SEC problem that might have made him particularly
sus8eptible to pressure related to disclosure problems.
Congressional testimony has suggested that Mr. Keating was
particularly concerned about staying out of jail.

In drafting the

order, I used transactions that I personally reviewed myself
involving the Hotel Ponchartrain, R.A. Holmes, and Southmark
Corporation.

I knew we had the documentation on these

transactions and, in fact, had through Mr. Stelzer, junior
examiners Xerox whole files related to these transactions and
index every page, a mammoth task done in anticipation of an
anticipated court challenge.
this in more detail.

My Congressional testimony addresses

I had advised Mr. Stelzer on my fifth day

assigned to Lincoln that enforcement action was necessary based on
the Hotel Ponchartrain transaction alone and he had concurred.
After drafting the order and discussing disputes with L.A. staff
over documentation, I spent a whole day with Los Angeles
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management.

At roughly the beginning of December, and that

included Ms. Thayer going through the order, which I had footnoted
with over 100 footnotes linked to supporting documentation, which
I produced to the group as requested.

That included Ms. Thayer,

Mr. Sumimoto of Los Angeles, Mr. Travis of Los Angeles, Mr. Shames
of Los Angeles, Mr. Stelzer who is here, Mr. Mare of Los Angeles
who left early for an emergency, and Mr. Davis who came in and out
of the meeting.

The footnoted draft C&D was included as an

exhibit to Congressional testimony and included approximately 25
footnoted pieces of documentation dealing with the disclosure
problems alone.
A-83.

These are referenced as exhibits A-69 through

The level of review at this meeting was extremely detailed.

I was amazed that Mr. Mare wished to delete the whole finding
relative to the $10 million disclosure problem because it was
alleged to be a typographical error by American Continental's
attorneys.

The attendees represented the whole Los Angeles chain

of command at the time and the whole purpose of the meeting was to
satisfy management that we had the documentation to support the
order and move forward.

My impression was that was satisfied, and

we made minor changes to satisfy the group.

An E-Mail from Ms.

Thayer, refer to page A-84, to Ms. Sakamoto followed the meeting
which somewhat confirms that, as an exhibit.
was indexed in several files and filled a box.

The documentation
Every page and

every file was actually numbered by hand to totally organize the
files and facilitate the review.

I sent a follow-up memorandum to

Los Angeles taking exception to suggested minor changes that
seemed to intentionally favor American Continental Corp., which is
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an exhibit also.

The issue of adequacy of documentation was

satisfied by CDSL management before it went to the A.G., which is
the normal procedure.

It is obvious from contemporaneous

memorandums, referenced here as exhibits, that the intent all
along was to take this draft to the A.G. for review which is the
normal procedure on issuing C&D's that may result in litigation
when time permits.

That was particularly true in this case

because of the litigious nature of ACC.

•

My written and oral

statements to Congress, plus exhibits to that testimony,
specifically addressing disclosure problems, clearly indicates my
strategy from the beginning of using disclosure problems by ACC as
a means to put pressure on Lincoln-ACC as well as the Federal Home
Loan Bank in Washington, Securities and Exchange Commission, and
the Department of Corporations, to whom they were also provided.
This was a very explicit letter to Mr. Kietty, that addressed in
considerable detail all these errors and omissions in disclosure,
and it's here as an exhibit.

It should be particularly emphasized

that the ''SEC securities law" violations issue seems to be raised
as the joint Thayer/Rhem basis for removing the entire disclosure
section as a smoke screen and was argued internally before the
draft order even went to the A.G.

•

Please draw your own conclusion

as to whether the deletion of the whole disclosure section was
justified by "SEC securities law" red herring.

With the written

admission by ACC's own attorney of a $10 million error in
disclosures on the Ponchatrane transaction proving that there was
an error in disclosure, at least, appeared to be a slam-dunk.
hope the

Co~~ittee

I

understands that this was a fatal flaw in the
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SEC regulation violations arguments.

My impression through much

of the C&D preparation process was that Mr. Mare and others were
reluctant to issue an order and wished to water the order down as
much as possible.

I recall one heated conference call with Mr.

Harvey and myself in San Francisco, Mr. Crawford, Mr. Mare, Mr.
Shames and perhaps others in L.A., before I went on vacation.

Mr.

Mare and others argued to weaken the order and we prevailed in
convincing Mr. Crawford that the order should be issued including
the section on disclosure.

There had been later instances of

difference of opinion with Ms. Thayer seeming to unreasonably
favor ACC-Lincoln, I have indexed exhibits on that.

There are

other instances of Mr. Mare's seeming to unreasonably oppose the
whole C&D process, I've indexed exhibits on that.

I have also

become aware that other Thayer legal interpretations unusually
favorable to industry have caused CDSL off c als consternation,
including one related to 1

tations on junk bonds at a large

institution specializing in junk bonds.

I would request that you

ask Mr. Harvey and Ms. Sakamoto about this, and other telephone
calls they had with L.A. personnel where they learned of the
proposed change and the final change in the C&D.

As noted,

documentation indicated that prior to when the order went to the
A.G. it was blessed by CDSL management and will be issued as per
the memorandum from Harvey Shames, Assistant Chief Examiner in
San Francisco supervising Lincoln, which stated, "The final L.A.
version was delivered to the A.G. yesterday", and "I expect if the
A.G. passes on this, we will issue it next week."

This was the

exhibit provided to the Committee on November 29, 1989.
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This

would also be the normal procedure at CDSL.

The events and other

facts addressed in this testimony have lead me to the conclusion
that I was the victim of a deliberate campaign by the Attorney
General's office to mislead and distort the truth at my expense,
countenanced by Mr. Crawford and Mr. Davis at the California
Department of Savings and Loan, who so far have been unwilling to
issue correcting news releases in spite of admissions by A.G.
personnel, referenced in newspapers, that the A.G. 's earlier

•

statements about my testimony were in error.
some agency involvement with that

It appears there is

business transportation.

It is

clear to me that there has been a breakdown in the professional
responsibility and ethics by the Attorney General's office due to
the conflicting involvement of the A.G. 's office in the Lincoln
matter involving their own interests.

The A.G. 's actions may have

adverse affects on serious state and federal litigation in which I
have been, am now, or will be called as a state or federal
witness.

Neither the A.G.'s office or the California Department

of Savings and Loan has shown any inclination to correct erroneous
news releases.

Prior to this incident, I was highly regarded by

state and federal regulators with an outstanding track record that
included involvement in some of the most difficult examinations
and enforcement actions in California.

I invite you to ask

Mr. Mori to confirm that as the Assistant Commissioner in charge
of San Francisco.

To facilitate the Committee's review of this

matter, I am providing the following testimony.

On November 27,

1989, approximately 9:00a.m., I initiated a squawk box telephone
conference call to our Los Angeles office.

Mr. H. R. Harvey, S.F.
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staff counsel and Ms. Sakamoto, S.F. staff counsel, were present
in San Francisco with Commissioner Crawford and his assistant,
William Davis from L.A. present in L.A.

I believe Mr. Wright of

the L.A. legal department also attended in L.A.
opinion that I thought it was i

r

I stated my

riate to use the A.G. 's

office for my proposed briefing on Tuesday by the A.G. 's office in
L.A. relative to my pending testimony.

I am disturbed that

Mr. Crawford and Ms. Bender had spent extensive time with multiple
A.G.'s in preparation for testimony.

I stat

my reason to be

that there was a conflict of interest with the A.G. 's office
representing us.

I advised that it would pr

ly come out in

testimony in words to the effect that the cease and desist order
had been weakened at the A.G. 's suggestion based on concerns
reportedly expressed by the Deputy A.G., Mr. Rehm, about his
expertise to handle litigation that might involve complicated
securities issues.

This informat

had been provided to me

indirectly by Ms. Sakamoto and Mr. Harvey, who had recollection of
December 1988 events.

Ms. Sakamoto had rais

specific

recollection of December 1988 conversations with Ms. Thayer.

I

would invite you to confirm today with these people to get rid cf
any credibility concern here.

I stat

that because the weakening

of the order may have resulted in large losses to subsequent
purchasers of subdebt, there was potential conflict of interest
involving the CDS versus the A.G. 's responsibility for the change.
That seems to have understated what has happened.

Mr. Crawford

rejected my suggestion because the A.G.'s office frequently has
similar conflicts to deal

th.

It should be understood that I
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was extremely sensitive about the possibility of tampering with
testimony.

I had then indicated that I did not want to go to L.A.

in any case because my testimony was already well known from the
Congressional record.

Mr. Davis agreed.

Immediately upon hanging

up, I called Deputy Attorney General C.H. Rehm in Los Angeles with
Mr. Harvey and Ms. Sakamoto remaining present.

I advised him with

words to the effect that the modification of the Lincoln C&D, at
his suggestion, based on his lack of specialized securities
expertise, might come up in testimony on Wednesday.
indicated that he didn't recall it.
have some recollection of it.

Initially he

Later he indicated he did

I don't recall the specific words,

but I was certain that he had confirmed the foregoing statement,
re: securities expertise.

I advised him also that I could not see

the purpose of traveling to L.A. which he agreed.

As we left it,

if the A.G.'s office had any questions, they would call me the
following day.

Mr. Rehm asked me at the end of the conversation

if I had any thoughts or suggestions for the Corporations people
which I took to mean to refer to Department of Corporations
personnel testifying on Wednesday and I advised him, yes, pray.
When we hung up, Mr. Harvey, Ms. Sakamoto and myself discussed his
response and they also indicated they felt he generally had
confirmed seeing the C&D and modifying the C&D because of his lack
of securities expertise issue.

That was my last direct contact to

date with Mr. Rehm relative to this matter.
too

Actually the first,

On Wednesday morning, I delivered with Ms. Sakamoto present,

copies of my testimony to your Committee and one copy of the
Harvey Shames memo with the attached draft of the C&D which is
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attached here again to Mr. Suchil.

On Wednesday I made it very

clear in my oral testimony that I was testi

ing to having been

informed by San Francisco counsel relative to Ms. Thayer's
comments relative to the A.G. 's role in influencing the Department
to weaken the order.

The counsel were in fact Ms. Sakamoto and

Mr. Harvey, both of whom had confirmed their own recollections of
the December 1988 events, re: the change to the C&D.

Shortly

after the hearing, Ms. Thayer advi

me that I

sstated what

she had said.

to what Ms. Sakamoto and Mr.

I said no, I testifi

Harvey had recounted to me in Dec
recalled.

r 1988 and which they still

I didn't say you had told me that directly, as a

matter of fact, we confirmed it with C.H. Rehm Monday.
recall her responding and I left.
that.

Ms.

I don't

to was present for

On Thursday morning, I read quotes in the San Francisco

Chronicle attributed to Attorney General Van
Was Wrong" or words to that effect.

Kamp that "Newsom

I have seen even more

appalling quotes attributed to Mr. Duane Peterson, Mr. Van de
Kamp's press secretary, that Newsom "either
talking about or is a liar."

sn't

As I recall, the r

now what he's
r of thes2

stories would be led to believe that no draft order or
documentation had ever been provided to the Attorney General's
office, nor would it have been the normal

ocedure to do so.

Mr.

Davis advised me on Thursday morning that Thayer was claiming that
I perjured myself on Wednesday morning during the hearing.

Davis

agreed that I had not and indicated that he remembered I very
clearly advised the Committee that I received my information
indirectly which is confirmed by the Committee's own transcript.
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At 11:15 on Thursday morning, a statement was purported to have
been read to Channel 2 and Channel 7 by Thayer which stated, in
part, "Mr. Richard Newsom at the hearing yesterday before the
Finance and Insurance Committee read a statement in which he
indicated that he was informed indirectly through myself that the
Deputy Attorney General felt that he lacked securities law
expertise to effectively deal with any court challenge by ACC of
the Department's order.

Mr. Newsom only repeated what he was

told, but what he was told was not accurate.

It should be noted

that Mr. Davis advised myself, Mr. Harvey and Ms. Sakamoto of this
and provided us a copy of this on December 13, almost two weeks
later.

This statement is far less misleading than the earlier

A.G. 's news release or the CDSL news release drafted by the A.G.
and CDSL management issued four hours later, but still contains
inaccuracies.

Heated discussions occurred all day on Thursday,

November 30, in which myself, Ms. Sakamoto and Mr. Harvey were
generally involved in conversations with Mr. Crawford, Mr. Davis
and Ms. Thayer in the L.A. office.

At one of these, Ms. Thayer

related to us the substance of Thayer's, November 29, 1989,
conversation with C.H. Rehm wherein Thayer related several reasons
why the order was changed.

Thayer related to myself, Mr. Harvey,

Ms. Sakamoto in San Francisco and Mr. Crawford and Mr. Davis in
L.A. that she had spoken with C.H. Rehm and what our understanding
was on November 29 and he had told her that he recalled his
concerns at the time he reviewed the C&D order as follows:

1) The

SL's lack of jurisdiction authority to issue orders based on
securities law;

2) The C&D only alleged potential violations of
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security laws and specific violations should be alleged; 3) His
personal lack of background in securities law, and 4) The SL
lacked sufficient factual basis or documentation for the orders.
I was surprised because we were back again to the initial premise
that the lack of specific securities expert se

the assigned

A.G. was at least an admitted factor in modifying the order which
seemed contrary to the Thayer statement read to television at
virtually the same time.

I believe Mr. Har

and Ms. Sakamoto

were also surprised from their comments and Ms. Sakamoto kept
notes, made notes, of the meeting, of the comments.
Mr. Rehm and everybody else to testi

Please ask

about this conversation.

don't want to have any more credibility problem here.

I

On December

13, 1989, two weeks later, Mr. Davis made myself, Ms. Sakamoto and
Mr. Harvey aware of the short statement that was read by Thayer
noted above.

Mr. Davis indicated also that they had Thayer call

all the people she called
statements.

on Wednes

afternoon to correct her

At about 2:00 p.m. Thursday, November 30, Mr. Davis

advised me that a news release was being drafted by the Attorney
General's office for the CDSL.

As r

to me

the draft included

a section that indicated no documentation was provided to the
A.G.'s office which Mr. Davis indicated was being taken out at the
Department's request.

I assume that clause had been inserted by

the A.G. 's office to be consistent with alleged denials in
newspapers by the A.G. 's office that they even saw the order at
that time.

It is a very serious indicator that "someone" included

an affirmative denial that documents never went to the A.G. when
there was evidence to the contrary which also showed it was the
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intent to do so.

I put Mr. Davis on hold, gathered Ms. Sakamoto

and Mr. Harvey on a conference call, briefed them and continued
the conversation.

On December 5, 1989, with Mr. Crawford, Mr.

Davis, Ms. Thayer, Sumimoto and lawyer present in L.A., Shirley
Thayer confirmed that the press release was drafted by the
office, with editing by Shirley Thayer.

A.G. 's

Mr. Mori and then Ms.

Sakamoto were present in San Francisco in addition to myself for
this.

I objected to the fact that the press release was carefully

crafted to avoid mentioning all corroborating evidence, including
the corroborating memo and draft C&D which was the exhibit
provided to your Committee on Wednesday that clearly indicated
that a copy of the order was at the A.G. 's for review.

I stated

that the press release also failed to emphasize that I had, in
fact, accurately testified to indirect sources of information.
The press release also failed to mention our Monday morning
confirmation with C.H. Rehm, noted previously, and the lack of
return phone calls from the A.G. 's office.

The release referenced

only ''a call" to the A.G. 's office and emphasized alleged
inaccuracies in my statement.

I advised that my testimony clearly

stated that I was advised indirectly and that Mr. Harvey and Ms.
Sakamoto had specific recollection of what they heard and related

I

to me.

Thus, my testimony was not inaccurate.

Mr. Davis did not

dispute any of this, but said nobody in L.A. could remember taking
the C&D to the A.G. 's office.

These alleged inaccuracies are, in

fact, not inaccuracies in my testimony, but appear to be
subsequently disputed recollections between Ms. Thayer, Mr. Rehm
Ms. Sakamoto and Mr. Harvey.

Subsequent events have revealed
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inaccuracies in the recollection of Ms. Thayer and Mr. Rehm.
These disputes did not affect the accuracy of my specific
testimony.

As indicated earlier, in my opinion, the press release

was carefully and artfully crafted by the A.G. 's office to give
the misleading impression in conjunction with the A.G.'s denials
quoted in the newspapers that I was a "know nothing liar."

In

reviewing both releases, I believe that the insertion of federal
SEC regulations in both press releases, page A-1 and A-3 of these
exhibits, which appears no where in either the draft order or the
final order, was a red herring possibly included to divert
attention from the fact that in December 1988 a Department of
State government had provided to a deputy attorney general a
document alleging unsafe and unsound actions, conflict of
interest, disclosure problems, as well as potential security law
violations, that presumably might involve referral of the matter
internally in the Attorney General's office to law enforcement
officials, notwithstanding any separate C&D action taken by the
CDSL.

Since Department of Corporations personnel had already been

advised of these specific disclosure concerns in November 1988, it
added to the Attorney General's problem with the conflict of
interest as the A.G. is defending the Department of Corporations
against the subordinated debt shark victims.

The implications of

this are rather negative as the Attorney General's office joined
the Department of Corporations, the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Federal Home Loan Bank as agencies to which we
sent specific information on disclosure problems while subdebt was
still being sold.

On December 1, 1989, the L.A. Daily News and on
70

000737

December 2, 1989, the San Jose Mercury News and the San Francisco
Chronicle published alleged recanting statements by A.G.
officials, the location of a memorandum from Mr. Rehm to
Ms. Thayer, that documented Mr. Rehm's review of the draft order
which he earlier denied seeing it in other information.
out of newspapers.

This was

On December 4, 1989, Mr. Davis confirmed to

Mr. Harvey, Ms. Sakamoto, Mr. Mori and myself his October 27,
1989, statement to me on the telephone relative to his telling
Janice Brown at agency that tampering with testimony was not okay
because of the sensitivity of the matter.
pre-Congressional hearing testimony.
my testimony ''toned down."

This relates to

He added that agency wanted

Mr. Harvey described the brief reign

of terror that occurred when I resisted the tampering attempt.

On

December 5, 1989, a series of events occurred which triggered
submission of the December 5th clarifying testimony to the
Committee.

In essence, the cumulative effect of the tampering

incident and the events of the last few days led me to believe
that a progressive attempt was being made to cover up government
actions.

The events include, but are not limited to,

1) Mr. Crawford and Davis had earlier approved a press release on
November 30, 1989, that mischaracterized my testimony and falsely
claimed inaccuracies in my testimony, and questioned my
credibility in sworn testimony, even when these facts were brought
to the attention of Mr. Davis.

We were led to believe in

San Francisco by Mr. Davis that we would get to review the draft
before it went out.

Contrarily, when we received a copy in

San Francisco, I called back and found Davis and Crawford had left
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for the day and the press release was processed.

I was unaware of

any action taken by Davis and Crawford to stop the dissemination
of misleading and self-serving information by the A.G. 's office.
3) The press release proposed by Crawford and Davis on the 5th,
included nothing that would correct the earlier press releases'
adverse reflection on my credibility, even after newspapers broke
correcting stories.
the morning said,

4) Mr. Crawford on December 5th about 9:30 in
"Don't send it," i.e., the additional testimony

to the Committee after I faxed him a draft.

I was shocked because

that was the first time Mr. Crawford ever obstructed by testimony.
Mr. Mori and Ms. Sakamoto found it equally surprising in their
comments at the time.

I later that day became aware that Davis

and Crawford contacted Mr. Suchil, which I took to mean they were
trying to short-stop my testimony going to the Committee.

On

December 13, Mr. Davis advised me, Mr. Harvey and Ms. Sakamoto
that they did call Mr. Suchil and yourself, the Chairman of this
Committee, and requested that information going to the Committee
should be "channeled or funneled, through Crawford or Davis so
they could see it."

Mr. Davis indicated he did not know that

Crawford had told me not to send it, and I assume the Committee
was not told that fact.

But in

t

I had sent a draft to

Crawford that morning just for that purpose on my own volition.
Davis also indicated that he had also spoken to Chairman Johnston
who, and I emphasize, this is second-hand information, that that
was a reasonable request.

I assume something was lost in relating

it to us as I can't believe .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

The first-hand information is I
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didn't speak with Mr. Davis.
MR. NEWSOM:

Okay.

I assume there was something lost in

relating it which is the next sentence because I couldn't believe
that the Committee would do that.

I asked Mr. Davis words to the

effect, "Why did you go behind my back to the Committee when I
already volunteered and faxed a draft to Crawford.
me direct and discuss it.

Why not call

Until that day when these facts

occurred, I'd never given you any reason to believe I would go
behind your back.''

Mr. Davis advised us that if he knew the facts

as I saw them, knowing that Mr. Crawford had said not to send it,
he probably would have made the same assumption, a cover-up, as I
had, although he said Mr. Crawford would never cover up anything
to his knowledge.

I stated that evidence for the last two weeks

has been to the contrary.

It should be particularly emphasized

that requiring sensitive information going to an Assembly
Committee to be "funneled" through Mr. Crawford and Mr. Davis is
inconsistent with regulations established by Mr. Crawford for the
savings and loan industry which guarantee confidential access by
savings and loan staff to the Department of Savings and Loan or
the institutions outside directors.
regulation as an exhibit.

There is a copy of the

I believe this is another indicator of

an attitude change in the last three weeks.

6) Mr. Crawford's

draft memo, which is attached here, if approved, would have
rescricted access to the Committee, contrary to Government Code
Section 19251, which I have also attached, and been in essence a
gag order.

I understand that Laura, Commissioner Crawford's

secretary, advised northern California CDSL personnel, that the
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decision not to finalize the gag order, came from Mr. Geoshegan's
office or staff on December 5th, 1989, which seems strange.

In a

meeting on the 13th, Mr. Davis declined to identify who made the
decision to not finalize the order to Ms. Sakamoto, Mr. Harvey and
myself.

He also confirmed that he had ordered 25 L.A. staff

members to write down their recollections of everything they knew
about the C&D.

Mr. Harvey advised him that under the tense

circumstances, Harvey referenced a reign of terror that might be
viewed as intimidation, i.e., pinning down people to stories that
they might be discouraged from changing, if their recollections
improved or if they wished to amend.

Mr. Davis stated he hadn't

thought of that, which seems strange to me, since I understood
Mr. Stelzer had protested that it was intimidation when he was one
of the people asked to write the letter.

At this meeting with

Mr. Davis, Mr. Harvey also discussed a conversation he had with
Mr. Stelzer which I understood addressed the intimidation felt by
Mr. Stelzer, tampering with Congressional testimony.

Mr. Stelzer

told me on October 25, 1989, that he had been told that his
pending Congressional testimony could not have supporting
exhibits, which he planned to insert.

Since the exhibits

supporting my testimony were so numerous and so critical to both
the credibility and the documentary support of my testimony, I
included a "poison pill clause" in my testimony which I believe
would discourage attempts to remove exhibits from, or otherwise
make other than typographical changes, to my testimony.

This

clause stated, "A draft of this testimony has been provided to
senior
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MR. NEWSOM:

CDSL officials and I understand to the

State Attorney General's office, as well as our parent agency in
Sacramento, however, I have requested by inclusion in this letter,
that any material changes or requested changes, other than
typographical or clerical, must include the name and initials of
the requester along with any reasons to avoid tampering with
testimony.

It should be emphasized that rumors of tampering with

testimony were widespread because of the whistle blower nature of
the witness panel and Chairman Gonzales of the House Banking
Committee had made it very clear in newspaper quotes that he would
not tolerate tampering with testimony.

I also understood that

changes have been made to Commissioner Crawford's earlier
testimony at the request or suggestion of agency.

I would

emphasize this is indirect information and I invite you to confirm
it directly with Mr. Crawford.

I have no direct knowledge as to

whether there were changes or, if so, that

~hey

were substantive.

On October 26, 1989, the tampering incident described in my
testimony occurred involving a bitter argument with Ms. Thayer who
told me I would not be permitted to include exhibits with my
testimony.

At this time I had not yet faxed my testimony to L.A.,

but I believe I may have warned Mr. Mori that I was including the
''poison

pill~

clause because of Mr. Stelzer's warning to me.

Now,

again, I would like to emphasize this was before I sent the
testimony down there, we had the argument.

I told Thayer that the

exhibits were critical to my testimony and absolutely essential.
She told me that she would decide if exhibits were to be permitted
and ordered a copy of the exhibits and a draft of the testimony to
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be sent to L.A. for her review and also the review of agency,
which I took to mean editing, "toning down" as Mr. Davis described
on December 13th, 1989.

Ms. Sakamoto was present in San Francisco

and on the squawk box and argued against the tampering attempt.

I

advised Thayer that do you understand that what you're going
constitutes tampering with Congressional testimony.

It is me

personally subpoenaed, not the Department, and the testimony will
be mine.
testimony.

Gonzales has made it clear - no tampering with
If anybody makes changes, I will advise Chairman

Gonzales of the changes and who changed it.

She argued, but I do

not recall her citing a legal defense for her position.

Now, as a

little background information, Commissioner Crawford had testified
the week earlier and he had exhibits to his testimony, so we were
somewhat at a loss why the confusion as far as mine.

I advised

that the testimony described such bizarre events that I felt that
the credibility of the testimony was totally

ndent on placing

the hundreds of pages of contemporaneous exhibits in the
Congressional record for public scrutiny.

I later faxed the

testimony to L.A. with the "poison pill" clause described in
exhibit 20, which I understood caused considerable consternation
with CDSL management and with age

I have specific

recollection of discussing with Ms. Sakamoto before the issue of
leaving this in or taking it out and the timing is very clear in
my mind that L.A. did not have the document in their hands when we
had the fight.

I believe Ms. Sakamoto had arguments or

discussions defending my position with CDSL personnel in L.A.
relative to altering the text, including deleting opinions and
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conclusions, however, you would need to discuss that with her as
it is indirect.

Mr. Davis and Mr. Crawford supported me the

following day, however, if I had caved in, it would have been too
late on Friday to revise the testimony which was very lengthy.
Mr. Davis advised me by telephone on October 27th that he had
called Janice Brown at agency and advised them that the matter was
too sensitive and that no tampering would be permitted.

He was

extraordinarily traumatic having to challenge Ms. Thayer, who I
believed to be operating with agency instructions, that neither
she nor anyone else could take out exhibits or make substantive
changes.

As I mentioned to federal examiners in Washington, I

thought a royal dog house would be prepared for me in Sacramento.
Mr. Stelzer was eventually permitted to include his exhibits to
his testimony after I

took my stand.

After returning from

Washington, D.C., I became aware of an unusual letter to the
Commissioner from Corporations, Commissioner Bender dated
November 2nd, 1988, inquiring as to what proof my Department might
have that the subdebt sales were a scam as I described in my
Congressional testimony on October 31.

I was amazed.

Seeing this

letter at this point in time led me to believe that Corporations'
approach was to totally deny history.

•

The date stamps into the

rtment of Corporations were also suspicious, as were
mismatched exhibits attached to the letter.

I

felt that the

tampering attempt with Congressional testimony comments by agency
was linked somehow with Corporations' approach to denying the
obvious, and I decided that if they tried to tamper with our
testimony at CDSL, they almost certainly would try at
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Corporations.

I prepared a memorandum briefly summarizing the

event, and I eventually requested to Mr. Harvey to send it to the
FBI, because I told Congress I did not intend to be part of the
cover-up.

"Given a

Following is an excerpt from that memorandum.

subsequent letter from Corporations Commissioner Bender dated
November 2, 1989, whom my testimony seems to have put in an
awkward position, I am requesting a discreet, if possible,
investigation by you to determine whether the actions of Thayer,
Janice Brown and perhaps others, potentially violated state or
federal laws or regulations."

It was my opinion that this was a

serious tampering attempt and that the text and all the exhibits
would have gutted without my personal and harsh stand.

State

employees should not have to fight so hard just to tell the truth.
As an attached exhibit, there was a contemporaneous E-Mail sent
down the afternoon of the tampering incident to Ms. Thayer which
essentially says that I'll take anything out, but only if the
State Attorney General will give an opinion that it's not legal to
take it.

I got no response and that was when I asked that

question during the discussion, I got no response on legal
reasons, I kept trying to find legal reasons.

With all due

respect to the Committee and the seriousness of referring to a
government cover-up, I believe the facts indicate the probable
cover-up and warrant referral to whatever government agencies
monitor governmental and political abuses for further
investigation.

That's it, thank you for your patience.

I just

wanted to get it all out.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Thank you, Mr. Newsom, and for the
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supporting documents.

It will probably take us some time to

thoroughly review the materials you've given us.
cover a couple things with you.

I wanted to

On November 29, 1989, at our

prior hearing, you raised the issue of the change in the cease and
desist order.

I had looked for

sorn•~

prior

rai~1inq

o[

that~

is~;up

in your Congressional testimony and didn't find it.
MR. NEWSOM:

The exhibits themselves

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

What I was going to say is today,

just in trying to keep up with you in your exhibits, indicate that
you did have some internal conversations about that, is that
right?
MR. NEWSOM:

You mean, at our Department?

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Yes, after the decision was made to

issue the Cease and Desist order, is that right.
MR. NEWSOM:

To back up, you mean the decision made to

issue the cease and desist order was Mr. Crawford told me on
November 8, or I got the word from Mr. Stelzer indirectly, to do
the order.

The order actually took seven weeks approximately of

processing and arguing.

The documentation discussion that

everybody attended was at the beginning of December because
there's an E-Mail dated December 2, I believe, in here from

•

Ms. Thayer that follows up that meeting, so we had discussed this
potential securities law thing.

That was in it from the beginning

and it was in it at that point when documentation was specifically
discussed.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. NEWSOM:

That was December 1988 .

Yes, December 2 -
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just prior to December 2.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

The first time you raised this issue

publicly, at least, was November 29, 1989.
MR. NEWSOM:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

You did not raise it or allude to it

in your Congressional testimony.
MR. NEWSOM:

Right.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. NEWSOM:

Why was that?

It didn't seem significant enough in

relation to what Congress was looking for.

I put both documents

in, but at that point, and I think my written testimony, frankly,
I'm really surprised, in a sense, of the reaction over this.

I

think it was a horrendous fight we had, but I believe we discussed
it with the Congressional staff person at the time, I think that
came up, my recollection is vague, but we had two days or so,
actually I got the subpoena Thursday night from Congress, so a lot
of things ended up on the cutting room floor.

One of the things I

found on Lincoln is that what seems important now may not have
seemed so important two months ago because it seems like there are
efforts to recreate history, or to argue what over what we thought
had occurred.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

How long have you been with the

Department of Savings and Loan.
MR. NEWSOM:

Five years.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. NEWSOM:

Five years - 1984, 1985

December - the day after Pearl Harbor Day

in 1984 - December 8.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

That's some time in September, isn't
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it!

(laughter]

You had not previously been assigned to the

Lincoln case until the fall of 1988.
MR. NEWSOM:

Right, September 1988.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

When you took your responsibilities

on, did you consult with the people in your Department who had
already specifically worked on the Lincoln matter?
MR. NEWSOM:

Let's see, I spent approximately a whole

week down in Los Angeles with Mr. Stelzer.

It was almost an

orientation deciding scope, because my real role was to be in
Phoenix, so the first week assigned to Lincoln was actually with
Mr. Stelzer, reading over reports, familiarizing myself with what
was going on.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

In Mr. Crawford's testimony at our

last hearing was that one of the tricks of ACC was to move the
books to Arizona, and that made it more difficult to examine the
savings and loan unit.

Your job was to follow those books to

Arizona, is that right?
MR. NEWSOM:

Well, no, my real, I had several duties

that the holding company records were in Phoenix, and my
particular responsibilities were to examine the holding company,
although that quickly changed when we realized that there were

•

major holes in the Federal Home Loan Bank examination, Lincoln
examination.

So I essentially became a spy in Arizona for

Mr. Stelzer, and also my job was to attempt to get things done.
Actually, at the time, I felt I had a mandate, also, from
Mr. Crawford and Mr. Davis that they definitely wanted something
to happen on this institution at this time, so that's why . . .
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Did your belief that they wanted to

have something done with respect to Lincoln change?
MR. NEWSOM:

Well, my only beliefs have changed 1n the

last three weeks based on what happened after the last hearing and
what has come out.

Prior to that we had problems with

lower-level, with the supervising examiner on the job, and
frankly .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. NEWSOM:

Who was that?

Mr. Mare who testified last time.

We also

had problems getting things through the chain of command in terms
of there was a lot of resistance to ideas, to new approaches on
getting something done.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

You link the examination of the

investments made by ACC and the Ponchartrain Hotel, specifically,
to the viability of ACC to pay back the bond holders, right?
MR. NEWSOM:

As part of it, yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

As part of it, I mean not solely,

because we relate it to the bond issue.
MR. NEWSOM:

By the end of October, early November, I

had identified about $50 million in loans that were just
losses.

Mr. Stelzer was finding more.

de~d

By the beginning of

December, the tentative loss numbers were $140 million on
Lincoln's books, which was substantially more than American
Continental's whole net worth 1 so they are effectively gone.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

When you came on the job in

September of 1988, is that right, September of 1988 . . .
MR. NEWSOM:

Yes.
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

In your view, you would have looked

at the Federal Home Loan Bank Board examination from 1986, 1987?
MR. NEWSOM:

I believe I did, yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

And other examinations that the

Department had been involved in .
MR. NEWSOM:

I'm not sure I saw those because I don't

believe, it's my recollection that some of the reports hadn't gone
out, so mainly I relied on the Federal Home Loan Bank examination
report.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Wasn't there a considerable body of

evidence that had been accumulating, much of it produced by people
in your own Department, to indicate serious problems with Lincoln
and ACC?
MR. NEWSOM:

Absolutely.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

The bonds were approved first in

November, December of 1986, and then again in May of 1988 for
sale, not by your Department but by the Department of
Corporations.

Since that's not your job, you're an examiner,

there would be no reason why you would have taken particular note
of that, I assume?
MR. NEWSOM:

Lincoln wasn't even, I'm in San Francisco

so it wasn't even one that was assigned to us, so all I knew about
Lincoln was what I 3aw in the newspapers and an occasional
document addressing the dispute between the .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Once you started working on the file

beginning in September, you realized, I assume, that there had
been a whole history both of examinations of Lincoln and approval
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of the bond offerings?
MR. NEWSOM:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

That caused you some concern, did

it?
MR. NEWSOM:

Yes, it blew me away.

In fact, as one of

the exhibits in here is dated in mid-October, it was an interim
report of examination, and .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. NEWSOM:

October of 1988?

October 1988, and the problem in early

September, the Federal Home Loan Bank in Washington, ORA, had shut
off all tax-sharing payments going to American Continental from
Lincoln which was about the last viable source of cash, if you
call that a viable source.

Essentially from that point on, the

way we looked at it with the losses that we were seeing, there's
no way there's going to be dividends going up, there's no way
there's going to be income to throw off tax-sharing payments and
those were cut off also.

By mid-October, it appeared to us that

there was no way that these subdebtholders had a chance.

Everyone

from October on . . .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Was that the view of your colleagues

and superiors that you talked with about?
MR. NEWSOM:

It was the view of Gene Stelzer.

We had

several meetings, I believe, and Mr. Crawford and Mr. Davis, I
think, also felt that the whole thing was, that they were had, it
was gone.

The problem was proving it.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Right.

You were here for Mr.

Crawford's testimony last time and he said that he had advised the
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Department of Corporations, prior to their approval of the bonds
in May of 1988, the kinds of problems you describe .
MR. NEWSOM:

I saw you hold up the Federal Home Loan

Bank report with $30 million in losses.

Also, I saw Christine

Bender said she admit that she saw it, too.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Correct.

So in November, December,

is it fair to say that you devised the strategy that you refer to
on page 6 of your statement today, the strategy to .
MR. NEWSOM:

•

Include the disclosure?

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. NEWSOM:

Include the disclosures?

Yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

As a way of doing a number of

things, right?
MR. NEWSOM:

Yes, we were trying to build a fire under

the behinds of other regulatory agencies.

We were also trying to

put the .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Did that include the State

Department of Corporations?
MR. NEWSOM:

Absolutely.

One of the exhibits in here is

a letter dated mid-October to Mr. Kielty, Chief Counsel from
American Continental Corp., which addresses in detail all the
disclosure problems we saw.

In fact, there were several, I wrote

three letters, let's see, there's an early October letter dealing
with the horrendous problems, I believe October 6th letter, which
is referenced in the letter that I provided to you.

You have the

October 6 letter in the Congressional testimony.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

We have the October 18th letter that
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you provided today.
MR. NEWSOM:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
October 6 letter.

To Mr. Kielty and your earlier

My point here, really, what I wanted you to

perhaps amplify on was this - development of a strategy to cripple
the ability of Lincoln to sell bonds, right.
MR. NEWSOM:

Yes, Yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

ACC to sell the subordinate

debentures through Lincoln, okay.

Now, when I asked Ms. Thayer

about that, her answer was basically that we have to follow the
law and a strategy that ignores the law, in her judgment, cannot
be done or should not be done.

What is your response to that, and

did this debate go on internally?
MR. NEWSOM:
debates.

Yes, it went on, there were ferocious

In fact, I was involved in some.

Mr. Harvey was

involved in some with Ms. Thayer and Ms. Sakamoto was involved,
also.

The problem is there is, unsafe and unsound is a fairly

nebulous law.

What the Commissioner decides is unsafe and unsound

that he believes is unsafe and unsound and can support, is a
violation of the law.

The guts of this order were that lying to

the public is inherently unsafe and unsound for a publicly traded
to do.

When you get into the materiality of it, that's where you

end up, perhaps, in a securities law argument, but we were not
arguing materiality, we just said you have to stop lying to the
public, in essence, and since we have instances of errors,
omissions, that's our basis for telling you to stop.
law argument.
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There was no

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. NEWSOM:

Are you an attorney?

No.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Was there an attorney involved in

the strategy who agreed with your approach?
MR. NEWSOM:
attorneys, I believe.

Yes, two, both are northern California
Ms. Sakamoto and Mr. Harvey who are

witnesses today.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

We'll stipulate the value of people

from northern California, they're going to testify in a moment,
and they are attorneys, okay.

You said that the cease and desist

order would force ACC to more accurately tell the public what the
condition of their company was, is that right?
MR. NEWSOM:

That was the purpose - the technical

problem they had is that since they had prospectuses outstanding
that included errors in them and the one that we particularly
honed in on was the Hotel Ponchatrane, which was an appalling
theft, really, of inside company assets, violated regulations
involved 20 to 30 insiders.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

I don't doubt that.

Our first

hearing on this subject, which I don't think you were invited to,
so you probably weren't here, but the witnesses that we had and
perhaps this was the experience in Washington at their hearings,
was that the people who bought these bonds said either that they
weren't actually given the prospectuses, or in being given them,
they were so aggressively sold the bonds that they didn't read the
prospectuses or read them long after the fact.

Do you have reason

to believe that this cease and desist order, if carried out in the
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fashion that you said it should be and it was upheld by a court,
which is problematic, would have caused a different behavior on
the part of unsophisticated bond purchasers?
MR. NEWSOM:

What I think it would have created was not

in terms of unsophisticated bond purchasers who were going to be
looking at the tape down at Merrill Lynch to see the latest public
disclosure, but a court battle with

Lincoln-fu~erican

Continental

against its primary regulator, if they took the position of saying
you guys didn't tell the truth to the public and you guys told the
public that on a $20 million transaction, that you guys
essentially stole money without recovery or repayment, that the
same terms and conditions you'd afford the general public, that
would be news.

The news itself would get to a lot of those

people.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

It was a legal and press strategy,

is that fair to say?
MR. NEWSOM:

Well, what we hoped was that if we laid

something like that on the Department of Corporations, as well as
the SEC, it might have gotten them off their decision-making
process to figure, gees, what do we do now.

If the primary

regulator issues an order to an institution saying that they are
misleading the public in their public disclosures, how is the
primary securities regulator going to react when they open their
mail and see that order?

We felt that by going to all these

different people, we would find somebody who would turn the button
off, who would do something.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Okay.
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Let me ask you about

something else.

In your testimony on page 15, if you could turn

to that.
MR. NEWSOM:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

You recount reasons that you say Ms.

Thayer gave to yourself and the other people, that she got from
Mr. Rehm of the Department of Justice, his concerns the C&D,
right?
MR. NEWSOM:

Well, what this recounts is that it was our

understanding at the time that when she said this, she said she
had talked to Mr. Rehm like the day before, and that's what he
remembered.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Okay, here's my question.

You list

four matters, and some of them are consistent with Ms. Thayer's
testimony today and also with Mr. Rehm's testimony today,
particularly the issue of alleged potential violations, and the
need for specific violations, okay.

Now, when your testimony goes

on, the only one that you seem to focus on was No. 3, the personal
background in securities law.

Would you care to comment on the

other ones?
MR. NEWSOM:

Yes, the other ones are addressed elsewhere

in the body, here, just the fact that we had, I think, 25

•

footnoted pieces of documentation supporting this thing, the fact
that it had been gone through the complete review process by CDSL
management, an all day meeting.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. NEWSOM:
and Loan.

Which management?

Our management, the Department of Savings

From the top down, I spent a whole day in L.A. with
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Ms. Thayer and everybody up through -Mr. Crawford didn't attend,
Mr. Davis dropped in and out, but the whole chain of command, the
documentation we were led to believe at that point was totally
satisfactory, and in fact the issue of inadequate documentation
kind of surfaced at this point.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

You, in your, I found it when you

referred to it when you were speaking, but I'm not sure I can at
the moment, you refer to a memo from, I think, Ms. Thayer that you
provided us with, that in your judgment seems to indicate that
everything was in order except that it had to be checked with the

A.G.
MR. NEWSOM:

Yes, it indicated that subject to Mr. Mare

who left part way through it, that's the memo.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Okay, and you just suggested that

Mr. Mare, in your view, was resistant to the kind of aggressive
strategy that you were proposing.
MR. NEWSOM:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Okay.

You've heard before,

obviously, and it's in your testimony and you've heard the
testimony of the Department's lawyer and the lawyer from the
Department of Justice, the problem with ''potential" violations of
law.

How seriously do you weigh that?
MR. NEWSOM:

Since the order was not based on potential

violations of law, what it was based on was factual errors ln
disclosure, I think that in here we address, that's the
underscored section that we invite anybody to look at and decide
for themselves.

We were, I think Mr. Harvey and Ms. Sakamoto and
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I felt that if that was going to kill the deal, we could just take
those three words out and the order could be issued just exactly
the way it_ wao;.

'I'he potential sPcurit:ies laws

issuE~

i:..; really a

red herring and I think that's the phrase I used in discussing it,
because if you took that little section out, the order would have
still stood on facts, details, Section 8200 of unsafe and unsound,
we would just be arguing do we have the facts to support the
order, I mean, the answer is yes, we had the facts.

We even

referenced them in the order, the public disclosure statements
that these particular errors were in, so we had already discussed
that.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Ms. Thayer said that the SEC has

still not made a determination as to whether there was a violation
of law.

You've previously criticized the SEC, at least

implicitly, in saying that they needed a fire to be lit under
them, I think were your words, what's your reaction to .
MR. NEWSOM:
days ago also.

Let's see, I talked to the SEC a couple

In fact, they called me up because one other thing

that I called them about in July, they didn't want at the time,
now they want it.

My understanding from the Congressional

testimony is that they have redoubled their efforts at this point

I

and probably wish they had done more earlier.

At the time last

year, from conversations with SEC people, I understood they only
had about two or three people working on this thing, and when I
talked to the SEC person myself a couple days ago, I asked have
you guys figured out on the Ponchartrain yet and they hadn't
figured it out yet, either, but in terms of whether it was a
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securities law violation or not is irrelevant to the order,
really.

In terms of that potential securities law was not

fundamental to that order, it was a phrase in there and I believe
we inserted it to put a little pressure on ACC, but the facts
didn't require that we prove a securities law violation in that
order.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Then you don't quarrel with the

judgment by the attorneys who are expert in the legal matters,
presumably, Ms. Thayer and Mr. Rehm, to remove the language
relative to potential violations?
MR. NEWSOM:

I have actually discussed that with our

northern California attorneys and I believe at the time we
discussed it also, that if somebody, if that was a deal breaker to
somebody in getting the order out, then just wipe that little
section out, but that those three words, but that section still
stands on its own without it.

The order says that the findings

are you've got $10 million errors, their own attorney admitted it,
they've got other errors in there that we pinned down that weren't
argued, and the order says tell the truth, it doesn't say, we
don't need to tell them to not violate laws, so the problem is the
whole section coming out.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Mr. Newsom, a lot of your testimony

is devoted to events and impressions since our last hearing.
you been limited in any way in presenting the testimony, is it
full and complete as you want this Committee to have it today?
MR. NEWSOM:

Yes, it's not hardly likely that people

would try to tamper with my testimony at this point.
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

And you've submitted to the

Committee all the documents, at least at this point, that you feel
we should have and pursue.
MR. NEWSOM:

Yes, at this point.

One of the problems of

the Lincoln story is, you get something out in public and two
months from now, we'll probably be asking more questions about it
because it's a puzzle and if somebody disputes what we think is a
fact today, you may want more documentation later, but

•

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Thank you very much.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

Just two questions.

Ms. Wright?
Could you

have gone forward with a cease and desist order based strictly on
the fact of false advertising in relationship to these bonds?
MR. NEWSOM:

You mean, these errors?

Yes, that was my

opinion, that was the opinion of our northern California attorneys
at the time also, that the potential securities law was not, it
was a red herring, it didn't matter that much.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

But your counsel in her

presentation before you, at least to my interpretation, is stating
that basically the whole reason for throwing it out was based on
this SEC violation.
MR. NEWSOM:

I heard that, too.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
MR. NEWSOM:

This doesn't make sense to me.

Me neither.

You'll have opportunity to

talk to our northern California attorneys who were working on this
also and get their opinions, but it seems - I was angry at the
time because the cows were long since out of the gate, but
$10 million was sold in January and we were trying to at least
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save somebody.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

What is the relationship, is

Ms. Thayer a higher employee than the other two, Mr. Harvey and
Ms. Sakamoto, or are they on the same level as far as their
positions are concerned?

Would Ms. Thayer, in other words, if

Ms. Sakamoto and Mr. Harvey said, yes, we should still go forward
with the cease and desist order, would Ms. Thayer have the ability
to cancel out their request, is she above them in pecking order?
MR. NEWSOM:

As far as their structure, it would be

better to ask, there's a chief attorney and I don't know exactly
how their lines work over there.

In effect, that's what happened

this time, I think, but I don't know you'd better ask them because
I'm not an expert on their reporting, or perhaps
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

Ms. Thayer also stated that the

cease and desist order wouldn't have meant anything in regards to
eliminating the sales of bonds because most of them were already
sold.

Do you have any idea as to what would have been the

difference if the cease and desist order had taken place in
December, its relationship to how many bonds would not have been
sold?
MR. NEWSOM:

Yes.

They were selling, at the time, we

were told about $700,000 a day in subordinated debt.

Remember we

got, in January, from federal examiners was that it was about
$10 million sold in January.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

So we could have saved about at

least that $10 million?
MR. NEWSOM:

That was my opinion.
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

I don't know whether it's

appropriate to make a statement with you there, but I tell you
what I get the feeling, is that a lot of people dropped the balls
with this whole issue, and not whether Lincoln is all of a sudden
become a big headline issue, sure it's in the headlines now, and
everybody is sensitive, and I think what's happening now is a lot
of people are trying to cover up for the simple reason that it is
such a big item in the newspapers today and so sensitive, but I
think the past - I guess what I would like to see from these
agencies and departments, including the Attorney General, is the
simple statement that we goofed and we should have done things
differently, instead of this constant trying to change what took
place, or giving the reason for why we didn't do it.
didn't do it and you were wrong.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

So far, no.

There's some things I wish I had done, too.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
Mr. Newsom, we

Thank you, Mr. Newsom."

Any votes you wish you didn't make?

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
MR. NEWSOM:

Just say you

Okay, thank you very much,

reciate your testimony.

I'd like to ask

Sheila Sakamoto, H. R. Harvey and Eugene Stelzer and Osamu Mori if
are all here, if

would please come up to the table and

we'll ask Mr. Miller to swear them in and I assume their testimony
is

the purpose of shedding additional light on the discussions

that Mr. Newsom had with others in the Department relative to the
cease and desist or
MR

MILLER:

r.
morning, I believe each of you were

present in the room earlier this morning when I read to you the
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statement regarding your rights as a witness before a legislative
Committee.

Would each of you indicate whether or not you

understand that statement.
MS. SHEILA SAKAMOTO:
MR. H. R. HARVEY:

Yes.

Yes.

MR. EUGENE STELZER:
MR. OSAMU MORI:
MR. MILLER:

Yes.

Yes.

All the witnesses have indicated they

understood the statement.

Do each of you agree to testify

voluntarily under the conditions stated?
MS. SAKAMOTO:
MR. HARVEY:

Yes.

MR. STELZER:
MR. MORI:

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

MR. MILLER:

Let the record reflect that all the

witnesses have indicated yes.
please.

Would you raise your right hands,

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you're about to

give before this Committee with be the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth?
MS. SAKAMOTO:
MR. HARVEY:

Yes.

MR. STELZER:
MR. MORI:
MR. MILLER:

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.
Thank you.

name for the record, please.

Will each of you state your

Would you speak into the microphone

at the podium there and state your name.
MR. HARVEY:

I am H. R. Harvey, Staff Counsel for the
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Department of Savings and Loan.
MS. SAKAMOTO:
MR. STELZER:

Sheila Sakamoto, Staff Counsel.
I am Gene Stelzer, Specialist 4 for the

rtment of Savings and Loan.
MR. MORI:

My name is Sam Mori.

I'm the Assistant

Savings and Loan Commissioner for San Francisco.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Mr. Stelzer, you have a statement

you'd like to read to the Committee.
MR. STELZER:

Yes.

Mr. Chairman and members of the

Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to testify before this
Committee.

My name is Gene Stelzer.

I am currently a supervising

examiner with the California Department of Savings and Loan.

I

was the examiner in charge of the July 1988 examination of Lincoln
Savings and Loan Association and was also in overall charge of the
examination of both Lincoln and its holding company, American
Continental Corporation.
the examination of ACC.
surrounding the cease and

Mr. Newsom was the examiner in charge of
My statement is concerned with the issues
ist order that was issued by the

Department of Savings and Loan in December 1988 against Lincoln.
I will begin by briefly outlining the financial situation at
Lincoln and its

I

as I

rent company, American Continental Corporation,

rstood it in November 1988.

My understanding of what we

knew about the financial condition of these firms in November
1988, the significance of the decision to delete the clause
related to disclosures being made in the public documents of ACC,
should be clarified.
consult sever

In writing this, I have had time to only

documents essential to this topic.

My
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recollection concerning the knowledge that I had about the
financial condition of Lincoln and American Continental
Corporation in November 1988 is as follows.
that ACC was engaged in a vast Ponzi scheme.

It was evident to me
A major source of

its cash flow, the tax-sharing payments from Lincoln, had been
halted by the Office of Regulatory Affairs of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board.

The only other significant outside source of

cash flow was coming from additional debenture sales.

Funds from

the debenture sales were being used to pay corporate expenses, pay
for the repurchase of ACC stock from the Keating family and
others, and pay off its sharing debt.

The financial condition of

the major subsidiary of ACC, Lincoln, was also known by me to be
very bad.

Mr. Newsom had determined that there was $50 million in

losses on just two commercial loans.

The interim Department

examination report on Lincoln dated October 3, 1988, reported that
as a result of DSL review appraisals, there were potential
appraisal losses amounting to $33.5 million.

The report also

indicated that many of the major real estate for development
projects of Lincoln will be classified which indicates that they
were not functioning properly.

My opinion at the time was that

the results of the examination clearly showed that the debenture
holders had little chance of ever getting their money back and
that a massive fraud was being perpetrated on the public.

This

was a situation as I understood it in November 1988, when I
received instructions from Commissioner Crawford to prepare a
cease and desist order.

I assigned the person that I felt was

best qualified to develop an effective cease and desist order,
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Dick Newsom, to be in charge of doing this job and assigned other
examiners to help him on this project.

My recollection is that

Mr. Newsom worked very hard on this assignment, and was even able
to obtain the assistance of both the Department attorneys in
San Francisco, H. R. Harvey and Sheila Sakamoto.

Mr. Newsom also

did something for which I believe he deserves the highest praise
he put a clause in the proposed cease and desist order that was
intended to stop any additional debenture sales.

The clause as it

was stated in Draft No. 6 of the proposed cease and desist order
is as follows:

The Commissioner orders Lincoln, or any other

subsidiaries, cease and desist from the following:
3) Permitting erroneous, incomplete, misleading or inaccurate
information of any kind to be included in public reports,
including lO(Q), offering circulars, proxy materials, or any other
public information.

This order includes, but is not limited to,

material omissions regarding related or affiliated party
transactions.

That's the end of the clause in the draft.

As I

understand the strategy of Mr. Newsom on this clause, his plan was
as

lows.

l) If Lincoln and ACC challenge this order in court,

this would provide an opportunity to bring the financial condition
of

hese firms to the attention of the public during the legal
ings.

a

2) If the order was not challenged, it might provide

of exerting pressure on other agencies, in particular, the
fice of Regulatory Affairs of the Federal Horne Loan Bank and the

Securities and Exchange Commission, to take some action to stop
the debenture sales.

3) It might provide the Department of

Savings and Loan with a valid reason to put Lincoln in a
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conservatorship.

A section of the savings and loan law,

8225(a)(5) provides us a reason for putting an association into
conservatorship the following:

11

The Association is in violation

of an order or Injunction as authorized by this Division.

If the

prospectus for the debentures was not corrected after this order
became effective, Lincoln would be in violation of the cease and
desist order.

Whether this plan by Mr. Newsom to put a stop to

the debenture sales would have worked is now problematical.

What

is clear is that his plan was never given a chance to work because
the clause was removed from the final version of the cease and
desist order.

The decision to remove this clause was a fateful

one for those citizens of California who continued to purchase ACC
debentures.

As far as I know, this was the only actual plan

developed by anyone in state government to stop the debenture
sales of ACC.

It was never clear to me what significant damage

could occur to the Department and the State of California if the
clause had been put in the order and Lincoln had prevailed on this
particular issue in court.

This question seems particularly

relevant given the information that we had about the financial
condition of Lincoln and ACC at the time this clause was deleted.
I'd like to make one other point and that's that we had no idea
how much additional debenture sales were going to occur.

It's

just after the fact that we happened to be able to get a figure,
but I think there was an enormous reluctance on the federal people
to put Lincoln into conservatorship, and they did this, I think,
just when they were finally sort of forced to.
that they were going to do this.

We didn't know

It wasn't at all clear.

We had
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no information that would show whenever this would happen.

We

didn't even have any information showing that the Department of
Corporations wouldn't issue a permit for more bond sales.

They

were permitting the one to go on, if that was okay, there's no
reason they couldn't have issued another one, so that the
potential debenture sales could have been enormous.
information we were acting on in November of 1988.

This is the
So as a matter

of fact, there was maybe a minor amount compared to what might
have happened if the examining results hadn't been so devastating
and finally forced the federal people to put it into
conservatorship.

So we had an almost unlimited potential here for

losses and we knew about it.

There's no excuse for not acting in

terms of us not knowing the financial condition.
finished our examination work.

We had basically

We had what we call management

meetings with Lincoln personnel where we present our findings and
there were two of these, they were both in November, and this
means that basically what I put in the draft of my board letter to
Lincoln, we really mostly knew all of that in November.
have been some

There may

ts we didn't have, we had ongoing appraisals, so

I may not have had some appraisal results, but if you look at that
draft of the board letter, you'll see enormous losses, bad assets
t

t were classified.

Basically, we had most of that knowledge.

I don't think all of it,

that's why, and I didn't cite that, but

we had most of that knowledge in November and it just showed a
financial disaster.

That's the points I wanted to make here.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Mr. Stelzer, how long have you been

with the Department of Savings and Loan?
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MR. STELZER:

Approximately five years.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

How long did you work on the Lincoln

matter?
MR. STELZER:

I was assigned as an assistant on a

special examination in 1987, I was assigned to work on loans.
That examination was interrupted for quite a long period of time
and then the exam was resumed and I went back by myself as
examiner in charge.

I was not examiner in charge and didn't

design the exam, but I was sent back to finish it, and that was
very valuable because I was aware of a lot of things I needed to
do on this exam.

I was aware that Lincoln, for instance, didn't

have records of their loans.

They'd give you a schedule, they

would give you the loan number, the name of the borrower, and the
amount of the loan, and that was it.

And you didn't know if those

were commercial loans, real estate loans, purchase loans, you
didn't know where the loans, where the property was located that
was securing the loans.
was just astonishing.

There was practically no information.

It

These were all over a million dollar loans,

and so one of our exam objectives was to develop schedules, which
we did, with a data base on these loans and that was just a first
basic step.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

What period of time are you speaking

about, now?
MR. STELZER:

For the schedules.

I did this 1987 exam

and finished it in late 1987, and turned the report in.

Then I

was reassigned in June of 1988 and began working on the Lincoln
exam and then in August it . . .
102

C00769

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. STELZER:

June of 1988?

Yes, as examiner in charge.

I was working

in the office initially just getting prepared for it.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Your testimony, Mr. Stelzer, is a

strong critique of your own Department's handling of the matter of
Lincoln Savings, isn't it?
MR. STELZER:

Well, I'll let other people decide that,

but I do want
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Well, because your testimony really

relates to the entire period that Lincoln was a troubled
institution, and that goes back prior to your direct involvement
in June of 1988.

In fact, the bonds were sold in 1986 and then

earlier in 1988.

Mr. Crawford of your Department testified that

they had been aware of the problems and had pursued them with the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board at earlier stages and had made the
Department of Corporations aware of these difficulties prior to
the Department of Corporations' approval of the second $150
million bond

fering, and the Department of Savings and Loan had

rescinded the ability of Lincoln to sell those bonds in the
lobbies.

All those actions you view as insufficient?
MR. STELZER:

sa es.

Well, they didn't stop the debenture

There were efforts, but nothing, nobody stopped the

nture sales.
hat's why

Lincoln-ACC just stopped them themselves.

statement is that .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

the

So

The responsibility for the sale of

res was the Department of Corporations.
MR. STELZER:

Right.

But I think what Dick Newsom did
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was to see if we couldn't do something about it with his clause.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

I understand you are in support of

Mr. Newsom's recommendation and his strategy, but you're his
supervisor, are you not?

And you've been with the Department as

long as he has and, in fact, you were working on Lincoln matters
prior to the time he was involved with them.

Were you privy to

discussions about Lincoln and how it could be brought under
control?
MR. STELZER:

No, not really, because I was a field

examiner, which means I'm out in the field.

So, for instance, in

the 1987 exam, I simply was out in the field and I write up my
report and send it in.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Looking at Lincoln?

MR. STELZER:

I send it in and I don't

Yes.

necessarily ...
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. STELZER:

What was your judgment at that time?

In 1987?

We only looked at the

underwriting, the documentation of underwriting.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. STELZER:

What did you find?

No underwriting, it was terrible, I mean

it was just totally obvious that there was no underwriting.

We

did their real estate for investment, loans and securities, and
for instance, on the securities files, there were no prospectuses,
no memoranda, there wasn't even the basic documents to do an
underwriting, so- and that's in my 1987 report.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Did you recommend any enforcement

action to your superiors?
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MR. STELZER:

I wrote a, and this is standard practice,

is you write a proposed Board letter which I did and there were
certain constraints they wanted, so I didn't put in the REI, the
real estate for investment, but for the securities, I recommended
that they not be permitted to buy anything but investment grade
securities.

For loans, I put in a clause saying they couldn't

make any loans over a million dollars, and they only make loans
over a million dollars.

Basically, they have a few under that,

but almost all their lendings are over a million, so that would
have stopped a lot of things.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. STELZER:

Where did that recommendation go?

It went to my supervisor, which was

Tommy Mare, who was the supervising examiner for Lincoln.

The way

the Department is structured is that associations are assigned to
a supervising examiner
are t
t

then their examinations are done and

rarily assigned to do the exam, so I was

rarily assi

to

the Lincoln special exam, so once I

turned that in, I have no, unless they want me to do something, I
have no formal contact or .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
whom you cr

You're here in support of Mr. Newsom

it with coming up with the only strategy, you say

it's problematical whether it would have worked, but the only
strategy to try and shut down Lincoln's sale of the bonds, right?
Does that mean that you didn't come up with a strategy?

Or could

have?
MR. STELZER:
showed real

nsi

I didn't think of it, I think that it

on his part to, you know, everybody is going
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to tell you we didn't have the authority, we couldn't do anything.
Well, Dick's the sort of guy that wants to do something and tries
to figure out some way to do it, and doesn't make excuses about,
well, we can't do it, and that's why I wanted him on the exam
overall, and why I gave him certain assignments because I thought
he would come up with things, and get things done, and as far as
I'm concerned he did do that and I .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Is this a strategy that you would

consider employing in some other circumstance which was to force
the issue with a court test, even if the attorneys . . . are you
an attorney, by the way?
MR. STELZER:

No, I don't want to deal with the attorney

issues, I'm just pointing out that the consequences of not doing
this that we could know about, that were there.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. STELZER:

What are those consequences?

The debenture sales continued unchecked

and they could have gone on for another year, we have hindsight
now that they didn't, but that's pure hindsight.

At that point, I

had no reason to think there was going to be a conservatorship.
Mr. Keating is very durable as far as preventing conservatorships.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Would it have not been a more direct

approach to focus your views and Mr. Newsom's views on the
Department of Corporations, since they were the ones permitting
the bond sales and it's somewhat indirect to have a cease and
desist order going to representations in a prospectus which might
trigger a court sale or a public reaction which might in turn
influence institutional investors and trickle on down to the
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purchasers of the
MR. STELZER:
arr

a meeting

Commissioner Crawford and Bill Davis

th Corporations which I was invited to, as

well as Dick Newsom.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. STELZER:

Yes, I went.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. STELZER:

You were invited to it?
We had a meeting.

What happened there?

One of the items that Dick Newsom gave is

his three memos on the Ponchatrane informed me of this, and he
handed them over with Commissioner Crawford's approval, to the

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. STELZER:

When would this have been?

In November.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Of 1988?

MR. STELZER:

A lot of things were happening in

Yes.

November.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

What reaction was there by the

rtment of Corpo ations?
MR. STELZER:

Well, I was assigned to be the liaison

th them and I had several subsequent phone conversations and I'm
not even sure,

•

di

't k

notes or anything and I was talking

th them
CHAIR14AN JOHNSTON:
MR. STELZER:
was s

ti

No.

You didn't keep notes?
Because I was directing an exam that

just the volume of transactions, I was

working on
JOHNSTON:

Who did you speak with?
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MR. STELZER:

I think it was Ken Endo, but I'm not sure.

I'm really not sure, and whoever I spoke with asked me for some
specific data which I more or less provided them facts that didn't
seem to be very significant.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. STELZER:

Did you provide them in writing?

No, just over the phone, they were just a

couple of facts and the fellow, whoever I was speaking with,
didn't think they were going to do much and I wanted, I had to
deal with people who were going to get things done, and I . . .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Do you have any record of this

effort on your part to get the Department of Corporations to do
something?
MR. STELZER:

No.

Well, we had the meeting, otherwise I

just phoned a couple times and they .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

But you were the one appointed to be

the liaison between the two Departments.
MR. STELZER:

Yes, and whoever I spoke with said, well,

we can't really do anything.

Well, I didn't have time to wait for

somebody that couldn't do something, I mean, it's nice now to, we
would of sort of, it's more a matter that you could sort of show
they weren't doing their work, now, but that wasn't my concern.
My concern was a positive concern of getting the exam work done
and insuring it with somebody I thought that would use it at the
time, and so
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

How important was it to get some

action if you didn't keep records and you didn't send anything in
writing and you're not sure who you spoke to.
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I understand

Mr. Newsom's commitment to the issue, he's got voluminous
documentation, where's yours?
MR. STELZER:

I simply did not have time, I did keep

some notes on some things, I didn't have time to keep notes, I was
revi

ng massive amounts of
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Then it wasn't as important as some

other matters that you were attending to, I suppose.
MR. STELZER:

I had to get the exam done.

I had to get

the basic exam work done, that was my basic responsibility.

And

when people wanted information and you can check with the
federal ...
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
is

Well, you see, the reason why this

tant is that part of Ms. Bender, the Corporations

Commiss

r's defense for her agency's approval of these bonds,

is that there were vague representations of problems with Lincoln,
but nothing

ific, and you're about as vague as Ms. Bender

indicated the representations were.
MR. STELZER:
think, quite

And Mr. Newsom's three memos were, I

icit if you read them.

want

didn't request anything, except just a

i

s.

So there is nothing for me to send if they didn't

t

ific findings.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR

t

I phoned and asked if

- I

STELZER:

It wasn't your job.

It was my job if they wanted something,

dn't know what they needed to make their decisions.
i

ion-maki

process.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Did you ask them?
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MR. STELZER:

Yes, I did.

I asked do you want anything,

and they asked for several specific little
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

The

ts.

rtment

Loan

Savings

and the examiners are the ones who a e deve

s body

t

rtment of

information about the

oblems

th L nco n

Corporations has an

rtant, but somewhat limit

is on the bonds being sold, so presumably
them what's important in evaluat

which

you wou d have to tell
i y of the i sues of

he s

those bonds.
MR. STELZER:

As

I

say,

I

talk

indicated there was just nothi
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
the documentation or

with someone

could real

to this

his memo, on the

to las

'd like

pa ag

addressed to me)please make you

will find the product

br

r

manageme t

esent.

Could

MR. STELZER:

date, our final

think

worthwhile relative to Mr. Tom's and Mr.

Mr. Stelzer would,

30th, I'm not

ing
I

1

Stelzer at which I was

we're examining.

his is

i

s with examiners

present our fi

t to

ttee

Samuelian's attendance at meeti

happy to elaborate.

.

've seen

rhaps

ttee,

ners, meetings w

I

December 5

t

you, as discussed with Mr. Suchil of your

records

, so

one other thing, in

Let me ask
itional test

that Mr. Newsom prov

hey

shed some 1

Mr.
I

am sure, be

on that?

t

rd practice is we

in, one

ings to the

associa ion that
,

t

've

te

I

so I can

th Lincoln

meeti
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the

rsonnel, two of

the people present at that meeting were Franklin Tom and
Samuelian, and they both signed the .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. STELZER:

The 30th of

November of 1988, that's approximate.

can give you the date, I don't .

I

They signed in so we got

their signatures on the sign-in sheet.

Mr. Samuelian, I had, we

were doing asset classification, and I had my examiners write up
the Crescent and the Phoenician hotels as problem assets, and at
the same time there was an agreement being developed to have a CPA
firm review these assets to see if there was any loss in them, and
Mr. Samuelian objected to my reviewing them, since this other
agreement was going on.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. STELZER:

The other agreement . . .

With the Department Commissioner Crawford

was developing this with Lincoln to arbitrate, if there should be
losses recognized on these two properties and, in fact, that
agreement was signed and an accounting firm did arbitrate.

But I

rejected and I said that my assignment was to evaluate the
financial condition of Lincoln and that's what I was going to do,
and these were critical properties in which we had come across
large losses and so they were staying in my report, and that was
it.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Mr. Samuelian asked you to remove

those?
MR. STELZER:

He questioned that, as I remember, I think

that's the issue.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

And you said you would keep them in
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your report.
MR. STELZER:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. STELZER:

And you did so?

Yes, they are in there.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Anything else on that issue that's

alluded to by Mr. Newsom.
MR. STELZER:

I think that's what he was referring to is

the presence of Mr. Tom and Mr. Samuelian at that management
meeting.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
your testimony.

Okay, well, thank you very much for

Yes, Mr. Seastrand has joined us, he had to fly

somewhere else to get here, I understand.
ASSEMBLYMAN ERIC SEASTRAND:
1280 feet elevation.

Cameron Park is so nice,

Who was the auditor for Lincoln Savings and

Loan?
MR. STELZER:

Arthur Young.

ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND:
MR. STELZER:

Arthur Young?

Yes, at that time it was Arthur Young.

There was a change, in fact, Arthur Young was replaced by I think
it was Touche-Ross at a certain point, they couldn't agree on
certain transactions, so they were replaced, so there was actually
a series of auditors during the time that Keating controlled it.
It was first Arthur Anderson, Arthur Young, and I think it was
Touche-Ross was the final one.
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND:

During this period when you were

looking at the, during the examination, did you ever look at the
reports in your normal course of business with all the red flags
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that were flying on this, did Arthur Young give a passing grade in
their audit.
MR. STELZER:

Yes, they always gave clean audit

opinions.
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND:
MR. STELZER:

A clean audit report?

Right.

ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND:

In your knowledge of acceptable

accounting standards and procedures, would you say that that
report was justified?
MR. STELZER:

Well, I was the one that decided that ten

transactions in a place called Hidden Valley were not valid sales,
there were ten land sales in a place called Hidden Valley that I
carne across and I thought, there's no way that those make any
economic sense and I did some more work on four of them to
document it further.

One of them that I worked on was the

Southrnark transaction and National Realty is a subsidiary of
Southmark.

It had

t two parcels in Hidden Valley and I had

done a schedule of all the Southrnark transactions back and forth,
because these were very suspicious, and on my schedule I saw that
the same day that
MR. STELZER:

. . . three real estate loans, and

purchased a participation in a
those loans made no sense.

rth.

We reviewed those loans

The interest rate on the loans was

barely above Lincoln's cost of funds.

The property securing the

loans were apartment houses that were not cash-flowing adequately
and that had other loans on them, so that although they were
esent

as secured real estate loans, they real

were dependent
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on the cashflow of Southmark itself, they were really unsecured in
any real sense, so we had these really noneconomic real estate at
the same time that we had this sale to a company that was hard-up
for cash, they were buying land in an area that made no sense, so
I wrote that up and I eventually got three other examples.

At the

end of January, I sent it back to the Office of Regulatory Affairs
and they went to the SEC and they launched an immediate
investigation.
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND:

Well, I guess the question I

have is .
MR. STELZER:

So, with this information, no I didn't

believe, this would indicate that these were sham sales and I came
up with $70 million of profits as not being valid, but this was
developed, it was sort of my last project that I worked on by
myself, it didn't even get into the exam report.
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND:

And in your opinion, an auditing

firm that did their job correctly would have come to the same
determination that you did and should it have been in their final
report?
MR. STELZER:

Well, the firm of Kenneth Leventhal has

reviewed these transactions and issued a public statement and
called them a sham sale.

So I'm dependent, I simply am not a CPA,

but I did present the evidence to the people I thought could
evaluate it properly, and as I say, it had a tremendous impact, I
think, in leading to the conservatorship.

The conservatorship

document, there were 15 items in it, this is the federal
conservatorship document.

Ten of them were my Hidden Valley
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transactions that they went back and they agreed and said that
the8e were phony sales and said the profits should be reversed and
to understand maybe, further, the structure of what was going on
at Lincoln is they had a tax-sharing agreement, and Lincoln and
ACC was sending out money to pay the taxes on a combined basis.
The thing was that ACC, because of losses, didn't have to pay
taxes, so the money went up and just stayed with ACC, it was in
effect a loan, which got up to almost $100 million or somewhat
under $100 million.

To do this, to get this cash up there, they

had to have profits.

Well, the land wasn't selling, it was just

pie in the sky sorts of places that they were buying land, it
wasn't selling, so they arranged these transactions that, in my
own personal opinion, were phony.

This sent cash up to ACC.

Dick

Newsom mentioned that the tax-sharing agreement was stopped.

Well

that stopped all this cash from going up, that's the significance
of that.
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND:

Well, I'm still trying to figure

out somewhere along the road I get the idea that an accounting
firm has certain responsibilities to abide by acceptable
accounting procedures, and that if they don't do this, there could
be liability involved, is that not correct?

•

MR. STELZER:

Well, I think there will be lawsuits about

this and the SEC is going to have to, the SEC is investigating
this and they are going to have to make, I suppose, the final
definitive call on this, and I know I was sent back to the SEC to
discuss these findings with them and explain why the land sales in
Hidden Valley didn't make any sense given the location of the
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place.

This is in the RICO lawsuit against ACC and Mr. Keating,

they cite these as one of the major things.

I found ten and we

have a couple others, and they keep finding more and more of them
that they consider to be fraudulent land sales.
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND:

Well, at this point, are the

auditors involved in any of these lawsuits?
MR. STELZER:

I don't know if Arthur Young has been sued

or not, they may have been, but I don't want to say for a fact.
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND:
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Thank you very much.

Okay, thank you.

I'd like to ask

Mr. Mori, Mr. Harvey and Ms. Sakamoto if they have testimony that
they want to offer, or are they just here in response to the
invitation in case the Committee has questions?
MR. MORI:

I'm just here to answer any questions that

this Committee may have.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

I don't have any, do any of the

members?
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

Well, I'm going to ask the

question that I asked before that Mr. Newsom couldn't answer, and
I guess it's addressed to the attorneys.

Are you on an equal

basis in pecking order as far as the Department is concecned with
Ms. Thayer, or is Ms. Thayer over you, because I'm really
concerned about who made this final decision of the cease and
desist order.

In other words, could you have forced the issue for

the cease and desist order?
MR. HARVEY:
MS. SAKAMOTO:

Would you like me to answer that, Sheila?
Yes.
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MR. HARVEY:

Before I answer it, if I may, I do have

some prepared testimony.

I'm not avoiding your question, I'm

going to get to your question as quickly as possible, but before I
get to my prepared testimony, I have a problem which may not be so
meaningful to the nonlawyers here, but we've had two lawyers
testify so far, neither one of them has made any reference to the
attorney-client privilege of confidentiality.

Now I'm an attorney

for the Department of Savings and Loan, and I'm not an expert on
the privilege.

I don't know whether the privilege has been waived

by implication here, by Commissioner Crawford allowing these
attorneys to testify.

The privilege belongs to the client.

To

the extent that I do have a client here, which I'm somewhat
uncertain of, I feel that it's my duty when in doubt to assert
that privilege.

So at this time, before I go on, and when I go on

my testimony will have to be extremely stilted and limited, I
would ask the Chairman if he would address the Commissioner and
solicit a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
CHAIR~AN

JOHNSTON:

Mr. Crawford, could you come forward

and respond to the issue raised by Mr. Harvey?
MR. WILLIAM CRAWFORD:

Apparently Mr. Harvey wasn't

available at the time that we checked on this.

We didn't know

what to do, we asked Janice Brown at the agency and she said we
could waive it as to this specific item, of this specific cease
and desist order, and this specific testimony relative to that,
and we communicated that to Sheila and to Shirley Thayer, but he
wasn't there at the time, so it's now communicated to him.

Thank

you.
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. HARVEY:

Okay.

Mr. Chairman, I think your counsel will

advise you of this, the privilege cannot be waived piecemeal.

The

holder of the privilege cannot say to his attorney, you can answer
this question and that question and not others, so
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

I heard Mr. Crawford indicate that

the subject matter before this Committee at this hearing does not
cause the Commissioner a problem for you to testify . .
MR. HARVEY:

If the subject matter is Lincoln Savings

and Loan, all of the ramifications in regard to that, and the
Attorney General's office and their representation of this
Department, and things that Mr. Crawford and Mr. Davis have said
to me relative to those things, I think that encompasses enough
that I can deal with it.
MR. CRAWFORD:

It covers whatever is covered by the

subpoena, period, I think.
MR. HARVEY:

But that's not adequate, your subpoena is

extremely narrow, refers primarily to the conflict over the cease
and desist order, and so then my testimony will have to be
extremely limited and I will not be able to submit the written
material that I have prepared.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

I will now attempt to answer .
Well, we obviously can't read

anybody's minds as to what they would like to give to the
Committee, but we'll think about it so that we can have the
benefit of whatever documentation you'd like to give us.
MR. HARVEY:

Well, of course, what I would frankly

prefer is that you hold me in contempt and get a court order, of
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course that can't be done under the rules that you've laid down.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Well, I think given our time frame,

I'd like to focus on those issues that we can deal with today
which is primarily the cease and desist order and if you could
deal with Ms. Wright's question and other matters, we'll think
about, we're not at all hesitant to try and obtain from you any
useful information.
MR. HARVEY:

•

Thank you.

I'll answer Ms. Wright's

question, then, as succinctly as I can.
Senior Staff Counsel Specialist.

Her specialty, I believe, is

legislation and legislative liaison.
~

She is in

Shirley Thayer is a

She is not a supervisor.

higher paying civil service position than either

Sheila Sakamoto or I, but she does not supervise us.

Actually,

in name, our Chief Counsel, Alex Stein, who's a grand old
man, he's 76 years old, he doesn't give us much supervision and I
don't, in the ordinary course of events, I don't have any contact
ith him, sometimes once in two months.

My contact is generally

directly with Commissioner Crawford and Bill Davis, the Chief
Deputy Commissioner, and with the people in our office that we
rk with.

So, I think to sum up my answer to your question,

for the fact that her office is a few doors down from the
vVl<UHkssioner's in Los Angeles and she has more frequent contact
ith him, and except for whatever his personal opinion is of her
el

ility as a lawyer compared to ours, she really has no

thority beyond our authority.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
rect

1

Okay, then if I'm hearing

then you and Ms. Sakamoto could very easily have gone
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forward with the cease and desist order over her advice?
MR. HARVEY:

No, I'm not saying quite that, Madam,

because the Legal Division does not issue a cease and desist
order.

We make recommendations to the Commissioner.

We couldn't

have gone ahead, Ms. Thayer couldn't go ahead under our
Department's rules, though she is a Deputy Commissioner as we are,
and in theory she could sign a C&D Order, but under Mr. Crawford
and Mr. Davis' rules, we are clearly not authorized to do that,
none of the attorneys are.

A cease and desist order is signed

only by Mr. Davis or Mr. Crawford, and so going ahead with it is
not up to one of the attorneys, except as an adviser.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

I'm not a lawyer, thank God, I'll

tell you right now because it gets more confusing.

Both you and

Ms. Sakamoto felt that a cease and desist order was in order.
MS. SAKAMOTO:
MR. HARVEY:
ASSEMBLYWOt~N

MR. HARVEY:

Yes.
Yes, Madam.
WRIGHT:

You did.

I don't know if you heard her answer.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

Yes, I did.

You also made that

known to Mr. Crawford.
MS. SAKAMOTO:
MR. HARVEY:

Yes, we did on a number of occasions.
Vehemently, yes, on a number of occasions.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

Well, it seems very strange to me

that if you two attorneys advising Mr. Crawford felt very sure
that the cease and desist order should go forward that the advice
from what you're telling me is the legislative liaison and a
Deputy Attorney General that he took their advice over yours.
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MS. SAKAMOTO:

Well, I think part of this also is the

fact that Lincoln is a southern California association.

It is

located in southern California, and it: is my perception, anyway,
t~at

Ms. Thayer being from the south was the primary attorney on

the case and that's why it was being handled primarily down in
that office.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

It just seems to me that it would

be even more so to accept your recommendations over hers because
of her probable relationship with southern California, and maybe
thinking things are done a little different in southern California
than northern California, but I really feel that you are almost
two people who had, well, you are absolutely removed, and
therefore what you were looking at was documentation and facts
before you in making your determination, would you say I was
correct in that ?
MS. SAKAMOTO:

Well, the documentation I think that we

had before us at the time the C&D was drafted, was limited I
think.

The bulk of the work papers and what the examiners were

working on were in the Los Angeles office.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
mind.

•

Go ahead, because it boggles my

It really does.
MR. HARVEY:

If I may, Madam,

answer to your question.

just a partial additional

I think if you go out and hire three

attorneys on any complicated question, you're going to get three
different pieces of advice, and you're going to have to decide.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

You're going to get four, you're

going to get the three and then what the summation of the three
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are becomes the fourth.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Mr. Lancaster.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

I'm trying to understand the

geographical differences here, I don't quite fathom the reason if,
you happen to be from northern California, I take it, right?
MR. HARVEY:

Yes,sir.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

And southern California is where

Lincoln was based?
MR. HARVEY:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

But I can't understand why that

should even make any difference whatsoever.

It's it's all the

same state.
MR. HARVEY:

Well, it's very common in state government

to draw a line across the state, often at the Tehachapi.
You have an office down south that handles the
associations that are headquartered .
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

. .

Well, then how did you get

involved in it in the first place?
MR. HARVEY:

Because Dick Newsom is headquartered in our

office, he's headquartered in San Francisco, and he wrote the
Order in San Francisco and we helped him.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:
that's what he testified too.

Well, I understand that I know,

So, but suddenly you were excluded

from the final decision process, is that what you're saying Mr.
Harvey?
MR. HARVEY:

I really can't answer that because I can't

say what took place in our absence.
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ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

Well, you weren't in the top

management counsel, then?
MR. HARVEY:

The last thing that I recall prior to

seeing the order was a telephone conversation with Shirley Thayer,
I think Sheila was present, but I'm not sure, in which Shirley
Thayer told us, well, I won't say told us because I can't come
close to quoting it.

I believed after talking to Shirley Thayer

that she had physically taken the order and its supporting
documents to the Attorney General and obtained his advice.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

And that's very difficult for us

to ascertain just exactly who gave advice to who around here.
MR. HARVEY:

She returned and told us that the Attorney

General had advised, and I'm not quoting, it could have been
suggested, it could have been any of the words that you've heard
used here, but somehow the Attorney General thought that it would
be best to remove that paragraph.
I had.

That is the last influence that

I didn't have another chance that I had had many times

before to say, why not just delete the phrase potential securities
violation, if that's what worries you, and that's the red herring
here today is the word "potential" and the words "securities
violation" and the word SEC has been stuck in when it's not even
there, why not just delete that phrase because the allegations
stand as they are without that phrase and support the order, the
order saying just tell the truth.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

Well, you are in northern

California and it's a southern California decision, is that what
you're sayi

?

Mr. Harvey, let me ask you this?
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MR. HARVEY:

I don't like to look at it that way.

It's

a decision of the Commissioner who happens to be headquartered in
southern California.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

Mr. Newsom, and unfortunately I

had to leave and missed part of his testimony, but I believe he
was using you and I believe you, is that correct?
MS. SAKAMOTO:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

And perhaps everybody sitting at

these tables as corroborating witnesses do and what the strategy
was and how good it was and you all

reco~~ended,

I presume, that

this strategy should proceed, is that correct?
MR. MORI:
northern California.

Excuse me, I'm the Assistant Commissioner in
I have no direct knowledge of Lincoln,

involvement in Lincoln.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

Okay.

The other three

recommended very strongly that Mr. Newsom's strategy was to
proceed, is that correct?
MR. HARVEY:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. HARVEY:

Yes.

Is that true of the other two?
I'd like to comment on that at some

length since things became a little truncated.

I did have some

prepared remarks that I wanted to make and one of them .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

.

.

Why don't we get to that, how long

are your remarks?
MR. HARVEY:

Not long.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Okay, why don't we have you present

those remarks at this time.
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MR. HARVEY:

Well, my answer to the gentleman's question

was yes.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, I

understood he wasn't going to present the remarks.
MR. HARVEY:

Well, they will be very limited.

CHAIRMAN JOHNS'l'ON:

Well, why don't you say that and if

we have any additional questions that aren't answered by your
testimony, we'll ask them at that time.
MR. HARVEY:
a little background.

First, I wanted to give the Committee just
Who am I?

I'm an old retired lawyer with

well over 20 years experience, a good part of it was litigation.
I retired from private practice, got bored, and five years ago,
September 1984, took a job with this Department.
That's who I am.

It's been fun.

I'm not a friend of Dick Newsom.

that on the record.

I

want to put

I've never had a drink with Dick Newsom.

I've never gone to lunch with Dick Newsom.

I've never gone to

Dick Newsom's horne, though I did invite him to my horne once to use
my computer, he declined.

But I have worked with Dick Newsom

quite a bit in the last few years.
an unusual person.

I have found Dick Newsom to be

He has a dedication to work and a dedication

to the truth which is absolutely unusual in what I have seen of

•

the civil service.

I have carefully studied Dick Newsom's first

written testimony that I believe was on the 29th.

I

have obtained

through the Committee and through Dick Newsom a written copy of
his oral testimony.

I have reviewed additional testimony that he

submitted on the 5th of December.

Particularly on the issues

involving Mr. Rehm and Shirley Thayer, everything Dick Newsom said
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is precisely accurate.

In general, I support all of his

testimony, plus what I heard here today.

I don't know all of the

facts, so I can't corroborate every little thing he said and
sometimes I would use different words to express things than Dick
does.

In general, I would corroborate everything he says.

Now,

as to this controversy which I'm sure the Committee is very tired
of hearing about, who said what, I do want to point this out.

If

one was a lawyer, one might see it as multiple stage hearsay.

I

don't want to confuse you with lawyers' stuff.
ASEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
MR. HARVEY:

Please don't.

I don't believe in it.

C.H. Rehm told Shirley Thayer some things.

Apparently,

I wasn't there, Newsom

wasn't there, nobody was there so we don't know what he told
Shirley Thayer.

There's a small exception to that which I'll cite

in a moment.

Then, Shirley Thayer told me and Sheila Sakamoto

some things.

My memory of the things that Shirley Thayer told us

concerning the removal of that paragraph, now, that's what I'm
talking about.

My memory is a little vague about all the things

she may have said except one thing that happened to hit me
peculiarly and so it stuck in my mind, and that was that C.H. Rehm
had suggested, recommended or thought the paragraph should be
removed because he lacked sufficient securities law expertise to
defend it.

That stuck in my mind.

I can't remember the other

things she said, to be very honest with you.

Now, on November 27,

two days before Newsom testified here, we had that telephone
conversation that Newsom has referred to with C.H. Rehm and,
indeed, as part of that conversation, we brought up that old
126

question and Newsom's testimony was essentially accurate, I would
phrase it somewhat differently.

In the beginning, Mr. Rehm had no

memory of the event and that was very peculiar for reasons that
I'm going to mention a little later.
Mr. Rehm.

I don't mean peculiar as to

It's not intended as criticism of him.

As our

conversation went on on the 27th, C.H., as we call him, he likes
to go by his initials, he said, well, I vaguely begin to remember
it and one of us quoted that securities expertise thing to him,

•

and he said something like, well, I could have said that, because
I don't have any securities law expertise.

Now, I took that as

corroboration, that he had told Shirley Thayer what she had told
us, that's the little exception to the multiple hearsay.

Now, let

me briefly explain why I thought it was peculiar that Mr. Rehm
didn't have any memory.

This cease and desist order was probably

the hottest cease and desist order that had been undertaken in the
five years since I've been with the Department.

We all discussed

it and discussed it in telephone conference calls with
Commissioner Crawford and Chief Deputy Davis, and it was clearly
planned.

It may have been on my recommendation, because this is a

standard recommendation of mine, bring the Attorney General in
early when there's a problem expected so that we'll have his
advice early, and so that he, the individual deputy that's
assigned, will sign onto the matter, so to speak, so that he will
enthusiastically defend us in court, because he's passed on it
previously.

He's had input.

Normally, we engage the Attorney

General's services by what I call an engagement memo.

It's a

memorandum to the supervising attorney general, it's Mr. Marner
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down in Los Angeles.

I've written a number of them.

We ask for

their services, we tell them what we want, and normally the
Attorney General sends us a bill for his time, they bill us by the
hour, it's roughly $80 an hour.

I have checked, I find no

evidence that there was ever an engagement memo in this matter.
can't say there was none, it's hard to prove a negative.

I

We have

checked the billing records, we find no billing from Mr. Rehm in
this matter, and Ms. Thayer has told us that Mr. Rehm wrote no
memo in this hot matter.

I would have expected that she would

have insisted that he write a memo giving his advice.

But she

says he wrote no memo, and she wrote no memo with her advice.

So,

apparently, this matter that I thought, and I believe Ms. Sakamoto
thought, was going to be handled very formally, a real hot issue
matter, turned into something that was handled very casually and
frankly, I think Mr. Rehm was sandbagged, but that's a guess
because I wasn't there.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

Mr. Rehm testified earlier that

this was treated as a mundane matter.
MR. HARVEY:

He shouldn't have if the Department had

communicated with him properly.

Yes, I heard that testimony and

I was sitting there rather amazed because Lincoln had been all
over the newspapers, but C.H. is not obligated to read the
newspapers, and I accept his testimony that to him, it was, I
don't if that was his words, but a mundane matter, yes, I heard
that testimony.

But it should not have been.

It should have been

a hot, highlighted matter, and that's why I say it's peculiar that
he doesn't remember it because he would have remembered it had it
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been that highlighted matter.

Okay, I think that's about all I

can tell the Committee in regard to .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
any,

What conclusions to you draw, if

in your own mind about the process of review of this proposed

cease and desist order in your Department?
MR. HARVEY:

Well, my conclusion is, after being in on

numerous rather bitter and sometimes vitriolic telephone
conferences with Tommy Marr saying over and over, there's no

•

grounds, there's no grounds, with Commissioner Crawford sitting
there and listening, with Shirley Thayer saying well, I don't
know, I don't think there's any grounds, and I'm talking about the
whole order now, I'm not just talking about the clause, I'm
talking about the whole thing.

And then at one point having

Harvey Shames, and don't confuse him with me, we have two Harvey's
an H.R. Harvey and a first-name Harvey Shames.

Harvey Shames, who

is an examiner 5, assistant supervising examiner in the L.A.
office, with Harvey saying in one particular telephone conference,
well, maybe we shouldn't issue an order.

Maybe we should just

send them a warning or a directive, maybe we shouldn't issue an
order, and Commissioner Crawford, and my sympathy kind of went out
to him, you wouldn't believe the yelling and screaming that went
on in this particular conversation, Commissioner Crawford must
have been very tired of hearing it, and he said, well, maybe
that's what we should do, maybe we should just issue a warning or
a directive.

Send them a letter.

My conclusion in the overall is

that the ball was drastically dropped.

It was dropped and allow

to run under the table, it was dropped years before in connection
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with Lincoln, that's my conclusion.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. HARVEY:

Who dropped the ball?

Well, I hope I'm not getting beyond where I

think the privilege has been allowed, but I've told Mr. Crawford
over and over, the buck stops with him, he's the Commissioner, so
he dropped the ball.
little bit.

Probably all of the rest of us dropped it a

Ms. Wright was asking Mr. Stelzer if he couldn't have

done something a little more with the Department of Corporations.
Sure, he probably could have.

Could I have done something?

Sure,

I probably could have, I could have broken the law and gone to the
press and made it all public.

We could have done things that we

didn't do, we all could have.

But ultimately, Mr. Crawford and

I'm sure he will concede that, has to take the responsibility,
he's the Commissioner.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Mr. Lancaster.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

You know, the purpose of all

this in reality is the development of legislation to try that
something like this not occur again, and I frankly was somewhat
dismayed that the Department did not, nor did the Attorney
General's office, feel that the question of potential problem is
sufficient for the purpose of issuing a cease and desist order.
Have you ever been involved in cease and desist orders where they
are issued on the basis of a cease of a potential problem?
MR. HARVEY:

I don't recall one.

I doubt that I was

ever involved in one.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:
MR. SAKAMOTO:

How about your colleague?

Well, I think in this case, though, we
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weren't saying the cease and desist order should be issued on a
potential violation.

What we were saying, I think, in the order

was that all of these misstatements in public documents created an
unsafe and unsound risk to Lincoln.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

Well, this word potential is a

scare word as far as justice is concerned.
MR. HARVEY:

It's a red herring.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

And so just the elimination of

that, basically utilizing the rest of the existing order, it could
have been effective in your judgment, is that correct?

Am I

assuming your testimony correct?
MR. HARVEY:

Yes.

MS. SAKAMOTO:

I think there was a basis for the

Commissioner to find that there was an unsafe and unsound risk ...
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

To eliminate the cease and

desist order based upon a legal concern about that single word
really in effect destroyed the whole
MR. HARVEY:

Well, actually it was just a paragraph.

The order was actually ...
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

Well, that paragraph removal in

effect created this circumstance.
MR. HARVEY:

If you limited your question to the

paragraph, my answer would have been yes.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

I see.

Was it your testimony, Mr. Harvey,

that you did not raise the recommendation that the potential
violation of securities law be eliminated?
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MR. HARVEY:

I don't think that was my testimony.

What

I would tell you in regard to that is that that subject was
discussed in these conference calls and may I remind the Chairman
that this went on for seven weeks.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

I'm not trying to.

We only have two

drafts of the cease and desist order . . .
MR. HARVEY:

There were more.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

I'm sure there were many, but the

ones that we have, one of them on page 3 refers to potential
securities law violations may result in liability to ACC.

The one

that was issued doesn't have that phrase, that finding, which then
leads to the order, that portion of the order.

What I'm asking

you is, so it's clear, did you as attorneys suggest that the way
around the difficulty of that language was to strip is out?
MR. HARVEY:

It was discussed repeatedly.

I'm sure that

we both did.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MS. SAKAMOTO:

Do you have a recollection of

I don't remember.

~hat?

You see, the cease and

desist order that went to the Attorney General's office had that
in it, and so it was my conclusion from that that we were all in
agreement, that we were satisfied with the way that the order was
drafted and that it was now then prepared to be reviewed by the
Attorney General's office.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Have you previously been involved in

the draft of an order using language similar to this where there
may be potential violations of law?
MS. SAKAMOTO:

No.

132

CCJ0799

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. HARVEY:

So it was unusual?

Yes.

MS. SAKAMOTO:

It was unusual, but yes,

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

And you've not been involved and

Mr. Harvey's not been involved.
MR. HARVEY:

I don't recall one, I don't recall that the

word potential was ever used.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Does anybody at the table recall

one?

•

MR. MORI:

In the Universal case, this is what I hear.

The C&D was to prevent something from, I think, from the way it's
supposed to happen, but I understood that that action had already
taken place and therefore was thrown out, or so no it was a
potential thing that was going to happen, a loan that was going to
go through, but the fact is, even though it was thrown out, I
think we accomplished what we were supposed to.
MR. HARVEY:

I should point out that in the Universal

case, it was a conservatorship, a state conservatorship, and it
was taken to court and frankly, I'd like to publicly compliment
Commissioner Crawford for the way he handled it because he was
given an opportunity to get out the back door by the judge and

•

save what some people may have thought was embarrassment.

Somehow

in the state service, losing in litigation seems to be a total
disaster.

That means that you don't file a lot of litigation

e you are scared.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
appropriately raises.

That's the point that Mr. Lancaster

What I want to be sure about
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MR. HARVEY:

That's where the word "potential" was - it

had to do with that conservatorship.

I just wanted to make the

point, we really won, even though the court terminated the
conservatorship, we won, we stopped $10 million from going out the
back door of that little association.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

And that's the same example that

Ms. Thayer used.
MR. HARVEY:

Yes, that's the example she used.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

She has a different conclusion, you

agree that it was a success.
MR. HARVEY:

I don't think it's applicable, that was not

a cease and desist order, but I have no debate over the word
"potential" - i f you don't like it, put an "X" through it.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

What I want to know is, after Ms.

Thayer had whatever conversation she had with the Deputy Attorney
General, was there an occasion on which any of you recall raising
the possibility of deleting the potential language?
MR. HARVEY:

Not after, but repeatedly before.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. HARVEY:

Repeatedly before.

Before the A.G.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

I don't want to put words in your

mouths, so tell me if this isn't correct, but just it then, was it
your assumption that if there were changes made, of if that
language might be offensive or deemed to be too risky from a legal
point of view, that the drop-back position would then be to take
out the potential violation of law and that ultimately when the
order was issued by the Department of Savings and Loan, it didn't
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delete that more narrow language that you had said could have been
done, but instead stripped out the entire paragraph?
MR. HARVEY:

For me, the answer is yes, I was quite

surprised.
MS. SAKAMO'l'O:

Well, by the time we found out that the

paragraph had been removed, the decision had already been made by
the Commissioner.
MR. HARVEY:

•

The order had been signed and released.

MR. JOHNSTON:

I see .

MS. SAKAMOTO:

And we were informed of the decision that

he was going to file.
CHAIRMAN JOHNS'rON:

But you recall in the weeks

preceding the ultimate decision raising the issue that it could be
written in a different fashion to eliminate the potential conflict
language, is that right?
MS. SAKAMOTO:

I think we did discuss that at length.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MS. SAKAMOTO:

You think or you're certain?

No, I'm not certain, but it's familiar to

me, discussions regarding that, and you know, after the C&D was
issued in the form, you know, I don't remember discussing it too
until recently.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Well, do you feel today, then, that

that language, potential conflict, should have been in the order?
MS. SAKAMOTO:

I do not perceive a problem with it.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

You do not perceive a problem with

it.
MR. HARVEY:

I'd answer your question just this much
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differently.

It makes no difference.

It would have been fine in

or fine out.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. HARVEY:

Okay.

I don't think a court ruling on that

paragraph, just on that paragraph, I don't think a court would
have considered that phrase as pivotal.

The point is, there were

a lot of specifics mentioned in that paragraph, a lot of
specifics.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

That's fine, I just want to

understand your testimony.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

Do you seriously feel that if the

cease and desist order had been issued in December of 1988 there
would have been prevention of much of the sale of these junk
bonds?
MR. HARVEY:

To whom is the question directed, Madam?

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
MR. HARVEY:
MS. SAKAMOTO:
MR. HARVEY:

Whoever wants to answer it.

Would you care to go first?
Go ahead.
The answer is yes.

In order to fully

explain that answer and enlarge on what Mr. Newsom said, which I
think said was quite accurate, we would have sent a copy of that
order to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
mentioned here, to put the heat on them.
something about their posterior.

That hasn't been
I think Mr. Newsom said

We would have sent a copy and I

think he mentioned this to the SEC, and if they did not file an
8(k), this i s - I'm sorry for the jargon- this is a notice of
significant events that a reporting corporation is required to
136

file, if they didn't file it, we would have been all over the
Securities and Exchange Commission saying, tell them they'd better
file it, this is a significant event.

We would have given copies

of that order to everybody you can think of.

I frankly am very

surprised, having learned recently that no copy was sent to the
Department of Corporations, even though the order is secret, when
you read the secrecy section, 8009, there are exceptions and we
could have sent it to the Department of Corporations, they
supervise financial institutions.

We could have sent it to the

FBI because it implied criminal activity and this is one of the
things I don't understand about the Attorney General's review.
don't understand their internal workings.

I

Maybe Mr. Rehm could

explain this, but it seems to me, even though in a civil
regulatory matter, if a Deputy Attorney General becomes aware of
something that could be a crime, just a potential crime, he might
refer it to somebody else in the office for evaluation.
Apparently that wasn't done, but we would have sent that order to
all kinds of people and I think the sales would have stopped.

It

would have stopped both because Keating would have been afraid not
to stop them, or they would have been stopped by public clamor
because one way or another, that order would have become public.
So, it was only $10 million, maybe, that's what Mr. Newsom
testified.

Gee, we might have saved all of $10 million, and

that's small compared to $200 million, but if it was part of your
money or mine, it would have been pretty significant.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

If you saved one person, you

saved something.
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
testimony, I appreciate it.

All right.

I'd like to ask Mr. Davis and

Mr. Crawford to come up, please.
MR. MILLER:

Thank you for your

Mr. Miller.

Both you gentlemen were present in the room

when I read to you the statement regarding your rights as a
witness before a legislative Committee and do both of you
understand that statement?
gentlemen indicated yes.

Let the record reflect that both
Do you both wish to testify voluntarily

under the conditions stated?
the witnesses stated yes.
please.

Let the record again reflect that

Would you both raise your right hands,

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you're about to

give before this Committee is the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth?
MR. DAVIS:

I do.

MR. CRAWFORD:
MR. MILLER:

I do.
Please be seated and state your name and

your present position for the record, please.
MR. WILLIAM DAVIS:

My name is William Davis.

I am the

Chief Deputy Commissioner for the Department of Savings and Loan.
MR. CRAWFORD:

William J. Crawford, Commissioner of the

Department of Savings and Loan.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. CRAWFORD:

What's going on in your Department?

I'm finding out a lot, but you have to

admit that I have 124 individuals.
MR. DAVIS:

Could I make a suggestion, Chairman

Johnston, it sounds to me from what I've heard here this morning
that you've been presented with one side of a debate and I
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understand that Mr. Newsom petitioned your Committee and suggested
that the witnesses that were here be subpoenaed, which you
accommodated.

We have sent you and in your office when you get

back you'll find three boxes of documents and exhibits that we put
ether concerning this issue.

Perhaps for you to get a fair

assessment and perspective on this matter, you should consider
subpoenaing other people that were in Los Angeles, the Chief
Examiner, the Assistant Examiner who supervised all of those
folks, and others who worked on this case, not for two months, but
for a long, long time.

I just offer that so that we present this

fairly for both sides.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

We will look at that documentation

and other that Mr. Newsom supplied today, and perhaps make that
the subject of a future hearing.

What I'd like to do today

because we've been at this for four hours, is focus directly on
the issue of the cease and desist order and what lead up to that
ision, and other matters that may be important to the
investigation of Lincoln, we'll reserve for another time when we
can look at your documentation.
MR. DAVIS:
or

r, the

rguments.

I understand.

As to the cease and desist

ssioner and myself heard discussions, debates,
We considered information from our lawyers in

San Francisco, from Mr. Newsom, from Mr. Stelzer, from ten other
ners that worked on this case, from Ms. Thayer and from the
Attorney General.

We considered all these things, we evaluated

information and the Commissioner and myself came to a
conclusion,

we made a decision.

That's our job.

It's not
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anybody elses job in this case to make tha
evaluated all the information.

decision.

We decided to

out of the cease and desist order
stronger order, and I think the

ake that portion

We felt that i

decision.

t a

oof of that is that it was not

challenged by a company that's very lit
in any way.

We

Nor

The order stood, and we felt tha
So, in terms of who's re

nded

we made t

t

i le for the eas

desist, it's the Commissioner and myself in terms of the
decision-making.

All of the things that have

n sa d today,

there's a lot of implications of things that we didn'
and we'd certainly like to respond to those a
time.

But we made the decision and I

industry in 1962.
for 28 years.

I

the

opriate

rience and our

r myself, I start

I've worked in the sav

the

s and loan business

have a respected record.

started in the industry in 1948 as an

t

think that we p obably were

appointed to our jobs as a result of our
judgment, and the experience is,

ri

ss

r

Crawford
the

r

years became the president and chief execu ive of

two

institutions.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
here.

Well, I'd like to focus our inquiry

Ms. Wright.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGH'I':

I'm just curious with all your

experience why you seem to be so concerned about whe her or not
this particular paragraph or sentence was in the cease and
order as to whether or not this company was going to take
court because you issued it.

st
to

It seemed to me that your first

concern should have been to the State of California and the
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citizens here in the State.

It seemed that you were more

concerned about a sentence as to whether you were going to be
litigat

or not.
MR

a

CRAWFORD:

rticular sentence.

We've never said we were concerned about
The cease and desist order is one

instrument that we have and the thing that we were trying to
a

ish is to go after them on three loans that they put on the

books or a series of loans, that were

•

oper to have been put on

the books and we told them they were improper, we told them not to
make any more like them, and we've told them to get them off the
books, and when t
a

s.

got them off the books, they'd have to incur

When they incurred the loss, they'd be writing off their

net worth, and that's what we told them.

We told them to get

those loans off the books within, I think, six months, and we told
them to start sending us reports within 60 days of your progress
in

tti

e

strategy of,

off the books.

is was someone elses strategy, to try to bring in

SEC thing, and we might

t we

lines

1.

rat

s, who had jurisdiction over American

is was in a high corporation domiciled in Phoenix,

zona, and we were
di

thought it was a good strategy,

communication open with the SEC and with

rtment of Co
tinen

Now that was not the

ing to try to govern it from California

securities laws that we had no jurisdiction over. the
were t
t

responsibility of the Corporation

SEC and Mr. Stelzer, the examiner in charge

communications, he was put as the liaison with the
rtment

rporations.

He was actually sent back to the SEC
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one month before we issued this order, we gave all our work papers
to the SEC.

So, they had all the story.

here put into a cease and desist or
to file an 8(k), they fi
included this.

r

So some little story
t

would rna e

an 8(k

neve

t

So they

rge securi ies

i

firms that told them they didn't even
about it.

make disclosure

And they didn't take us to cour

us to court on some potential vi

hem

.

If t

tion,

le

would have been held up until the court
the decision to take it out, it s our

d have taken

was

i

I

0

order
We

hink it was a

strong order.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

, when

're

just in your statements now, that you we e
things they had to do.

What was

or e

i

lli
1

that
11

l

if

It

it,

what would happen to them?
MR. CRAWFORD:

What do

mea

or else?

You mean

if they didn't do it?
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

You're tal i

had to do with their loans, reporting their
MR. CRAWFORD:

They

t what
ns.

to .

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

if

t

didn't do

it?
MR. CRAWFORD:

Well I can tell you what would happen, we

probably would have done what we recomme
that we would seize the institution.

back in May of 1987,

We had, we concurred in the

recommendations of Federal Home Loan Bank in San Francisco in 1987
for conservatorship or receivership, we wrote letters, I have a
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here that we wrote to Mr. Cirona on March 1, 1988,

letter ri
concurri

n

•

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

is Mr

MR. CRAWFORD:

es

He is the

in San Francisco and princi

Cirona?
of Federal Home Loan

l super

sory agent for Lincoln,

and we concurred in their recommendation that the Washington from
receivership or conservatorship, so now we're talking about a
cease and desist order and that we're going to go over to court
and get them on that, when were concurring in the grounds that
were in the federal law that we didn't have in our law for unsafe
a

unsound and dissipation of assets.

this

insolve

We could not prove with

or threatened insolvency because they had

an independent certified public accountant who had certified that
ir records were accurate and every time we tried to get the
assets written down, they had experts that said that we were
So this order,
juri
SEC

s

i

t

is to

y.
ti

•

i

s

to communicate to the people

t

lik

t

1

r work papers, give them the whole

rtment of Cor

rations or the

Stelzer was t

iaison, if he wanted to have five

, he cou

five meetings with them.

Newsom was the one t
can Continental.

t

did t

He cou

holding company examination of

't have communicate it through
nister the law for other

rtments

e

we

our own

to

nister and that's what

i

WRIGHT:
t

I have anot

r

tion for you.

Attorney General before your presentation
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on the 29th?
MR. CRAWFORD:

I was sent over a

they thought I might be ask
homework.

just so

And I went over there

tions that
could

I

answer

i

t

t

questions at all, I went over the e cold,
questions for four hours, and I answer
when I came here I answer

tever

those
me

as
all the

stions, a
sk

es ions

and lawyers do this in private practice all the time with t
re a

client if they think they're going to

me,
ir

test fy.

Nobody told me what to say.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

d you testify in Wa

i

ton,

D.C.?
MR. CRAWFORD:

Yes I did.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

con er

i

At tor

General before that?
MR. CRAWFORD:

Nope.

ASSEMBLYMAN WRIGHT
MR. CRAWFORD:
I

think they did, I

not?

I mi

t

come over,

t

think they came over a

we jus

a brief

little discussion.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

after

29th, did you then have another
Attorney General before t
MR. CRAWFORD:

ri

on

renee or discussion

th t

press release was issued?
I

lieve

Thayer had a discussion wi
the press release, I believe.

did, I think that Shirley
We used their wire service for

I can tell you that we've been

using the wire service for the Federal Home Loan Bank in
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use when you put out a news

San Francisco for quite awhile

release like we se ze a financial institution, if we went in and
eiz

l

, a

we \va

ity to

i

t

to

ou , we

t somethi

out to wher

it

ove

't have the

all the wire

services, but the Federal Home Loan Bank in San Francisco have
people with expertise and we have to

rticular not to create a

run on an institution and if we do create a run, they're the ones
that have to cover it with advances.

It's much better that we let

them issue the release, because then if they got a run, they had
their two cents worth in, you see.
release right

re that I

Keating had put out a
institution was

t

And frankly, here is a news

out on February 10, 1989, that

1 in the paper that the sale of this

nent and we put out a press release and we

them issue a press release that the sale was not imminent, so
if

we're afraid of

arl

Keating or Lincoln Savings,

're
IGHT
thi

it s

v

e is

strange
n

MR

ce
rt a

w n
as we can

months, that • . •

f

want to tell
v1an t to

ri

You

th

lose or draw.
t we

, in government
t, they never want to lose

, if

that's normal.
never

I

because this became such a high

t

CRAWFORD:

rs a

't think you are, but

No, I

listen to that all the

ve to step up sometime and

We

't wait to

it and we try to be as
100% right before we

t

Well, I just don't understand why
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in this particular instance you

to use a press release from

the Attorney General and didn't
MR. CRAWFORD:

your own.

Well,

from the Attorney General's

fice.

I

ieve

was with them and we thought we ought t
we could get it.

went out v1as

ess release
t

the thi

I think a lot of

lict
as ri

t

as

e

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

Do

cal i

Mr. Newsom

MR. CRAWFORD:

lutely no , Mr. Newsom is a

liar or .
No,

excellent examiner, he's an excel
job, he's got his battery

t

, he
pre

r

a great
s a

h

man.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

Well,

s

t

don't you think?

, I l

MR. CRAWFORD:

Mr. Stelzer and Mr. Newsom, a
junk yard dogs, that's our

e
we encou

r

Mr. Ha

I just wi

listened to them sooner in this i

Maybe once in a while we

we

We

ke

siness.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

MR. CRAWFORD:

t

sue.

We liste

i

to

Believe me, Mr. Newsom is not a st a
I'm the strategist and Mr. Davis are

t

or not

all the t

't listen to

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

have

ist

r this

rtrnent.

strategists.

Would you have done anything

differently.
MR. CRAWFORD:
done in relat

Frankly, on Lincoln I like what we've

n to the law we have, and, yes if I was going to do
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something, I'd go back and get the law changed back in 1985 when I
came to work and
l

'd con

to learn t

t

rm it to the federal law.

t I had to do that, but I did.

It took me a
We didn't

get it done until April of this year, but it should have been done
fore.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:
MR. CRAWFORD:

That's SB 391, right?

Yes.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Who carried that?

We have some other provisions that

we've tried to take your advice on in a bill that I would hope
will become a
Ms. Wr

ttee bill, and when you have an opportunity,

'11 want to join me in co-sponsoring that.

t, I'm sure

Mr. Lancaster.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:
Mr. C

rd

r

Linco n to divest

know,
to

o divest of the Southmark, the
tever else.

CRAWFORD:
r d

tti

e

t wou

losses a

, let's

write the net worth down.

if

s x mon
i

n

rmat

MR

Would that have been helpful in

had to wait another six months, you

to do

t according to the order, and if

in five mon
ive

punish them more than anything

those assets off the books because they'd

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:
i

fully understand,

today, you in the C&D order, you felt

r

rtrain and
MR

test

To see if I

, you would have had more

to maybe do something re

tive to .••

This company, the biggest problem with it
147

nno811
GU

~

llion in

was capitalized interest, they capitalized almost $300
interest and backed it out of
and overstated earnings.

nse whi

net worth

overstat

did.

That was the biggest thi

agreement.

The second thing they did, they got this tax-shari
The third thing they did, they

all

ofits on

se

n

Valley and those were write downs that were $100 million, you
know, so we're talking about something

re that could have

affected maybe $10 million worth of subdebt, so we had, you know,
we have to go after them for the major thi

s, a

that's what we

were doing.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

Well, Mr. Crawford

puzzles me and perhaps you can give me the answer.
whereas's and that's really what we've

one thing
In the
t is the

en talki

whereas's, not the therefore it be resolved, in
part of the deleted language mentioned t
Ponchartrain, $35 million held

i

res,
sts

trai

the

certain other things in the R&A,
original order and that was

se

are a

lis

line you were deleti

in,

, a

in the resolved, I call it that, they are going to call
further be directed that they divest of this proper y.

t
Wou

't

it have made sense to put that in, you want to remove the word
sense to

potential, that's one thing, but wouldn't it
leave the rest of that language in there so
would know that that's

t

poor buyer

reason they have to divest of this

property because it cost $35 million .
MR. CRAWFORD:

Let me just say, if you remove the word

potential, then you have to prove it and that was our problem.
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ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

Well, you told them to get rid

of it, didn't you have to prove that anyway?
MR. CRAWFORD:
elations, t

t's

re the word potential carne Erorn.
ential, then

word

r

things.

Now you're talking about the SEC
If we had

would have to prove those

That's where we had a problem, was that .
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

le parag

Let's say you just removed that

, couldn't you have left in about the fact that

rtrain was being covered by $35 million mortgage and all
that ki
of

stuff,

cause at the end, you say, you know, get rid

t

MR
e

CRAWFORD:

to

r

s, t

Well, when they got rid of it, they'd of

that mortgage off, it would have been off the

were getting rid of a $20 million loan that was

rdinate to that, and when they would have gotten rid of the,

s
tri

to deed the title to that, I'm sure that San Azento Savings

wou

called their $35 million loan and they would also call,
lieve there was a $5 million guarantee out, so this company
i

to

punished pretty severely with disposing of the

rtrain Hotel.
LANCASTER:

So you figure that the first

with the potential in effect tainted the whole
, is

t

t

what you're saying, Mr. Davis?

That section you

raw.
MR. CRAWFORD:

Yeah, we didn't like the word potential.

LANCASTER:
le sect

But the whole thing, then, the

tainted, in effect, of the whereas's and the
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whereas's is why you issue the order to divest.
MR. CRAWFORD:

Well, we issued the order to divest
had not disclosed

because of the conflict of interest that t

The $20 mill on was

s.

and the fact that the loan was a

e ,

advanced to fund the shortfall on this

wasn't disburs

, but Mr. Newsom

money had already been di

rs

the hotel was

Well,
t

to divest

r

the

Do not c

C&D?

o sum

t

r

up so in my own mind, you clearly felt t
was very, very important for t

t

lo .

a

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

lion of

e, $18

out

est of

it.
MR. CRAWFORD:

I

think it

atten

on.

I

think it got their attention.

attention of the people buyi
MR. CRAWFORD:

these i

Well,

discussion, Mr. Stelzer went back

e at

the

k

SEC, you know, if we can't convince

how a e we

i

to

know?

ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

lie awareness is sometimes a

difficult thing to accomplish, but in this case,
was vital to people that were unsu
MR. CRAWFORD:

the

the work

t

convince the little old lady,

n.

nts fr

t

ti

Well, t

pr

lie awareness

rs, in

judgment.

tus was so confusi

page 13, 47, 59, it's
ASSEMBLYMAN LANCASTER:

That was referenced to somethi

else at all times.
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MR. CRAWFORD:

That's right.

When you try to read that

stuff, it's rnumbo-jumbo.
that is something,

LANCASTER:
Mr. Cr

for

it's tough

utu e l

a eas to try to, you know,

islati

it's like an insurance poli

you should try to clarify it as much as
MR. CRAWFORD:

but by the same token,
ssible.

I agree.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
testimony, we appreciate it.
Attorney General, who

Okay, thank you very much for your
I note in the Committee room the

s not been asked to appear before this

Committee, but since he is here, I might ask Mr. Van de Kamp, is
ther

anything as t

like to

in r

head of the Department of Justice, you would
rd to this matter?

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Is he bei

sworn in?

Yes, sure.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

He wasn't here before.

'd

MR. JOHN VAN DE KAMP:
WRIGHT:

to be sworn in.
at all the legalese we have

re.
CHAIRMAN

We would be happy to swear in all

itnesses.
MR. MILLER:
. Van

Do

to give
tru

Would you raise

r right hand,

emnly swear that the testimony you are
is Committee will be the truth, the whole

t

, and

DE KAMP:
MR. MILLER:

truth?
I do.

Thank you.

State your name.
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MR. VAN DE RAMP:

John Van

members of the Committee.

irman and

Mr.

I've heard some of the testimony this

morning and of course I follow this very closely in the press,
particularly since your November 29th hear

, a

here because I wanted to do a

MR. VAN DE RAMP

(inaudible) indicate what is goi
so I

on in some other areas as well,

hope I can be informative.

First of all, I feel duty-bound

to defend the integrity of the Attar
matter.

came ove

The lawyer in this case,

General's office in this

Deputy Attorney General C.H.

Rehm, who you've met, and you've heard this morning, and it seems
to me that the testimony you've
Thayer meshes pretty well

pretty well settles I

secondhand information that Hr. Newsom
off, but off to a certain extent
impressions.

Mr. Rehm, I

had been at the London

think some

t was not too far

crea

i

sl

some

th s goes to a

ht

think Mr. Lancaster had ask

t

wit

Econom

l

back in September, 1988, so he wou

I don't know how much he real

stion I

ss a few mi
s

come

r a

a

r

n the

not

newspapers about the Lincoln Savings a

came in from Ms. Thayer.

from Mrs.

rd from him a

Loan be

re

knew before the tel

t time and
call

Seven years in the Attorney General's

office, as he testified, he carne to me in our office from the
District Attorneys office in Los
closely with Bob Philabotian.
before, he had worked in

les

re he worked very

And as you heard in testimony
lican

igns.

I interviewed him

when he came to the office.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

What's that got to do with it.
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MR. VAN DE KAMP:

tence and he was reinstated by my office

professionalism and

to

a

has been an outst

knowl

General, a

certain

t

He has a high reputation for

was a routine tel
him to be t

s been made about this,

east it certainly appeared to

irley Thayer

about it ad nauseam today
Mi

a lot

call, at

t, from

violations.

n working with him there.

since I have

rd about today,

ing Deputy Attorney

t focused, and we've talked

about the language of potential

you, he was not brought into the strategy,

Mr. Newsom didn't call h
strategy with r

, Ms. Thayer didn t talk to him about

ct to this o

r, or about all or what now

appears to be the in-fighting within the Department.
merely ask

about t

order, whether he saw a problem here as she

did, and he said,
lawyer

,

'd

same t
r

see a problem and I'll lay you odds that

I

ed at this wou

ific, you've
just potent

lators.

so he said he concurred.

a

t.

We

not

e the law.

know, one

the
rson

on this, if

vot

t

tion and

a pretty darn good job

stions being raised.
I

ree

You talk about,

that and I think that the first

really want to get serious, Mrs. Wright,
to this Legislature.

o re
n?

We provide legal advice and

Now, a lot of blame is being cast around here today and

I've heard some

comes r

At the

the testimony is clear, we are not the

i

rtments in liti

•

say, yeah, you've got to be

ndicate what violations there are, not

l violations,

, I

He was

In 1982, how many of you

nvestment situation with respect to savings
How

you voted "yes" on the Nolan bill?

How
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many of you.

Good, good for

But the majority certainly of this Legislature did, and
I think we are all ruing that day and I would hope if something
comes out of this, that you follow some of the leade ship that's
been taken to make sure that that mistake is undone as well as
providing to the Department of Savings and Loan the kind of
personnel that's necessary to enforce the law.
your opening statement today, it was r

As you heard in

to nearly an all-t

low, at least in recent memory, what in 1983, they are the
enforcing arm of the state with respect to the savings and loan
industry, it's not the Attorney General's office.

If you want to

grant us that authority and change the law, let's proceed in that
direction.

But in my view, they are t

state in this particular area.

chief enforcer for the

So I think, you know,

Mr. Newsom's statement today used the word red herring, I think
that's accurate with respect to trying to make us the fall guy in
this particular situation.

The Department . . .

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

On this point .

No, let h

finish his sentence,

Ms. Wright.
MR. VAN DE KAMP:
Mr. Rehm.

The Department got good advice from

As one of their own witnesses indicated, there was

never any request made of us for anything in writing.

It was not

elevated in our Department to a high state of interest.

No calls

ever carne through to me, to Dick Martland, or to the section heads
involved here with respect to this particular case.
shot proposition.

It was a one

Now, Ms. Wright, you had a question.
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

Yes, the one thing I was

t is what you just said.

cancer

said this morning in the testimony?

Har

n

Are you contradicting also

DE KAMP:

Please refer to me as to what

are referring?
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
. Har

The attorney for the Savings and

, said that the information that passed between
Ms. Thayer gave the impression that Mr. Rehm said you

t

rtise as far as the SEC ruling was concerned.

t

DE KAMP:

What was said has been taken . . .

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
rring.

r

l

And that's the part that has been

. VAN DE KAMP:
Mr

Can I point you to both the statements

Ms. Thayer today, who were parties to that

t was said was yes, I don't have any great
se at SEC

t I think as a lawyer I have problems with
was never any implication that we would
ings and Loan if they went ahead with the

sent to us, he merely pointed out a problem and I
Mr. Rehm were absolutely clear on that.

r

WRIGHT:

I
t

But it seems to me what you are

contradicting what Mr. Harvey said.

DE KAMP:

I am contradicting, because I'm basing

on the basis of the first-hand testimony
were party to that conversation.

What

ng to and I don't doubt his veracity, is
what I think he put together, and I think
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that's happened and I think today we can come to closure on that.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

What he testified to was that

Ms. Thayer told Mr. Harvey of the conversation between Mr. Rehm
and Ms. Thayer.

May I just say one more thing and then I'm going

to shut up and I may even leave the room, you may bank on that.
I think the point here is I don't understand, Mr. Van de Kamp, why
you felt that you yourself, it was necessary to come here and make
any statements before this Committee, number one, and number two,
I would really appreciate it if you would consider on behalf of
your department, since you feel you want to defend it, that you
would contradict or at least apologize to Mr. Newsom for calling
him a liar when he already had three people come up and verify
what he said.
MR. VAN DE KAMP:

Mrs. Wright, first of all, you have

been impugning my integrity from the time that Mr. Newsom was here
on November 29.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
MR. VAN DE KAMP:

The Department.

No, it was more personal than that,

let's be honest.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
MR. VAN DE KAMP:

Okay.

We're on opposite political parties

and I know what's going on here.

And you know what is going on.

We have a professional obligation to maintain here and I'm just
telling you what the facts are in this particular case.

What was

said in the newspapers in response to what Mr. Newsom said which,
by the way, he has said today and he has said before, although it
was somewhat cushioned at that point, was that he had indirect
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information about this conversation.
that's right.
to see.

There was a conversation,

And I think what was said is now out there for all

As I say, a routine request, we did not tell the

Department what it should do, we did not make the decision.
Everyone, I think, who is directly involved agrees on that.

What

was said in response, I think, before is that he's either wrong,
mistaken or is a liar.
kind of word.

•

I don't like to use, frankly, the latter

I think he was wrong.

And I'm not going to use the

word liar because I doubt, I have no reason really to think . . .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

I think your press secretary was out

of line.
MR. VAN DE KAMP:

Well, let's let that go.

The fact of

the matter is
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
didn't make that statement.

Well, Ms. Wright, Mr. Van de Kamp
He's here voluntarily to comment on

this issue as the head of the Department, as Mr. Crawford has been
cooperative, I think we ought to let them complete that, and
advise the Committee of other actions that he and his Department
is taking and then we will be done with this.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
MR. VAN DE KAMP:
is well-intentioned.

Okay.

I think, by the way, that Mr. Newsom

That he obviously has seen some problems,

he's argued inside his own Department on this.

Obviously he feels

very strongly about it and is trying to do the right thing.
God bless people who try to do that.

And

You've got to be careful,

though, when you're in a public forum that you don't tar other
people unfairly, that's an obligation that we all have who are in
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public life and I think those of us who are lawyers feel strongly
about that.

Enough said about I think the issue that brought you

here today.

I would just like to briefly indicate what we are

doing.

First, at the request - that's not quite right, I should

say it was our request that joined in by the two departments that
we'd open an investigation some while ago about the sale of these
bonds, as whether or not it might violate state law.

We did that

because there was no other public entity engaged in that and as
you know, I think there was testimony in Congress and elsewhere
that there were laws that might be violated and I opened that on
our own after reading about it in the newspaper with the
concurrence of the two Departments.

It became clear to me,

however, that there was a lot more that had to be done in this
situation.

One, we had defended and are defending the two

departments in the civil lawsuits that have been filed against
them and the State of California.

Our Tort section came into the

cases, I believe, in early September.

And by the way,

just to

pick up on this, we did not prepare or talk to any witnesses
before the Congressional testimony because the lawsuits had not
been filed at that point.

It was only afterwards.

And so there

had been, as you know, discussions that our lawyers had had in a
sense letting them know what they are apt to be questioned about
before their testimony here, I think, on November 29, but it was
not for Congress.

Now, one, no public official, no agency, no

public agency anywhere, has taken any concrete action to try to
get the money back for the 23,000 people who are out in this
particular case.

Yesterday I announced that we were opening a
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civil investigation under our own authority, this is exclusive of
the two departments, and it's not in conflict with the situation
that we're in with them, to pursue recovery for those who have
lost money in this fraud.
for the state to do.

And I think that is absolutely critical

How are we going to do that?

We will

conduct a regular investigation, using the powers that we have,
using the unfair practices law in California, ultimately if we
find adequate facts to bring an investigation, as well as a
prosecution that will lie against those who are responsible for
this.

Second, I think it is absolutely incumbent that the State

concurrently, with federal authorities, run a full criminal
investigation to determine whether anyone in California, public
servant ot private party, had any kind of criminal culpability in
this matter.

There are allegations that have been raised hither

and yon about that.

Because we have represented the Department,

starting in September, we are precluded under the case of
Deukmejian versus Ralph in doing that ourselves.

And so I have

put together a task force involving two of the three primary
counties of where Lincoln Savings and Loan is involved, Sacramento
County, Steve White the D.A. here, Ira Reiner in Los Angeles, who

•

is dedicating a small unit to open this up, we've asked Orange
County to join in this, but Orange County for its own reasons
declined to join.

They will be looking at this case from the

criminal standpoint, bottom up, and are into this as of now.

So

that was announced yesterday and I only bring that to you to
assure that I think we're moving ahead on two fronts, one what we
can do to get civil recovery for the bond holders today, and there
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may be some parties out there from whom recovery can be obtained
in whole or in part, as well as a full, no-holds-barred
investigation as to whether or not there's any criminal conduct by
anyone in this state in this matter.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

I appreciate your reporting to the

Committee, Mr. Van de Kamp, and I applaud your action to appoint a
special prosecutorial unit to examine any criminal wrong-doing in
this matter, and I think that your investigation of sources of
recovery for the 23,000 Californians who hold those worthless
bonds is certainly appropriate.
of that action.

We are pleased with your report

Ms. Wright on that issue.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
ask one more question.

I'm going to break my promise and

Is it not possible for you to seize the

assets of Lincoln in order, because what I'm thinking of, is when
there was a situation with a thrift and loan in northern
California that Mr. Boatwright and Mr. Baker carried legislation
on and which the state loaned money in order to pay back these
people who had lost in those investments, they turned around and
the assets were seized and at that point, and I understand as of
today, with the sale of those assets, that the total loan was paid
back to the State of California.

Is there a possibility of

seizing the assets of Lincoln?
MR. VAN DE KAMP:

Mrs. Wright, as I understand it, what

Lincoln Savings and Loan was, what, taken over, was it April of
last year, April 14 of last year, so the assets in a sense are
today under state control through the Department of Savings and
Loan.
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

And are they going to sell those

assets?
MR. VAN DE KAMP:

I don't know what they are going to

do, I'd have to refer you to the Department of Savings and Loan
for that.
CHAIRMAN JOHN&TON:

Okay, I think this draws this

portion of the hearing to a close.
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND:

Mr. Seastrand.
In your investigation for the

bond holders, will you be looking at possibly any wrongdoings by
the auditors?
MR. VAN DE KAMP:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND:
MR. VAN DE KAMP:
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Arthur Young.

The answer is yes.
Okay, thank you very much.

Mr. Taggart, our next witness, has just arrived from southern
California by way of the bay area because of the fog.

We're going

to take a brief recess of about five minutes and then we'll take
his testimony.

[FIVE MINUTE

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

BREA~]

We have one remaining witness,

Mr. Larry Taggart, former Savings and Loan Commissioner.
Mr. Taggart, I'm going to ask Mr. Miller of the Legislative
Counsel's office, to swear you in as we do typically with all the
witnesses.
MR. MILLER:

Mr. Taggart, under the provisions in the
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Government Code that describe your rights as a witness before the
Committee and I provided you with a copy of those rights.

Did you

understand those statements as set forth in that Government Code
provision?
MR. LARRY TAGGART:
MR. MILLER:

Yes.

Do you wish to testify voluntarily under

the conditions stated in that provision of the Government Code?
MR. TAGGART:
MR. MILLER:
please.

Yes.
Okay, would you raise your right hand,

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you're about to

give before this Committee will be the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth?
MR. TAGGART:
MR. MILLER:

I do.
Okay, would you be seated and state your

name for the record, or stand.
MR. TAGGART:

Thank you.

Yes, my name is Lawrence W.

Taggart.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Mr. Taggart, you're the unrepentant

chief proponent of deregulation, is that a fair characterization?

MR. TAGGART:

I would say, yes, I was saddled with that

when I took the position, a bit unawares of what was really
occurring, but I would say I'm a proponent of deregulation, yes.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

I don't know if you have any

introductory comments, I would like to cover some of the ground of
when you carne on board as Savings and Loan Commissioner for the
State of California, and what occurred during your tenure as to
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resources of the Department and enforcing the law which had
recently changed, the approval of savings and loan applications,
and a couple of specific questions relative to Lincoln.

Do you

have any opening remarks?
MR. TAGGAR'l':

I have no prepared opening remarks, but:

I'll be happy to address what you've asked.

I am going to give

you a little brief history of my background, maybe that will
explain how I came into the office.

I was previously with Great

American First Savings Bank, formerly San Diego Federal, for
twelve years and held positions as commercial loan officer, and a
branch manager, and legal counsel, and loan servicing manager, and
had directed a number of mergers and acquisitions, and so forth,
for the company.

My father and my sister and brothers were also

with savings and loans, so I felt somewhat familiar with savings
and loans at the time I came in.

I'm also a graduate of the

savings and loan graduate school in Bloomington, Indiana, it's a
three year program, and was appointed by the Governor and took
office March 9, 1983.

That was about two months after the Nolan

bill had hit in California.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

How did you come to be selected, are

you familiar with the process?
MR. TAGGART:
you the truth.

I'm still not familiar with it, to tell

I went through the interviewing process, had

understood that they were taking candidates, and that the
candidates names would come in from anywhere in the state, if
somebody sponsored them or sent a letter, and a letter was sent by
another organization, not Great American, from Horne Federal to the
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Governor, rather unbeknownst to me .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Home Federal of San Diego?

MR. TAGGART:

And my father had been employed

Yes.

there, I didn't really realize what happened but the Chairman of
Home Federal I think had sent a letter to the Governor and I was
then called later on to ask if I wanted to participate in the
interviewing process.

And I said, I'll be happy to get

interviewed, so I went up to Orange County once, and I was up here
again being interviewed, up her and it's a three or four month
process.

In a list, I don't know, some list of candidates, it's

not clearly known exactly how this happens.

I came from a federal

association at that time, it's now state-chartered, but it was a
federal association.

I was familiar with the disparities in the

laws between the two associations and somewhat of the jealousy
that the federal associations had for state-chartered associations
at the time.

I was not that familiar with the Nolan bill when I

came into office because I had come from a federal association, I
was really much more familiar with the federal regulations, so I
came onboard March 9, 1983.
time.

It was a very interesting period of

Trying to get our staff together, I think the Department of

Savings and Loan had been decimated at that time and they had
something like 42 employees, down from about 165 employees several
years previously.

There were 105 associations and there were

considerably more than double that in previous years.

There was

kind of a lackluster spirit within the Department, I think they
needed some direction at that time.

A number of associations had

converted from state to federal chartered associations because of
164

the more favorable federal climate they felt, regulatory climate.
So a number of things had happened in the Department and this new
spirit of deregulation was coming on the seen, the Garn St.
Germain Act was passed in 1982, Congress had kind of signaled that
it wanted deregulation within the industry.
suffering dramatically from 1980 to 1983.
losing money in California.

The industry was
Most associations were

It was necessary to get them back on

their feet and they had not found a way of doing it through strict
home finance.

Even though I am for home finance, they had to have

other means of raising profits.

So it was a difficult period

coming into 1983 for associations in California.
difficult times making money.

They had

And then deregulation again hit

from the federal side with the Garn St. Germain and then the Nolan
bill in California effective January 1, 1983.

It was about a

month after I was in office, and we have a split office, one in
Los Angeles and one in San Francisco, and I came into my office in
San Francisco and pretty soon I saw applications starting to pile
up on my desk and I asked the staff, what are these?

And they

said these are applications for new savings and loans and I said,
my goodness, and there were more and more each week, and I guess·
probably for a year prior to that time, there was a tremendous, I
think, amount of promotion out in the industry and at the
conferences and conventions, to obtain new S&L's.

I think that a

number of entrepreneurs in the late 1970's made a considerable
amount of money in real estate and other related activities.

They

found that, I think, in the early 1980's that the S&L represented
some diversification, and it was another asset they could possibly
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acquire at that time, it only took $2 million, and seemed like a
relatively secure safe horizon for them.
started tightening up the criteria.

By June of 1983, we

When I came into office, we

were probably, and I'm just guessing, 60 to 70 applications
already in process within the Department in various stages.
Throughout the course of the two years I was there, there were
probably a total of 200 or 210 that had come through the system.
The exact amount we had approved was less than that, I don't know
the exact number.

I think in the two-year period, there were

probably another 50 that came in, I think there were 155
associations by the time I left.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. TAGGART:

What we did .

How many did you approve?

The Counsel from the Department of Savings

and Loan, I would guess
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. TAGGART:

The number 200 is sometimes cited.

I don't believe we approved 200 at all,

there were 200 somewhere in the system.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
federal insurance.

The process that you went through to approve

MR. TAGGART:
Department, either.

I understand, well, many did not get

Well, many didn't get through our

About halfway through 1984, it was very clear

that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board had issued, they hadn't
issued anything, it was an informal moratorium that they were
putting on associations.

I met with them continually about new

associations and nobody ever told me to turn off the spicket.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Who was supposed to tell you to turn
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off the spicket?
MR. TAGGART:
of accounts.

It would be the FSLIC who issues insurance

Somebody, nobody ever told us we're not going to

issue any more insurance of accounts .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

You said you carne from a federal

institution before you carne on as a California regulator.

How did

you view the dual system, what was the point of having a state
chartering system in the state regulatory apparatus?
MR. TAGGART:

That's a very good question.

It's one of

the first times people have really brought up the issue of the
dual system.

I feel it was very important to have a good balance

within the financial industry and at the time I came in, probably
a little prior to that, I believe it was probably weighed more
heavily to the federal side.

The state chartered associations

were becoming decimated in many of the states.
pretty strong.

The fed's were

I was, because I was representing the state and

the state chartered associations wanting to bring back a sense of
strength within the California savings and loan industry, and I
believe through the Nolan act, that was my charge.

That is

signaled from the Legislature and from the Senate in California.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Did you favor the Garn St. Germain

deregulation act and what you refer to as the Nolan bill in 1982?
MR. TAGGART:

When Garn St. Germain came through, I had

felt, because associations had been struggling for about two years
prior to that time, I had felt that it was almost too little too
late.

It was a piecemeal type regulation.

It was giving savings

and loans really commercial lending powers, they wanted to look
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like banks, they wanted to call themselves banks.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. TAGGART:

Now they do call themselves banks.

Now they do call themselves banks, but

they had suffered tremendously up until about 1982, 1983.
were all losing money.

They

And they didn't see any way out except

through direct investments.

State

had an enviable position for

rtered associations really
15

rs prior to that in that

they could invest five percent of

ir assets in the typical

direct investment type of activity.

Federal charter savings and

loans only had one percent they could invest and they were very
envious of that for years and

rs.

profits centers and additional income.

It gave them additional
Rather than increasing

fed's five percent or increasing everybody ten percent, through
the Nolan bill, it effectively took them to 100%, so rather than
throw a little balance or movi

the pendulum a little bit to the

right, it went totally to the right, and totally lifted the lid
off ...
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Now that happened in 1982, which was

prior to your tenure.
MR. TAGGART:

January l, 1983, through the Nolan act.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. TAGGART:

Well, when it became effective.

Yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

But we

ssed it in 1982, that's why

Mr. Seastrand didn't have the privilege of voting on the bill.
And you were with the Federal Savings and Loan association, so
does that mean you were not involved in the promotion of that
legislation?
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MR. TAGGART:

No, not in any way.

I had understood that

maybe California Savings and Loan League was, I'm not clear about
that right now, but the industry needed something, and they didn't
know where to turn.

Probably the most dramatic regulation I think

that occurred was in the early 1980's.

If you wanted a stock

association prior to that time, you had to have 400 shareholders,
which typically made you a mutual association, you had to get them
typically from the community involved and so forth.

They changed

that law from 400 to one and all of a sudden you say, people that
had made a considerable amount of money in the late 1970's said,
you know, I can come in as an individual and I can acquire a
financial institution, it only requires one share.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Let me go to, we were talking about

the dual system, so California prior to the 1980's, had some
advantage by having some direct investment authority, even though
it was only five percent, it was still more than you had with the
federal charter.

Then, Garn St. Germain in 1980 gave federally

chartered institutions some additional powers, and we had an
exodus from California, that is the charter moved from state to
federal in the case of Home Savings, Great Western and some of the

•

major institutions, and with that went their assessments that
funded the Department of Savings and Loan, and paid for all that
staff that was supposed to keep an eye on everybody, right?
MR. TAGGART:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

So into this environment, then

ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND:
there?

...

Well may I make one point,

I don't think that there was lack of money during that
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period of time in the Savings and Loan account that paid for
auditors.

In other words, you weren't prevented during that

period of time 83-84 from hiring more people because the money
wasn't there, as I recall at some point along in there, I was told
there was like $15-$16 million of special fund money that was
available for salaries to hire auditors, and yet they weren't
hired because of a policy

not wanting to put on any more PY's

because we didn't want to see government grow.
MR. TAGGART:
those.

It's actually a combination of both of

At the time I came in, there weren't very many

associations paying assessments and the large shops were
converting to fed's, so it really hurt from that standpoint.
During my two-year tenure, I didn't feel like I was really
constrained on the money side of it because we were getting new
associations.
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND:

You had 200 associations that

had paid money in that wanted to be chartered in the State and, I
mean, it wasn't inexpensive to file for a charter.
MR. TAGGART:

It's kind of a ratcheting thing, you

probably, if you were here, saw me a lot here.

Rather than

waiting each year for the budgetary process, I came up here about
every three or four months and worked with the Legislative Analyst
Budget, Analyst continually trying to get more people and I would
ask for 20 people and I would get 10.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

I'd ask for 25 people and

The Governor on January 10 makes a

proposed budget public, sends it to the Legislature.

What did
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those proposed budgets for years 1984-85, which would have been
the ones you were involved in making recommendations to Department
of Finance, what increases did they have

MR. TAGGART:

As I

can best recall on that, I had the higher figures in there for
more examiners and auditors and so forth, and I'd get typically
half of what I'd asked for, and I would come back
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

From the Department of Finance or

from the Legislature or
MR. TAGGART:

Yes, from the Department of Finance, and

we met with them continually and it was a problem to me because I
knew what I needed and I couldn't go increase my staff and then go
a year and increase my staff and go for a year, because all of a
sudden I had this influx of activity.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Plus, you were only staying two

years.
MR. TAGGART:

Me.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. TAGGART:

I didn't know it at that time.
Oh.

And the other thing was, we had worked out

a formula with the Federal Home Loan Bank because, and we had a
number of meetings, Ed Gray was involved in a meeting, of these
new associations coming in.

Nobody said turn it off, they said

this will be the constraint, and we spent a number of meetings
designing a formula, if we have so many examiners for so many
associations, we can continue to add as we go along, and so it was
a pretty straightforward process at that point.

And it was

readjusting to all of this new interest in savings and loans in
California.

Putting a legal hat on, I had a difficult time
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discriminating against people, saying who could come in in the
industry and who couldn't, and there were advocates that said,
well, gee, there shouldn't be any more associations, but typically
they were worried about more competition.

I think the only

complaint we really got in the Department for the two year period
was the fact that we were too slow in approving applications.
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND:

You've got that right.

I was

involved at that period of time with some constituents of mine
that had applied which typically before that, as I understood it,
it was like a six month process, you made your application, went
through all the hoops, and six months later you got an
application, and two years later and a half a million dollars
later, you got the application but, of course, by that time they
had cut off the FSLIC.
to California.

FSLIC had cut off issuing more insurance

But that's what really bothered me during that

period of time and I think I probably had a conversation or two
with you over the telephone on why we couldn't put on more
auditors.

Here was an industry that was begging to be regulated,

paying up big bucks to do it, and yet here we were with 45 or 50
auditors trying to cover everything in the state, it was stupid.
MR. TAGGART:

We would have joint examinations, I think

for instance, we went in to audit American Savings and I think the
fed's, the Federal Home Loan Bank, put on something like 25
examiners, I think we put on two or three.

It was a joint

examination, but we had to rely very heavily on our federal
brother, our counterpart.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Speaking of American, in your
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federal testimony before Congress, weren't you critical of the
examination and the process by which the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board engaged in what you called seizure mania?
MR. TAGGART:

Yes.

I happened to have been in

Washington about a week and a half before they made a move on
American, and I was told by certain individuals at the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, they were directors of departments, they'd
asked me, they said, Larry, do you know Charlie Nabb.

•

I said,

well I've met with him I think four times over the two year
period, on very formal occasions, you know, in his office, I said,
but I'm not that familiar with him.

I said, why?

He said, well,

we're going to go out to California and take him over our knees
and teach him a lesson.

I said what are you talking about?

They

said, well, it's been growing too fast and very prolific and all
this stuff, and losing control, we think, so we're just going to
go out there.

I said, have you ever sat down and had a meeting

with him and asked him about their business plan, because I knew
they were on a plan, they had presented it to us several times.
And sure enough . .

.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

•

Wasn't that plan based on broker

deposits and direct real estate investment?
MR. TAGGART:

Yes, it was a difficult situation.

American was growing by leaps and bounds and it was difficult for
me to capture where they were going, they were growing so fast.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Did you find that risky strategy at

all that they were doing jumbo certificates of deposits with
boiler room phone operations and brokering, attracting brokered
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its in hundred thou
MR. TAGGART:

s?

r b

My phi

at tha

time was that it

wasn't necessarily the sources of funds that were critical, it was
the uses of the funds that were critical.

That associations were

going to make money .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

It depends on what you pay for your

money, doesn't it?
MR. TAGGART:

That's correct.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Weren't they paying above market

rates?
MR. TAGGART:

They were in and out of the market, like

all associations are, if you want to garner in funds, you're going
to raise a little higher rate than everybody else, you get your
funds and then you pull out of the market.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Weren't they mostly in during that

period because they were growing so rap

ly they had become the

largest savings and loan in the country.
MR. TAGGART:
I

.

.

They had a money desk that was incredible.

.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Why would people put money, and I

know it's headquartered in Stockton which is a very attractive
reason, but why else would they put all their money in a
Stockton-based institution from all over the country, if it didn't
offer a higher rate . .
MR. TAGGART:

.
It would be yield, most people would

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
guarantee.

Plus the insurance was the

Well, let's look at how they spent the money.

How did
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they invest their money?
MR. TAGGART:

American was kind of a potpourri of

everything you do in an S&L, including the fact that they were a
conduit.

In other words, they would be buying a lot of product

from other S&L's and passing it on thr
which is common.
offering.

I think

came out with the first euro dollar

They came out with

was issued.

, or securitizing it,

first mortgage-backed bond

t

At that time they were pretty innovative in doing

things that hadn't been done
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

n

industry before.

Well, they're still selling lots and

lots of real estate with the

nk now, that the fed's have

divided them into, American Savi

s Bank, with new management, new

ownership, and the bad bank, whi
MR. TAGGART:

is New West, right?

Yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

So

must have been engaged in an

awful lot of real estate ventures in California and other states.
MR. TAGGART:

Yes.

They being $34 billion in size at

that time, they were involved all over.
CHAIR~~N

JOHNSTON:

Well, isn't Charles Nabb your

business partner currently?
MR. TAGGART:

No.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

I resigned from there last April.
Oh, but anyway, subsequent to your

tenure here .
MR. TAGGART:

I was an offer in the company, I wouldn't

phrase it as a business partner, semantically.
ASSEMBLYMAN

didn't have any equity in

the operation, you were just a hir
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employee?

MR. TAGGART:

No, I was a hired employee, it's was just

trying to build up a mortgage operation, and I was driving too
much, it was too stressful, so I resigned.
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND:

May I ask a question about what

we were talking about earlier, about chartering these, the growth
in the ones that want to be chartered in that period of time.
Would you have had the power at that time to, in other words, you
had 200 applications, some applications were people that wanted to
start an S&L in the historic sense, broad-based ownership, do
nothing but home mortgages, not get into the land speculation
business and all the other things that were involved.

Could you

at that time have pushed these type of charter applications to the
front of the line, say, versus an application where there was one
person that was basically going to be the stockholder and maybe
was a developer or something?
MR. TAGGART:
any ...
in.

If I valued my life, I would not let

it was a very critical order when the applications came

I detected about four months after I was in office that

people were even selling positions in line.

I'll sell you my

position in line for $100,000 and you can take over my
application, and so forth.

I was continually trying to outplay

this game that was going on with new charters.

And basically I

think the Federal Home Loan Bank took them in the order in which
they were received, also.

It's amazing if you put out the

criteria, they'll qualify for the criteria, they'll tell you that
they want to be a home lender.
want to hear.

They'll tell you exactly what you

In June, what I did to tighten up the criteria in
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new shops, is we raised the capital requirement from $2 million to
$3 million, I didn't think $2 million was enough to start a new
shop with, you burned through that probably the first year.

We

required a certain mix on the board of directors, they had to be
people that were experienced in banking or savings and loans, or
thrifts or some related experiences.

I required business plans -

that was the first time it had ever been required anywhere in the
country, and that they actually had to tell us what they were

•

going to do, and you know, what next they were going to follow.
was kind of a proponent of niche financial institutions.

I

I didn't

say they all had to be the same, then they would become very
saturated in the State, but you had to tell me what your niche was
going to be and if there was a need for it, how are you going to
do it.

And so we required the business plans and pretty soon they

carne out of the word processors and they started all looking alike
within six months, and whatever criteria I used to change, they
started corning out of the word processor that way.

The only other

check you have is you run an FBI check and you run a State
Attorney General's check on the people, and if they're clean, how
do you discriminate and keep them out, legally.

And that's where

sometimes there would be complaints or this and that.

California,

being a pro-business state and pro-employment, says, hey, this is
the law, this is the criteria, if they meet the criteria, they get
a little company called a savings and loan, and I wrestled with
that tremendously.

I wasn't/ I would had one of my chief deputy

commissioners was almost solely committed to that.

I typically

spent 90% of my time flying around California working with problem
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shops.

You didn't see it in the press, but that's typically what

I was doing at the Federal Home Loan Bank, or probably 80% of my
time.

But we tried to get a handle on it, and I think we had a

pretty good handle on it.

I don't think the new shops necessarily

were the bulk of the problems that came about in 1985 and 1986.
It was the shops that were in place in 1979 and 1980, because when
the deregulation in 1982 and the Nolan bill hit in 1983, they were
in place with $100 million in assets, and they just grew a half a
billion to a billion dollars within a year or a year and a half.
They knew the system.

The new shops really didn't get a chance,

they got cut off I think as soon as they got in.

That's my own

feeling.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Speaking of business plans, Lincoln

Savings was purchased by Charles Keating and ACC in February of
1984?
MR. TAGGART:

Yes, Sir.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

According to the Federal Home Loan

Bank Board's examination from 1986-87, which was participated in
by your Department, you were gone then, but it was stated that
Mr. Keating had committed to the operation of a traditional
savings and loan institution, making home loans, and that he had
committed to retaining present management which, in the view of
the San Francisco office of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, was
important since there was no evidence that anyone in ACC was
qualified to manage a financial institution.

Do you have any

recollection of representations made by ACC or Mr. Keating when
they took over that California institution?
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MR. TAGGART:

I really don't.

application coming through.

I remember the

I remember the amount of capital, I

think it was $51 million or $50 million to pay for Lincoln.

I

knew Lincoln, I had a lot of respect for the manager of Lincoln or
the owner prior to that time, but Lincoln was an association that
was having difficulty for the prior four years.

And it appeared

that it needed a little fresh blood, I think, or an infusion of
capital or something.

•

It came through in the normal application

process, passed through staff, I don't know if it was there for a
year or six months.

I'm typically the culmination, it comes on my

desk and everything theoretically is supposed to be complete and
make a final pass on it.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Well, just using that as an example,

if a savings and loan committed to a business plan and then failed
to live up to it as Lincoln moved completely, virtually
completely, out of home lending, made eleven loans in a year
period, 1985-86, fired all the top management, installed new
people from Arizona, what recourse would you have?
MR. TAGGART:

That's a very good question.

I think it

was in September or October of 1983 that Federal Home Loan Bank
started using business plans also.

And it was a question on my

part and their part, how do you put them in check and balance when
they deviate from their business plan.
rights.

And you have various

You can issue a supervisory letter, I would probably put

out something not quite as formal the first time around, and say,
hey, we've got to have a meeting, and sit down and have a hearing
about this.

You can send out a supervisory agreement if they
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continue to . . .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

You mean a meeting, not a hearing, a

hearing sounds like it's a public event.
MR. TAGGART:

A meeting.

Tell them your concerns, if

they don't comply with it, you send out a supervisory agreement,
and if they don't comply with that, you hit them with a cease and
desist order.

And get them into compliance.

Now, what I would

have typically done is say fine, either get into compliance or
tell me why you can't get into compliance and what you're going to
do.

You can typically ask.

If you have a deviation or a

modification from your plan, it's okay, but tell me what it is
when you're doing it, don't just . . .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Well, this has obviously been

testified to you and covered in the federal testimony, but from
our perspective I'm curious about that period at the beginning of
December of 1984, just prior to your leaving state service, when
you approved direct investment of some $900 million by Lincoln
Savings and Loan in non-real estate ventures, or they were direct
raw land sales or junk bonds, and other things, that were
prohibited a few days later by the imposition of a new federal
regulation.

In your approval of that $900 million of direct

investment, what factors did you consider with respect to Lincoln.
They had a business plan that they had to show in February of that
year, by the end of the year did you review that business plan and
see if they had complied with it?
MR. TAGGART:

I'll need to give you a little historical

sketch for about six months prior to that time.

Lincoln, it
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became obvious to me probably about Jt1ne of 1984, that Lincoln was
going to be a direct-investment niche institution.

I was

impressed with them with probably the first contact I really had
with them, they submitted a request to the Department to move
their record storage, or center over to Phoenix.

This was a

California association, this is supposed to stay in California,
and I said I'm not going to do that, and they said, no, if you
could just come down here, if you'd just come down here, you'd
understand why, our whole accounting staff is here, and the legal
staff is here and so forth.

So I went down there and took the

Chief Deputy at the time, I think it was Sam Mori, and was
impressed with their operation.

At that particular time, they had

what I would consider to be a model operation.

They hadn't been

in business through that management more than maybe five or six
months, but their accounting records were, I think, impeccable,
and the legal staff and the way they ran their securities
investments and everything else, I was impressed.
lot of associations, and he was impressed too.
a model association.

I had been in a

I thought this is

They, during that period, had filed one or

more applications, I can't recall exactly how many, for direct
investment authority in certain areas.

Typically, we would spar,

we'd go back and forth a little bit on their application.

I think

one time they asked for a hundred million in a hotel subsidiary,
and I said, no, I'm not going to give you a hundred million,
that's too much, I'll give you fifty, and we'll see how you do,
and we'll see how the project comes out and then you can come in
and request an additional amount after it comes out, so during the
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year they would do that, and then I think, I don't know if it hurt
their feelings or what, but they would pull their application or
they wouldn't go ahead with it because they thought I didn't like
direct investments.
things are going.

I said no, that's not it, I'd like to see how
During that same period, I believe it was June

of 1984, there was a real concerted effort by the Federal Home
Loan Bank, the fed's, to preempt state law in California.

At that

time, I was on the board of directors of the National Association
of Savings and Loan Supervisors, the commissioners in this
country, and that particular group met continually and was alarmed
by the fact that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board was now going to
run in and preempt and cut back those states that had excessive
direct investment powers, namely California and Texas were the
most affected.

We had, I think, 100% authority.

the same authority in Texas.
coordinated it with us.

I think they had

And what alarmed me is nobody

All of a sudden they said, we're just

going to cut you back arbitrarily to 10%, and I said why not 8% or
12% -why 10%, and they said California associations now, and I'm
just using it as an example, but Lincoln, I think it predicated a
lot of their growth and everything on direct investment, they
probably had a five-year growth plan within their association,
what they were going to do, and here the federal government was
going to come in and cut it off, shortly after these bills had
been passed in California.

Myself and most of the other

commissioners and this commissioner group in the country, fought
this new imposition coming down on the states.

Okay, when you

start talking about the dual system, that's how the dual system
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works.

We assert our rights, the fed's assert their rights and

hopefully it maintains some balance in the system.

There were

meetings back in Washington on that, a number of them.

Finally, a

regulation 1 bf~lieve was proposed dnd came out limiting direct

investment authority back to 10% in California, all over the
country, and I think it was supposed to be effective in August 19,
1984 or some time around then.

There was so much flack on it and

so much criticism to it, it didn't have grandfathering provisions,
they didn't know how to deal with associations that were over 10%
already, Lincoln and other associations, and so forth.

They
I

withdrew that regulation, but it was re-introduced back in the
fall, again.
investment.

Here comes this regulation limiting direct
And it not only limited it back to 10%, it was 10% in

the aggregate, investment in securities, direct investment in
service corporations.
really only had 3%

So if you equally spread those out, you

direct investment authority, so you're coming

off with 100% in 1983 down to 3% and I said that's not fair, they
haven't examined those particular associations that are going to
be affected.

I wasn't lobbying on behalf of anybody other than

the State of California.

I felt that they were preempting

state's laws without any consideration for our laws.

Again, I

I
think I participated in a hearing back there.

I think Allen

Greenspan and everybody else was in the thing, and finally, the
regulation came out with a very short comment period, I think it
was 30 days or 45 days, it was . . .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Was Allen Greenspan working for the

government or for Lincoln Savings and that time?
183

MR. TAGGART:

At that time, he wasn't working for the

government, he may have been a consultant for Lincoln at the time,
I don't recall.

So, during this period, I called back to the

Federal Home Loan Bank and said I want to issue a comment letter
on behalf of the State of California, because it just needed more
consideration.

And some of the associations were feeling pressure

in California because all of a sudden they were taking away this
tremendous authority that they had, and it was happening all
within about 30 days.
comments?

So I asked, what do you do with the

They said, oh, we don't really read them.

We've got

about 700 or BOO comments here, we don't even read them.
kind of infuriated me.

That

And I thought, you know, people take the

time to write you, to have other proposals and everything else,
they were still going to cram this down states' throats, and
pree~pt

state law.

Then it came down, I think it was probably in

the regulation that was going to be effective on December 10, so
yes, Lincoln did come in, they had applications on file for direct
investment authority, I can't remember if there was $800 or $900
million, now, in a number of different service corporations, so
they were diversifying their activities, it wasn't all bunched in
one area, they probably had more concern than other associations,
even though they didn't really have the most direct investment in
California on a percentage basis.

During that same six-month

period, when associations came in and asked for authority for
things, the law gave them 100%, okay.
challenged on the Lincoln approval.

I could have been
They could have come, I

think, and legally challenged me - I'm cutting them back to $800
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million, when the law provided that they could go up to 100% of
their assets which would have been about a billion and a half at
that time.

That's what the law said.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Your testimony is that you trimmed

them back to $800 million?
MR. TAGGART:

The way that we were looking at it for

that year period, as I did it on basically a percentage of their
assets basis, I wanted to know whether they were 20% or 25 or ...
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. TAGGART:

How much did they ask for?

They had submitted approval for, I think,

I don't recall exactly, the papers say $800 million, if that's
what it is, that's what it is, there was so much in different
service corporations.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

I thought you said that you reduced

what they had asked for to $800 million.
MR. TAGGART:

There was a provision in the regulations

that said it was subject to the commissioners's approval.
never been challenged.

It had

It hadn't been challenged at that time.

Had they challenged this and said that the law gives us this, and
you're turning us off on this, you know, we're going to take you
to court.

There was no difficulty here because they were only

about 50% or 52% of their assets.

It wasn't alarming to me on a

percentage basis, they were about half-way there.
associations were in excess of half-way there.

Other

And then what we

did because the associations were growing so fast, is we put
through a policy within the Department, is I'd figured out an
approximate percentage basis, and we'd convert that to a dollar
185

amount, and then freeze the dollar amount rather than say I'll
give you 50% direct investment in the hotel industry, as it they
kept growing, that would keep going up.

We'd say fine, that 50%

represents "X" number of dollars and we'll freeze it there.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

You mentioned that you considered

Lincoln Savings in mid-1988 as a direct investment niche.
MR. TAGGART:

Yes.

They were probably much more

developers and builders
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

I thought the rationale for expanded

investment powers was to diversify, give institutions an
opportunity to make money, so that they could better support their
main business which is in the public interest, which is presumably
why we have the taxpayers backing up the deposits and that is home
loans.
MR. TAGGART:

I agree with you 100%, that was my

philosophy also.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Well, then, what does it mean to be

in the direct investment niche, that sounds to me like an
institution that is not focused on home lending.
MR. TAGGART:

Prior to the time they acquired Lincoln,

they were probably the leading home builder in the Phoenix area,
if you ever look at their subdivisions, they always have .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

You're talking about ACC .

MR. TAGGART:

The same group, and they'd have the

Yes.

American flag in all their subdivisions and they were basically
impeccable subdivisions.

My philosophy was, you didn't

necessarily have to be involved directly in lending as long as you
186

were involved in the home building or lending process.

Then you

were fulfilling your commitment to the country, if you built homes
and sold them, if you financed them, and I think they had the
first builder bond, they actually got involved in financing before
they acquired the association.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Where were they doing this

investment in homes or real estate?
MR. TAGGART:

Prior to that time, it was in the Phoenix

area.

I

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. TAGGART:

After they bought Lincoln Savings?

To my knowledge, they didn't get involved

in the home building business anymore.
out of it.

For some reason, they got

I thought they were still committed to it during that

time.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Wasn't most of their raw land and

other real estate related ventures in Arizona?
MR. TAGGART:

Yes, I believe they probably at some time

had a conversion of philosophy that rather than be a home builder
and put up the sticks and the mortar, they were going to become
land developers, sell off to various developers, and be
involved ...
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Well, certainly that's their

business and not ours, except that they owned a California
chartered savings and loan institution.
MR. TAGGART:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

What was the benefit for the State

of California?
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MR. TAGGART:

The benefit of?

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Of having an institution that took

deposits and invested them in Arizona?
MR. TAGGART:
a very good question.

There is not a lot of benefit there.

It's

It's a very good philosophical question.

Back in the 1970's, the industry, the thrift industry, became very
heavily involved in nationwide lending.

In other words, they

deviated and got away from this formula that you took in money
within a 100-mile radius, or whatever it was going to be within
your state, and you had to reinvest it back in there.

We have the

California Reinvestment Act which, and I know they were concerned
about that some time in, I don't know, 1986 or 1987, or some time
along there, they were concerned about the California reinvestment
act, that a portion of those funds have to go back into the
community in which you derive the funds.

But getting involved in

secondary market activities where portfolios of loans are sold
across the country and developments are made across country, the
only way the financial institutions in this country have survived
is the fact that they aren't confined to one specific geographic
location.

And that was really borne out in the Garn St. Germain

act also, and just before that, they just took all the lid off
geographic lending.
particular locale.

You weren't confined to your state or your
So that was through the course of

deregulation, that happened.

So when you say was it a bad thing

or a good thing, no, I feel the association should be committed to
lend back in the area where they take their money, and I wouldn't
argue with that at all.
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Yet in December of 1984, about ten

months after Keating bought Lincoln Savings, you approved $900
million in direct investments.

During that time, they had

terminated the staff that knew the savings and loan business, put
in a management team that had been in real estate in Arizona,
moved the books to Arizona, decreased to the point of eliminating
home loans in California, and expanded their investments in raw
land, junk bonds, and other higher risk investments such as

•

hotels.

Why, given that history which I would think was known to

you in your Department at that time, would you have approved the
$900 million?
MR. TAGGART:

I looked at Lincoln to be synonymous with

American Continental at the time and from all that I could
ascertain, and all that we knew in the Department, they were a
very successful company.

That meant that those skills could

probably be transferred to a financial institution or to direct
investments or to building.
me any differently.

I had nothing to the contrary to tell

And I think it proved out, accounting

standards, you know, if you take them on their face, I believe
Lincoln made, I don't know, was it $50 million the third year, or
$75 million profit the second year, and $125 or whatever it was,
they were for all appearances at that time, a very successful
company.

The management had been successful in building American

Continental, which was a company that was totally under water in
the 70's.

They had what I considered to be very good credentials.

They had an accounting staff, it was bar-none, and a legal staff,
and they had experience in developing
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
money, weren't they?

Except they were using the taxpayers

They were taking deposits that they wouldn't

have gotten except for the federal insurance, and then investing
them in business opportunities that they thought would be useful,
but they weren't going out and borrowing the money where they were
at risk, they were borrowing the money with the taxpayers at risk?
MR. TAGGART:

Yes.

In getting up to where we were in

December, to find out why, when you say fine, the law gives you
100% and we're going to take you to 50% or 52%, give you that
authority, I would presume that somebody would monitor the
activities.

It's not a blank check.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. TAGGART:

That was your job, right?

Yes, had I been there for another five

years, that would have been my job.

But there is continuity in

the Department.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Let me ask you, December 1 you

approved the $900 million in direct investments through
subsidiaries by Lincoln.

You indicated that it was common

knowledge among regulators and probably the industry, that there
was an impending regulation that would have restricted Lincoln's
aoility to make that investment, you felt rebuffed in your
attempts to influence that regulation as a representative of
California, so you proceeded to approve the investment authority
for Lincoln and ACC, which you viewed as a successful company with
a S&L unit in California.

The regulation did, then, go into

effect, and shortly after that, you resigned from the State of
California and went into private business, and that private
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business, as has been reported elsewhere, was TCS Financial, in
San Diego.

Shortly thereafter, this business which arguably was

not doing particularly well, had a massive stock purchase by
Lincoln and therefore a substantial investment that presumably was
to the benefit of the business that you had just associated with.

MR. TAGGART:

Yes.

I might mention that

MR. TAGGART:

I can't recall the exact date, I believe

when Lincoln had applied for that direct investment authority, I
recall having a meeting in my office with two representatives from
Lincoln, two representatives from the Federal Home Loan Bank in
San Francisco, and another member from my staff, and we went over
the direct investments.

I said there's an application in, this is

what's coming down, I said, do you have any objections, we went
through the whole thing, and do you have any objections?
were no objections from the Federal Home Loan Bank.

There

This is

really a two-pronged thing when things like this happen.

It was a

substantial investment and at that time, nobody raised a hue and
cry, nobody said anything, and I said, fine, I really can't find
any reason not to.

I told Lincoln at the time, I said, in view of

the impending regulation, you may have a difficult time, a real
difficult time, grandfathering that in, I said.
to be my battle.

That's not going

I said, if you have a tough time with the fed's

on this thing, because they haven't said anything here, you know,
you're going to have to tough it out with them.

That's where the

problems, I think, started, you know, with the Federal Home Loan
Bank and Lincoln and the feud.

191

000858

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Were you a member of the board of

TCS prior to your resignation as Savings and Loan Commissioner?
MR. TAGGART:

No, sir.

I have here the proxy statement

that's going out this year, okay.

I'll just read you from one

page on the proxy statement if it hasn't been mailed out to
everybody already and I'll explain why that discrepancy was there.
On page 4 here, and it says, I need my glasses, excuse me, page 5,
Mr. Taggart joined the company as a director in January of 1985
and was the President of TCS Financial, Inc., a subsidiary of the
company, from January 1, 1985 to October 31, 1985.

I have been

involved in mortgage banking and consulting activities and so
forth.

What happened during that period, one, I was not exactly

sure when I was going to leave office, I wasn't certain where I
was going.

Mr. Stickle was trying to get a commitment from me.

They were considering going public.

At that time they sent in a

preliminary prospectus which has to go to the SEC, which is
subject to modification and approval, in December of 1984.

I

presumed I was coming on board with them, and they thought I was
coming on board and I did come on board with them, and it wasn't
approved until January of 1985.

But that preliminary prospectus

had to go in because it takes one to two months to get approval on
them, and by the time the approval or disapproval would come back,
and it could have been disapproved, it may not have gone public, I
was on board at that time.

And that was not a document for public

circulation or anything, it was sent directly to the SEC and I
think they approved it on January 11 or something, so there wasn't
one share of stock sold prior to that time.
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Did you tell anyone associated with

ACC or Lincoln that you were going to work for TCS?
MR. TAGGART:

No.

Not to my knowledge.

They were

totally unrelated transactions.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

You indicated a few moments ago that

it was common knowledge that you were leaving the Department.
MR. TAGGART:

I don't believe it was ...

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

•

me rephrase that.

Perhaps not common knowledge - let

You said that it would be Lincoln's problem to

defend the grandfathering of their investments that you were
approving because you wouldn't be there.
MR. TAGGART:

No, I didn't say that, it wasn't that I

wasn't going to be there, I just said any grandfathering that you
have with the Federal Home Loan Bank on getting those provisions
in, because of the impending legislation, is not my problem, it's
your problem.

And it wasn't a matter of whether I was going to

defend them or not defend them, it was - legally, it was a
difficult issue.

In other words, when you start talking about

preempting state laws . .

.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

You did not tell anyone and to your

knowledge no one at Lincoln knew that you were leaving the state
to go to work for TCS?
MR. TAGGART:

No.

I don't think they even had ever

heard the term TCS.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Well, did you talk to Lincoln or

Mr. Keating or anyone from ACC after your leaving the state
service to interest them in an investment opportunity with the
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company that you were becoming the president of?
MR. TAGGART:

I was invited over to Phoenix in January.

I asked Mr. Stickle, I said, Tom,

would you like to meet these

folks, I think they're a model association and at that time, a
clean association, they're very entrepreneurial, I'm not very
entreprenueurial, Tom Stickle is, and he said, yeah, I'd love to
meet them, and so I said well, if you want to fly over for the day
with me, that's fine and I went over there and introduced him to
Mr. Keating.

The two of them started discussing about the stock.

I wasn't there for any purpose at all to mention about stock at
all.

Actually, at that time, I was almost trying to discourage

Tom Stickle from going public with the company and I thought it
was a little premature at the time.

And we used to go around on

it and that was his plan.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Then you and Mr. Stickle went to

Phoenix for lunch?
MR. TAGGART:

I don't know if it was for lunch.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Well, what was the purpose for the

visit?
MR. TAGGART:

At that time, Lincoln obviously knew I had

left the state, and wanted to talk to me about a consulting
arrangement.

My whole purpose for them was on an internal

consulting basis, not to mention anything about stock.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

When did you become a consultant to

Lincoln?
MR. TAGGART:

The exact day, I don't know, some time in

January of 1985.
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Did you contact your Department in

that capacity?
MR. TAGGART:

No.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
occur to invest in TCS?
MR. TAGGART:

How did the interest of Lincoln

Did it occur at that first meeting?
Tom is an energetic fellow and loves his

company, and I believe at that meeting he made mention, again, I
wasn't privy to a lot of the conversations on the stock.

•

I

believe he made conversation, I think Mr. Keating said, well,
gosh, if you've got a little public company going, send me a
prospectus, and it was worked out between Mr. Stickle and
Mr. Keating and the attorneys on what was going to be purchased.
I think there were two other companies, one other financial
institution that was very interested in getting TCS stock at the
time.
CHAIRl~N

JOHNSTON:

Why, why was TCS a desirable

opportunity?
MR. TAGGART:

It was, he had been very successful, I

think, in building up a savings and loan.

He converted to a bank.

Tom is a very innovative, energetic entrepreneur and the company
is doing extremely well now.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. TAGGART:

Over the years, it's returned . . .
Better than Lincoln?

Right now?

It probably has a better

return on capital, yes, I think so.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

You said Lincoln was a model

institution, what happened?
MR. TAGGART:

What happened with the institution?
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think as Keating went on and found out that he was having
difficulty with respect to direct investments, and got into a feud
-- a tremendous feud -- with the Federal Home Loan Bank and he and
Chairman Gray for probably three and one-half years were going
back and forth at each other, shooting at each other, and it has
pulled the whole association down.

There's just been an awful lot

of turmoil involved.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

This is the Danny Wall, U.S. Senate,

perspective on this issue, that it was a personality conflict
between Ed Gray and Charles Keating, that's your explanation for
what happened?
MR. TAGGART:

Yeah, when I was in office, from a

professional standpoint, if I had asked them to do anything or
submit anything, it was there.
argument.

There wasn't much room for

But for some reason, he didn't have that same dialogue

with . . •
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. TAGGART:

Maybe you didn't ask for much.

No, I did.

I sparred with them throughout

the year on direct investment authority and so forth, and • • .
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

You, in your federal testimony, have

said, not specifically with respect to Lincoln, have said the
majority of the substantial losses that have been sustained had
been due to regulatory intervention, write-down of assets,
write-down of supervisors and premature liquidation.

And then you

refer to seizure mania.
MR. TAGGART:
think it's important.

Yes.

I probably should explain that. I

It became somewhat clear to me in the last
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part of 1984 that there was a gaining distrust for the
entrepreneurs in the industry, whether in California, Florida or
wherever.

And I was also on the Federal Home Loan Bank advisory

council.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. TAGGART:

Was this distrust that you shared?

No, but for some reason I had a feeling

that Chairman Gray was getting very concerned and didn't know what
to do on his cutback regulations here and re-regulate there, and

•

swing the pendulum totally to the other side, rather than bringing
it back to center and bringing some balance, it was going totally
to the other side, cut everybody off.

And during that period,

there were a number of associations that were very concerned
they'd be affected.

The first association that came under, well,

we were monitoring a number of associations in California.
Lincoln was not on that list.

Nobody had ever brought to my

attention that Lincoln was a problem shop, they'd really only been
in business for ten months anyway, but there were a number of
other associations that were monitored, a number of other
associations I visited frequently with the Federal Home Loan Bank
in California.

When we made a more definitive move on San Marino

Savings, for a number of reasons, it became clear and apparent
that the Federal Home Loan Bank was very loath and very reluctant
to take the lead in state chartered takeovers, unless they could
clearly define that the association was insolvent, so it became a
pattern during the end of my tenure that the Federal Home Loan
Bank would have to find some justification for making the
association insolvent before they felt comfortable in seizing
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associations.

So rather than go in and remove officers, and I've

used the cliche before, what they would do is sink the ship to get
at the captain, rather than use removal powers that they clearly
had, and remove management from organizations, they would go in,
write down the assets, try to get it to a point of insolvency, and
thereby give them the justification for seizing and removing all
the management they didn't like.

That has caused a tremendous

need for liquidation in this country.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Do you think a more effective

approach by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board would have been to
remove Mr. Keating, Mr. Keating's son, Mr. Keating's family
members, Mr. Keating's associates, instead of closing Lincoln
Savings?
MR. TAGGART:

Yes.

Associations in and of themselves

are not bad, they're not problems.

But the problem assets have to

be dealt with.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Then, did you view the management as

incompetent or fraudulent in its conduct of its business.
MR. TAGGART:

At what period of time?

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

At the period of time when their

problems became apparent to you, when might that have been?
MR. TAGGART:

That probably was about 1986, half-way

through 1986.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. TAGGART:

Okay.

And I was becoming further and further

away from Lincoln at that time.

And the storm was brewing more

and more in Washington, so I really, truthfully didn't keep that
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close a watch on what was going on, I knew there was trouble
brewing, and it wasn't until this last year, I realized really how
serious it was.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

I know you've been a private citizen

for that period of time, but have you had opportunity to look at
any of the examination materials that the Federal Horne Loan Bank
Board prepared in looking at Lincoln and the high risk investments
and the lack of reliable appraisals and many of the other things
that suggest very risky investments, at best.
MR. TAGGART:

I'm not really familiar

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

So you're only not familiar with

newspaper accounts or what the management told you?
MR. TAGGART:
very much.

Yes, and actually management didn't tell

It seemed to me they were taking on their own battle

at about 1986 and they were going to take this battle on with the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board and it was a win or lose situation
for them.
lose.

Come head nor high water, they were going to win or

And I thought, whoa, that's dangerous guys.

That's really

dangerous and I really didn't see them that much any more,
sporadically off and on, but it just seemed to be a battle that
they were taking on in Washington.

I don't know really the extent

of the involvement of the battle, if there was one, in California.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Well, you've alluded to a powerful

enemy of Mr. Keatings, namely Mr. Gray, he also had powerful
friends and I guess you were one of them.
MR. TAGGART:

Well, thank you, I don't know if that's

flattering or what. but I really if you take a look at practically
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my whole record, I was not a strenous, I'm not a lobbyist.

I was

concerned more with internal consulting in associations and trying
to help them, and prior to 1984-1983, it was very rare for
supervisory agreements and cease and desist orders to be sent out.
All of a sudden there was a proliferation of them at the end of
1984 and 1985, and it was hitting management, it was hitting
directors, they didn't know how to cope with them, they didn't
know how to comply with them, there really wasn't anybody out
there that really knew ...
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. TAGGART:

Or contest them?

Or contest them . . .

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Was that part of your

responsibility?
MR. TAGGART:

I think if you talk to the regulators,

you'll find out that I wasn't, I rarely ever tested them, I think
there's one association that I'd helped represent.

It was a

little association in the valley, here, that was all.

It was more

working with management in trying to get them back on track,
trying to make home loans, trying to beat them over the head and
say, hey, if you guys don't do this and don't set this up, you're
going to be in trouble.

You try to convince them as much as you

can, and sometimes you can't.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Just a couple more questions.

Shelter Island was a thrift in San Diego that you were involved
in, were you not?
MR. TAGGART:

Yes, I was, unfortunately.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Why do you say that?
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MR. TAGGART:

Because it was a financial, let's say, a

tremendous financial loss for me.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Well, what was your relationship

Hith Shelter Island as commissioner and afterwards?
MR. TAGGART:

When I was working with TCS, I believe it

was about March of 1985, Tom Stickle had been consulting prior to
that time, I think maybe in 1983 or 1984, to that association and
getting their papers in, or whatever, and he said, they're having
a little difficulty up there, I don't know what it is, Larry, you
know, because you're the consultant, you know the industry, why
don't you go up there and see if you can give them some help.

•

I

happened to know the chairman, he was a friend, not a real close
friend, but he was a friend in San Diego, so I went up there a
couple of times and was working with them, and I said, what's the
problem, and they said, well, we have conditional approval.

I

said you do, that's rare.

It was difficult for associations to

get conditional approval.

I said how long have you had it?

They

said we got conditional approval for insurance of accounts two
months ago.

I said, woe, you've got six months to comply with

everything, what's the problem.
capital up.

They said we can't get our

And I said, well, where are you now.

And they said

well, we're about $300,000, and I said, whoa, you're really short,
and you're running out of time.

So I tried to work with them, I

tried to help them and so forth.

I had met an individual who at

one time said, hey, if you ever want to get involved in an S&L in
California Larry, give me a call.

I gave him a call.

I, again,

my whole life has been in the savings and loan industry and some
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day I kind of wanted to get back into it, so he came out and we
had met several times.
novo Association.

I said, this is the situation at the de

It's going to be tough and it has to be run as

clean as any association in California.
fuse on this thing.
not?

There's a very short t

And I said, do you want to get involved or

So finally we elected to get involved to see if we could

help it through.

Unfortunately, I think because of a personal

vendetta, it never came up for a vote back in Washington, and so
all of the organizational expenses and everything else, went
straight down the drain along with 100 other associations in
California.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Well, in November of 1983, as

Commissioner, you approved Shelter Island, is that right?
MR. TAGGART:

Yes.

I have to say, I don't recall it

coming through, but I would imagine my signature is on
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Okay, so in 1985, within a few

months after you left the State, you were involved in tryi

to

effect its launching, right?
MR. TAGGART:

Trying to see that it complied with its

conditions.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

So you represented it before the

State and federal agencies?
MR. TAGGART:

The representation was very brief.

I had

made a contact with Bill Crawford, and I said Bill, I said,
there's a situation with the Shelter Island savings down here, and
I said, I'm not even asking for preliminary approval or anything
because I wouldn't do that, I'm just saying if you have any
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objection with this, let me know right now and I won't be involved
with it.

Because if there's going to be objections along the way,

there's too short a time fuse on it.

And after discussing it with

him, he said, no, it sounds fine to me, Larry.

And I said, fine,

and I think it was Jim Cole had contacted and I had contacted an
individual at the Federal Home Loan Bank and I said, I'm not even
looking for any kind of approval, I know it has to go through the
whole process.

If you have any objections of the fact the way

it's set up, and he said no, he talked to the Chairman back at the
Savings and Loan, and I wasn't the Chairman, he called the
Chairman and said this seems fine with me.

So with that, we

assumed the organizational expenses, continued to fill out the
final paperwork.

Three weeks after that happened, I got a call

from the State and they said, we've looked at it again, we're
sorry to inform you, we'd like all the original shareholders back
in, there's not enough shareholders here.

I said, boy, I wish you

kind of told me that in the beginning, but that's fine.

We

brought in all the original shareholders, over 26 shareholders in
the association.

And filed, and got down to about the last two or

three days, and all of a sudden all these organizational expenses
were assumed or paid off, and they were considerable.

And I

thought, I don't know where this is going to go, and he said, I
think I talked to Bill Crawford, he said, I don't know where it's
going to go either, I said, I'm just going to file with the
Federal Home Loan Bank and see what happens.

When it went to the

Federal Home Loan Bank, it came back about a month and a half
later from Washington, and they said, we're going to deny it
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because there's a substantial change in the shareholder mix.
Because there wasn't any condition there was any particular
shareholder mix at all, that was not one of the conditions, so
once our attorney had told their attorney, the dialogue went
between the attorneys, they said, oh, you're right, they were just
trying to kill it.

They gave three automatic extensions beyond

that into 1986, without even telling us what was wrong with it.
Finally, I was back at the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and met
with a high official back there, I happened to be back in
Washington in about April of 1986, I believe, and I said, I'm just
curious, I said, what's going on, I said, I thought you had this
30-day thing, you're either going to deny things or approve
things, I said now I know how the public feels out there, I can't
find out anything on this.
problematic file.

And he said, well, it's a very

I satd, that's great, you're the first person

that ever told me there's a problem with it, what is it?
said, well, it's the adequacy of capitalization.
that's interesting.

And he

I said, well,

I said, the money is sitting in escrow, and

it's a little bit more than the amount required.

He says, oh,

you're right, Larry, actually it's the qualifications of
management.

I said there isn't any management, there's only one

gal that works there.

I said you can call me president, I've

never taken a penny out of the thing.

And I said, I'll tell you

what, I'll take my credentials against anybody you have back here
at the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and run circles around them.
He said, well, you're right, Larry, because actually it's a
problem with Ed Gray.

If you could use just a little bit of
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honey, you know, maybe that thing would come up for a vote.

I

thought, that's it, the thing's been sitting there for four years,
and that's the federal system.
money.

And, yes, it cost me a lot of

So it's a sad story, but I got hit with a thing that

hundreds of other people in the state have got hit with.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Your career has been in savings and

loan institutions, primarily.
MR. TAGGART:

Most of my life, yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

In that career, you served two years

as a top regulator for California?
MR. TAGGART:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. TAGGART:

Why did you take the job?

I think I was ready for a career change.

I was very fortunate in Great American to have been with an
innovative association and I had done just about everything within
Great American, I'd been on the lending side, the savings side,
the grants side, the legal side, the servicing side, worked on
mergers and acquisitions, it was time for a change.

And that

opportunity came up.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. TAGGART:

Why did you leave?

Why did I leave?

I found, to me, it was

an opportunity and an enrichment in my life and a different
experience.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
MR. TAGGART:

I mean left the state.

Went back?

Oh, at that particular time, I was up in

San Francisco, my family was down in San Diego, and after two
years, I think the average tenure of a commissioner in California
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prior to Bill Crawford was about a year and a half, two years.

I

had been two years, things seemed to be in a little bit of a lull
that last quarter.

I was missing my family.

I wanted to

repatriate myself with with, and so I resigned at the end of the
year, and had I known there vlould be these challenges later on,
people have asked me, would you have stayed in?

I don't know, I

like challenges.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Well, you would have more knowledge

then probably the average business person, maybe it's just the
nature of the business that your services were most valuable to
people like Charles Keating, or Charles Napp, both of whom have
been involved in the largest and most expensive S&L failures in
the country, yet you've seemed to put the best face on it from the
perspective of the entrepreneurs that ran those institutions and
lay the blame on the kind of people that were once your
colleagues, namely, government regulators.
MR. TAGGART:

I'm really careful not to place blame, and

you'll notice in my federal testimony, I really wasn't there to
castigate anybody or lay blame on anybody.

But I have to ask

myself, what the heck's gone on in the last five years.

Five

years have passed since I left, you know, has somebody been asleep
at the switch?

And a lot of problems come up and they aren't just

in California and they aren't just in Texas.

They're nationwide.

So if they are nationwide, you have to kind of take a look where
the source of the problems really come from.

That there's some

point in this country, some change in regulations, something, that
has caused this whole industry in this whole country to have
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extreme difficulties.

It's not a California problem, it's not a

Texas problem, it's a nationwide problem.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

Mr. Seastrand.

ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND:

I just might say that obviously

the examining and auditing of these firms have an impact on it,
but you go back to the late 70's, early 1980's, when we saw a 21%
prime rate, and had an inverted interest rate structure, short
term rates being higher than long-term rates, that has a
II

tremendous impact on financial institutions and especially since
we went to deregulating the savings rates.

You might recall that

prior to the mid 1970's, I think it was, you used to get paid a
total of 5% for your savings in the bank which was very nice for
saving institutions, not very good for the consumer.
MR. TAGGART:

I remember clearly in 1975, the fed's

wanted variable rate notes and the state charters had them, and we
got into 1977, and there was a tremendous fear on
disintermediation mediation, that money was going to be sucked out
of associations, rate control was coming off and all of a sudden
money market funds took $240 billion out of the industry.

There

have been problems every year and then they got in the 1980's with
those tremendous high interest rates, there were serious problems
facing the industry.

And now there are.

I kind of have to ask

myself, why is it t

fol s I'm trying to help clean these

problems up
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND:
we see in some

Now the lacest problem is that

financial publications around is the

collapse in real estate prices and not only in the southwest or
207

south, in Texas, where oil loans had been,

t now Ar zona

Colorado, I'm told, are taking it in the shorts and .
MR. TAGGART:

Phoenix in the mid 1980's was a str

strong city and it is
ASSEMBLYMAN SEASTRAND:

Now, instead of having worries

about oil loans to banks in Texas, we are worried about real
estate loans.

So there's always nice little problems around.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:
here.

We appreciate your efforts to get

This time of the year you have to almost come the night

before, but nevertheless you were here in time and we appreciate
your testimony and your willingness to candidly answer the
questions, and maintain your reputation as a continued proponent
of deregulation.
MR. TAGGART:

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON:

This hearing is adjourned.
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OPENING STATEMENT OF CAROL H. REHM, JR.
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
December 20, 1989
I am a Deputy Attorney General in the Civil Division,.
Business and Tax Section, in Los Angeles.

This section serves

client agencies which include the State Board of Equalization,
Franchise Tax Board, Employment Development Department and the
Departments of Insurance, Real Estate and Savings and Loan.
The Attorney General's Office provides litigation
services to these client agencies and is called upon to defend
them in court.

The office does not •pass" on client activities

in the sense that it approves or disapproves their regulatory
actions.
In December 1988, Ms. Shirley Thayer, Legal Counsel for
the Department of Savings and Loan, and I had a telephone
conversation to discuss a proposed cease and desist order
concerning Lincoln Savings and Loan.

She had forwarded a copy of

the proposed order and supporting documents which I had reviewed.
Ms. Thayer asked if I shared her concern over language

regarding •potential securities laws violations•.

I told her

that I did because these violations were not specifically
alleged.

I was not asked to research any matter.

direct the
not state

I

did 'not
H

language in the proposed order.

I, or

I did

office, lacked the securities law

expertise to defend a challenge to the order.

..
I told her we

would defend in court any action the Department took.

0008

was not

again by the Department

matter
see

on December
memo).
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LINCOLN SAVINGS lc LOAN; PROPOSED CEASE AND DESIST ORDER

Enclosed are the files (two volumes) containing•the draft Order
and supporting documentation in the above-referenced matter.
As always, your assistance and cooperation have been sincerely
appreciated.
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Mt. Chairman and Members of the committee I thank you
for the opportunlty to teati!y before this Committee. My
name is Qene Stelzer. I am currently a supervising examiner
with the California Depattment of Savings and Loan (OSL). l
wa1 the examiner-in-charge of the July, 1988 examination of
Lincoln Saving& and Loan Association (Lincoln), and was also
in overall charge of the examination of both Lincoln and its
holdin9 company, Ameriean Continental Corporation (ACC) Mr.
R1cha'd H•w$om was the examiner-in-charge of the examination

of ACC.

•

My

1t1tement is cnnr.ArnAd with the

ia§~e~

surrounding

tha Cease and Desist Or~er that was issued by the Department
of Savings and Loan in December, 1988 against Lincoln.
I will begin by briefly outlining the financial situation at
Lincoln and its parent company, American Continental
Corporation (ACC), as I understood it in November~ 1988. By
understanding whet we knew about the financial condition o£
these firms in November, 1988 , the significance of the
decision to delete the clause related to disclosures being
made in the public documents of ACC should be clarified. !n
writin; this, I have had time to only consult several
documents essential to this topic.
My recollection concerning the knowledge that I had
about the financial condition of Lincoln and American
Continental Corporation in November, 1988 is as follows. lt
was evident to me tbat ACC was engaged in a vast Ponzi
scheme. A major source of its cash flow, the tax sharing
payments from
ln, had been halted by the Office of
Regulatory Affairs (ORA) of the Federal Home Loan Sank
Board. The on
other si
f1cant outside source of cemh
flow was comi
itional debenture sales.
from
sales were being ~sed to pay
r
r
repurchase of ACC stock from
rm, and pay off maturing debt.

major subsidiary of ACC 1
be very ba~.
Mr. Newaon had
llion in losses on juat two
exami
ion report on

that, as e result of

ial appraieal losses
r also in~ioated that
lopment projeeta o!

recollection is that Mr.Newsom we
very bar4 on
assi
even
le
ain the assistance
in
Francisco, H. R.
Mr. Newsom also did &omething for which I believe he
deserves the highest praise. He put a clause in the proposed
cease and Desist Order that was intended to stop any
additional debenture sales. The clause, as it is stated in
draft no. 6 of the proposed Cease and Desist Order, is as
fol'lOWI:
The Commissioner orders Lincoln, ACC, or any of
their subsidiaries, cease and desist from the
following:
3. Permitting erroneous, incomplete, misleading or
inaccurate information of any kind to be included in

public reports including 10-Q, offering circulars,
proxy materials or any other public information. This
or4e~ ifteludes bu~ is Be~ limi~cd ~o mo~oriol omimaions
regarding relateo or att1l1ateo party transae~1ons.

As I understand the strategy of Mr. Newson on this
clause, his plan was as follows: (1) If Lincoln and ACC
challenged this order in court, this would provide an
opportunity to bring the financial condition of these firms
to the attention of the public during the le;al proceedings;
(2) If the order was not challenged, it might provide a way
of exerting pressure on other agencies, in particular, the
Office of Regulatory Affairs and the Securities and Exchange
Commission, to take some action to stop the debenture sales;
and (3) It might provide the Department of Savin;s and Loan
with a valid reason to put
ncoln into conservatorship. A
section of the Savings and Loan Law, 8225 (a) (5), provides
as a reason for puting an association into conservatorship
the following: "the association is in violation of an order
or 1njuction, as authorized by this diviaion" If the
prospectus for the debentures was not corrected after this
or~er became effective, Lincoln would be in violation of the
Cease and De1i1t Order.
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STATEMENT OF

SENIOR STAFF COUNSEL
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LAW AND REGULATION

My name is Shirley M. Thayer and I am testifying before this
Subcommittee pursuant to a subpena issued on matters related
to Richard Newsom's
timony given on November 29, 1989, and
the additional testimony provided to Steve Suchil, Consultant
for the Assembly Finance and Insurance Committee, on December
5,1989.

I am Senior Staff Counsel (Specialist) for the Department and
in this capacity I am as
to look at, review and make
comments and
tions on a variety of matters to staff and
to the Commissioner. I am
in a job classification that
authorizes me to
final
isions or policy decisions. I
do provide 1 al
and give opinions.
From prior testimony
aware that the
Lincoln Savings
Corporation (ACC)
I also do not need
the Department

by Commissioner Crawford you are
s taken a vigorous stance with
nco ) and American Continental
ion and enforcement actions.
ttee again how much effort
sale of the bonds.

As I underst
se of today's hearing is to accept
testimony
ist Order (Order) issued
by
1988 to Lincoln and ACC
because there
inconsis
statements as to who made
the decision to remove ce
language from that Order.
rtment, gave testimony on
certain language was removed
General C. H. Rehm. Mr.
nfo
indirectly through
Mr. Rehm felt he
deal with any
He also
"This would
sa es program."
December 21,
ruary, 1989.
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want to
something
her r
reasons

s on

repeating
did not veri
I
now that
not accurate.

0

language would have
p
Obviously there
of what
over a year
that no one had
first time
research had
law was being
Department was not ignoring
rmation de
from
the Order, as all findings had al
sent
the
rities Exchange Commiss
(
) n November with a cover
letter from William Davis, Chief Deputy. Additional
information has been forwarded throughout 1989. But, as of
December 15, 1989, the matter is still under investigation and
no determination has been made as to whether or not the
findings are a securities law violation. By naming ACC in the
Order this could trigger the requirement to file an a (k) with
the SEC, which would make the Order available to the public,
and alert anyone interested in finding out, that Lincoln was
being ordered to divest the loan that was associated with the
potential securities law violation.
Had the language related to the "potential" securities law
violation remained in the Order, it would have been easily
challenged and I have grave doubts that a court would have
enforced a "potential .. violation. ACC would most likely have
requested the court to seal the records, thus depriving access
by the public. If it was not challenged by ACC and had the
Department tried to enforce the Order through a court action,
I would surmise a similar result from the court. Had we tried
to use it as a basis for a conservatorship I strongly doubt
whether a court would have confirmed it. The SEC requires
publicly traded companies to report "significant events." ACC
did not file its annual report March 30, 1989.
I think it might be beneficial to describe the mechanics of
issuin~and enforcing a Order and the background leading to
this Order. By statute adopted by this legislature the
Commissioner is authorized to issue an Order when an
association, holding company or subsidiary is violating or has
violated a law or is engaging in or has engaged in an unsafe or
unsound business practice. (The past tense language was added
to become effective January 1, 1989.) The Order must first
state the violation or practice and then facts must be stated
in support of the violation or practice. The Commissioner then
orders discontinuance of the violation or practice and then
orders conformance with all requirements of law. The Order is
a two-pronged document with the .. order" portion of the Order
linked to the violation. You can not order someone to stop
doing something if there is no violation.
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i
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and not available to the
r is a
into court. An Order is considered to be a
un es t
is to be issued only as a final resort
very serious action
ifi
v lations or practices.
ifical
to s
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ision
issue this Order during the examination of
Lincoln
ACC was, as I
stand it, without precedent and
re was a considerable amount of concern with taking this
action
re
standard exami
ion procedures were
The seriousness of the situation related to certain
a great sense of urgency to get an Order out as
soon as possib , but it was extremely important to issue an
Order that would be enforceable if taken to court and which
complied completely wi
the law .
takes regulatory actions and issues Orders but
litigate. Therefore, the Attorney
acted when litigation is anticipated or
know
no Deputy Attorney General has
merits of a regulatory action, but does
give opi ons on what has a chance of being
Since a Deputy Attorney General is
or enforce this Department's Orders
we go
imes ask for review of drafts of an
r to see if
would be any problems defending or
rcing it. I am aware of two other such requests during
1989.
draft
ai
violation as
li
to
t

I

r at issue was given to me for review
of a "potential" securities law
o
r.
I expressed concern over
ial" violation. The Department
nvolving Universal Savings in a
ch contained language about a
iolation.
rt would not confirm the
the conservator so I thought that there would be
s situation. Orders issued by the Department
for violations, not "potential" violations.
r was sent to Deputy Attorney General C.H.
Since
re was only a brief telephone
over one year ago, I have no
t was said but remember generally
of defending a "potential"
1
need to be specific.
I do
he wasn't an expert in securities
him to do any research to
ssions were in fact a securities law
take time and the Commissioner was

discussion related to specific language being
s
or 1 t in; therefore, I can conclude that Mr. Rehm
reque
to remove language from the Order.
3

t a

an are

itig
f

or
l

ration
11
I
aid
t
Mr.

i
ted the 1
lacked securities law
court challenge by ACC
without merit.

any
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At a subsequent meeting with
staff linked to San
Fransico on a conference call
con for
leaving in or taking
the "
language was
discussed
There was suppo
sitions from staff
members.
I did communicate
Mr.
sa
there wou
be
problems with enforcing a "potential" violation. The
Commissioner made the final decision to remove the language
about "potential" violations
the attendant order after
listening to and considering all input from the staff and not
upon instructions from the Deputy Attorney General. Additional
language was also added to the Order after Mr. Rehm reviewed it
which would make Lincoln divest itself of the loans at issue.
In my opinion the removal of language that could be easily
challenged and the language added made the Order much stronger,
not weaker.
After the November 29th hearing, since the Deputy Attorney
General had not made a request to remove any language from the
Order, and since it was I who supposedly made the allegation
that he had, I felt it was imperative that the press be
informed that this information was not accurate. The
Commissioner and Chief Deputy authorized me to make the
appropriate contacts.
I also contacted Steve Suchil the
following morning.
I read a statement for TV Channels 2 and 7
on November 30th.
I specifically stated that "Mr. Newsom only
repeated what he had been told but what he had been told was
not accurate." A press release was also drafted the same day
which clearly said Mr. Newsom had no first-hand knowledge.
This press release was drafted by Duane Peterson, Press
Secretary for the Attorney General, for release to the news
media. Our Department is small and has no press office and no
capability to contact a central news release agency. We have
a
used other agencies
out our news releases. Mr.
Peterson faxed us a draft
Mr. Davis and myself reviewed it,
edi
it to our satisfaction~ and faxed it back to be
distributed.
In a printed submission from Mr. Newsom to Steve Suchil and
labelled as additional testimony dated December 5, 1989,
allegations were made that "I have reason to believe a
cover-up is in process".
In addition to Mr. Newsom's
references related to the Order which he alleges created a
conflict of interest with the Attorney General, I am accused of
having attempted to tamper with his testimony to be presented
4
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ressional Banking,
nance and Urban Affairs
r 31, 1989. He stated that I attempted to
from including hundreds of pages of supporting

or any actual tampering with
Since an attempt to tamper wi
is a very serious matter, I
t
before a legislat
wish to make a sho
statement relating the extent of my
timony.
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with Mr. Newsom's
Brief

, I had helped Gene Stelzer and the Commissioner edit
written st
thout changing content, and was
look
Newsom's statement on October 26,
1989, in a time per
re a subpena had been served and it
was
r it would be a subpena for testimony only
duces tecum. The only conversation that I recall
him was over the phone and was related to what
to be a draft of his statement.
I told him that it
to be c
up,
after he protested I said I would
touch it. At no time was reference made to specific
to him.
ila Sakamoto worked with Mr. Newsom to
s statement which was considerably different from
in a discussion that same day and gave an
a v l
ion of California Financial
arily submit confidential documents
This is the position I have
ttee.
In fact, in my
ia
Mr. Newsom has submitted to
a
duces tecum has violated
t
a subpena duces tecum was served
Committee and there was no longer an
sue
not be considered to be an
testimony.
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to say that the Department of Savings
in a coverup on any matters
We have at all times tried to do
sa
of the bonds being issued by ACC

law.
you

questions I

11 be more than happy to respond.

you.
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dis
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changes
ase and Desist Order (C&D) eliminating an
rtant clause
t in my opinion may very well have directly
or i
irect
stopped subordinated debt sales at American
inental
rp (ACC) in December 1988. A pattern is emerging
liberate attempts
state officials to conceal or distort
truth,
t
r with congressional testimony and discredit
or
sses or potential witnesses that is contrary
to
erest. As late as three weeks ago Commisioner
Cr
rd and Mr. Davis seemed to support both action and public
disclosures relative to the Lincoln matter. Something profound
seems to have occured since that time to change that position.
licting, inaccurate, and I believe deliberately

s releases and statements have been put out by
Attorney Generals Office(AG) and the Califonia
Loan(CDSL) to attempt to explain how
cast doubt on the credibility of my
r to pages A-1-A-5) Stories have
flip flopped again. Explanations
are inconsistant with multiple
standard operating procedures of
ch has a serious conflict of
a self serving, misleading press
t attampted to minimize the AG's
of my credibility, only to be
n hours
contradictory admissions by the AG's
newspapers.

I

little dispute that the AG's office had
draft
order and influenced
the CDSL to
AG's
ffice
was
quick to
inaccurate
self serving press
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to enquire about my
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publish a
release and assist
AG's office even
testimony, the

the AG's office exhibited at
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incr ibly poor judgement, escalated problems, and acted
improperly contrary to the client's best interests. (CDSL
myself). The result has been detrimental to the
public
interest and a slap in the face to the subordinated debt
lders who ~ the public most affected by this disaster.
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My previous testimony was
very clear in stating that I was
advised indirectly by California Department of Savings and
Loan (CDSL) counsel in San Francisco of Ms. Thayer's
explanation to them regarding the cause of the change in the
Cease and Desist Order. (Refer to page A-18) During that
testimony I clearly advised Assemblywoman Wright that it would
necessary for the committee to talk to others to find out
dir
ly their story on what happened. Mr. Harvey and Ms.
Sakamoto are the referenced San Francisco counsel and hopefully
are present to testify.
A written transcript of my
November 29,1989 testimony is
a ached.(refer to page A-6-A-21) . This was provided to me by
Mr. Johnston's office. Looking at the clarity of this testimony
it is incredible to me that the press releases by CDSL and the
AG • s office could be so wrong, so vicious in attacking my
testimony and my credibility, and so far from the truth and
deliberately misleading.
While I was first assigned to Lincoln/ACC in September, 1988, I
· believe that state and federal regulators would confirm to you
t no one worked harder to try to protect the public from
t
s disaster with efforts that included working up to 20 hours
a day. I felt that with obviously worthless subdebt being sold
at the rate of $500,000 -$700,000 per day to people described
in congressional testimony by federal examiners as "widows and
orphans, mom's and pop's "
any less effort would be
inexcusable.
The situation has changed a lot from last year when we were,
without success, seeking assistance from FHLB personnel, SEC,
Department of Corporations, etc. to help shut down the subdebt
sales. A year ago Mr. Keating appeared near the peak of his
power,a financial great white shark feeding indiscriminantly
off misinformed
senior citizens and others
swimming at a
public beach. There are many parallels to the famous movie
"Jaws", including public officials reluctant to "close the
beach" ..
I believe that I have been caught in a v1c1ous
squeeze between
public policy concerns warranting full disclosure to the
public, versus
tort liability concerns and political concerns
which require no disclosure or outright denials . My belief is
that when 20,000 + citizens, including many senior citizens,
lose $250,000,000 in a disaster under the conditions that
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L

n/ACC
have no

lie policy concerns should override
mind that some of these
, in what should have been
rement
ause of a combination of
g
arrogance of the Lincoln/ACe empire
unconsci
of
political/regulatory process that
a total brea
should have protected the public.
.

I

State employees who try to do something to protect the public
shou
not be muzzled, smeared, or intimidated when they
provi
a congressional or assembly committee information that
may be political
or
reacratical
embarrasing.
In conducting the
ring today I hope the committee
understands that the committees actions may be scrutinized by
other state employees
may wish to speak out about what
, and knew. If these potential witnesses feel
face
humiliation, retaliation, or isolation
t
to the Committee that I have felt, I
11 you that this will stifle your investigation
information from public scrutiny that should be known.
t
ayers
subordinated debt holders have paid their
and
to see all the cards, face up and uncensored.
se

Keating empire and other institutions that
ratching"
arrangements with Lincoln/ACe is
c
ci tzens beyond the
rs and the wipe out of
.. shark victims" referred to
insurance company, Pacific
Davis,
li rnia only 20 miles from here,
ate insurance regulators with what was
r_as a substantial deficit net worth.
New~
18,1989 stated that" The
will result in the single·
ses
in
the
state's
r
r, "Since California has no
se losses will be borne largely by
itors, like Lincoln, and its
the unsafe and unsound
atedly referenced in my
(Refer to Page A-25)
Desist order(page A-66 &
rk exhibits which I
r
pages A-22-A-28)
$50,000,000 in loans
~·-~~-~·i
presumably may
t paragragraph).The
s if i
as
t a
a
by
ent a memo and analysis to

expres
to FHLB

the

ne

r

n

r

a

was a t
in San Francisco,
s less concerned about

Heal thy insurance subsidiaries
inconsistant with a
looted holding company and a
review of Pacific
Standards financial statements
lf showed heavy
intercompany receivables and inves
rela
to
its
parent. At Lincoln near
eve
ng was worse than it
. I drafted the attached warning letter with Mr. Harvey,
August 16, 1989 (exhibit A-29 0) which I drafted for Mr.
Davis to the Department of Insurance. Receipt was subsequently
acknowledged.
This is an example of why this committee needs to encourage
witnesses to tell what they know about Lincoln. The pieces of
the Lincoln puzzle and related "backscratching" transactions.
need to be brought into public view and it may take years to do
so.
If you don't want to know the truth don't supena us. If you do
want to know the truth, you better make it very clear that
retaliation is unacceptable from any source.
I wish to thank the committee for hopefully providing supenas
to additional witnesses to add depth to testimony. Some of
these witnesses have specific knowledge about certain areas but
not the whole C & D.
My testimony will focus on three main areas all that relate ·
directly and indirectly to the cease and desist order:
1.

C&D issues

2.

The self serving breakdown in professional responsibility
by the AG's office which had clear detrimental effects on
CDSL and myself and will likely adversely affect the
subordinated debt holders by serving to intimidate State of
California employees who may be called to testify.

3.

Tampering incidents involving congressional testimony.

To insure that the witnesses , who include several attornies
for my department are able to answer questions , I would ask

4

CJ0830

irman to ask t
ior CDSL official present to
authorize attorneys present to fully answer questions without
concern over attorney Client privilege issues.

I
was as
November 29,1989 test

the

severity of the response to my
which included :

1.

A news release(
r to page A-l&A-2} was apparently
is
on November 29, 1989 by the Office of the Attorney
General that mischaracterized my testimony and then
attacked the mi
r
rization.This included a number of
false
r misleading statements that indicated that I
minimized the role of the AG's office in
C & D. It alsc mistated events and
on my credibility in sworn testimony
role of the State Attorney Generals
office in
draft order and
influencing the
CDSL to remove the one section of the order that was
intended to stop subdebt sales.

2.

A
lifornia Depar
of Savings and Loan news release
(page
& A-4} was reportedly prepared jointly by Shirley
Thayer of the
rtment of Savings and Loan and the
Generals
f
and approved by Mr. Davis
thst
that the C & D was at the AG's
also inaccurately characterized
avorably on my credibility in
material ommissions that
misl
ing news release and linked with
release could not help but lead the
t
testimony lacked credibility.

•

Even
inc

more
i

a

appeared in newspapers
one
indicated that Mr.Van De Ramp's press
, Duane Peterson said Newsom "either doesn't know
talki
about or is a liar" . It was my
from Mr. Davis that Commisioner Crawford may
di
Mr. Van DeKamp on Wednesday
r 29,1989.
ease confirm this with Mr.
information and seems to have
mentioned change in attitude of
newspaper reporter saw the
exhibit provided to this
A-58-A-68) supporting
my November 29,

5

1989 testimony and the al
claims by the AGs office
t
t included statements
that would lead one to believe
that they had never seen the d~aft order. The newspaper
seems to have
racted from
AG's office an admission
that they found a memo.showi
had in fact seen and
reviewed the C&D, which . they were allegedly denying
earlier. In light of all the contradictory and false press
releases, constantly changing stories, tampering with
congressional testimony of myself and Mr. Stelzer,
and
what I perceived as an attempt to keep my March 5, 1989
testimony from reaching the cornmi ttee and the public, I
hope you will understand why I describe this to you as a
cover up. Please review the evidence question witnesses
freely and draw your own conclusions. While you may not
want to believe this the evidence and I believe the other
witnesses will speak for themselves.
DRAFTING THE ORDER
My congressional testimony (See page A-31-A-42 contains
considerable information on the preparation of the C & D and
other efforts to stop subdebt sales.
The facts are that this order was drafted by me starting
approximately Novemer 8, 1988 at the delegated
request of
Commisioner Crawford with the staff legal support of both Mr.
Harvey and Ms. Sakamoto. This was the day after Mr. Keating
advised State and federal regulators that a takeover of Lincoln
would cause FSLIC $2,000,000 in losses. The "shark victims" had
little chance in these waters.
The strategy of the order was that
1.

Violation of a Cease and desist order would provide legal
grounds for a conservatorship which we didn't have under
sting law.

2.

Ordering Lincoln/ACC to cease and desist from making unsafe
and unsound loans, engaging in conflict of interest
transaction, and making misleading or inaccurate public
disclosures would likely stop the subdebt sales indirectly,
as accurate disclosures are fundamental to securities
laws.Further because of Lincoln's pattern of doing
business, reviewing new loans made after the order would
likely find violations that would quickly reveal
grounds
for a conservatorship. Violation of an order was grounds
r a conservatorship.

3.

A Cease and desist order would help paint the FHLB(ORA) in
Washington into a corner. They had the power to stop

6

we
C&D would pressure them to
FHLB ho ing company examiners informed
of our
ions includi
the section dealing with
disclosures~
as they were allies in attempting
in Wa i
ton
stop subdebt sales.( Refer to
pa
A-46) I also felt that such an order would put
pressure on the SEC and the Department of Corporations who
we
already advised of specific disclosure problems. (
Page A-47)

•

4.

Speed was of the essence-Subordinated debt was being sold
at the rate of $700,000 per day and it was obviously
worthless.(Refer to pages A-48- A-56)The supervising
examiner for the job Q1~.Mar)_ was working at a different
speed than Mr. Stelzer and myself and I believed it might
be months bef_or:.a...an~_ioi!_r_§PPJt !'lent out (if at all)
and I believed un
s I fought it through the system no
enforcement action would occur at all. At the outset of the
examination l was advised that Mr. Mar was relieved of his
duties as supervising examiner for the apparent reason that
several
previous Lincoln examination reports had in fact
never
ft
desk or been mailed to the association. He
as only a "consultant". He was inexplicably
during examination which created problems for
and Mr. Stelzer, in conducting the examination
a
se and Desist order processed. (Pages
Mr. Stelzer and myself took exception with
about--Mar-Ls-re.sumption of supervising
on
ncoln/ACC on several' occasions.

5.

ressional testimony (see pages A-31
ions
rting the cease and desist
so
lli
I felt even an unsophisticated
understand
ncoln/ACC was out of control.

6.

to challenge the order the
in court open to public view.
llingly unsafe and unsound and
would become public would create
public in terms of disclosure
army of ACC attorneys.

even

so innocous that I believed
our favor. My rationale was
block an order that merely
to stop including inaccurate
public rports.Even their own
n writing to a $10 million
page A-57)and there were
rors on which documentation
approved by CDSL management
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t

saw it
r article
989 u.s.
s article
into the record
January 1989.
o
si

r was to s
, if possible,
i
sure errors in the

relevant excerpt of the fi ings(
cou
be described
Did Wrong") in the draft order follows (refer to
A-65):
"Furthermore, public disclosure statements (Footnote #3) lacked
comp
and accurate disclosures regarding the above
referenced Pontchartrain transaction, which in addition to
being potential securities law violations may result in
liability to ACC, and thereby may adversely affect the safety
soundness of Lincoln.
Material omissions
and/or
inaccuracies in these reports include:
1.

Failure to disclose that the Pontchartrain
Hotel was
heavily encumbered by a $35 million mortgage with another
lender;

2.

Failure to disclose a $5 million
rantee by ACC of the
5
Ilion first mortgage he
another lender on the
Pontchartrain Hotel. (An additional $9 mi llioon secured
guarantee was later provided by ACC in 1988.)

3.

Failure to disclose the below market interest rate, the
preferential terms, and the unsafe and unsound risk
racterisitics of the above-referenced Pontchartrain
loan.

(Footnote #3 Proxy material dated April 8,1988, a 10-K report
dated December 31, 1987, and offering circulars for $300
Ilion
subordinated debt fi
th the SEC on April 14,
1988.)
4.

rs and potential investors were advised in one
(footnote #4) that "Management believes that the
terms of the transactions set forth in the preceding
paragraphs were as favorab
the company as those which
could
obtained in similar transactions with unaffiliated
ies". This statement is misleading given the facts of
transaction; and

8
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5.

Due
an error (described as "typographical" by ACC's
counsel}
ACC's proxy statement. dated April 8, 1988
erroneous
disc sed that ACC and a subsidiary advanced a
total of
6
llion to a limited partnership in which
officers and directors had an interest, when in fact the
total amount was $16 million under the $20 million line of
c
it
i
ore referenced.

(Footnote # 4 ACC's April 8, 1988 proxy statement, page 7.)"
These

findings are specific
and link to multiple
a
support. Further, the serious conflict of
interest f
ings on the same transaction (refer to page
A-63 ) survived legal review and were included in the final
order. This added to my surprise regarding the reason for
the
the order. In essence if it is accepted that
the
shows
that you can prove that insiders
$20,000,000 contrary to Federal regulations
in an unsa
and and unsound transaction, proving
disclosure problems given all the evidence doesn't seem
difficult.
that
underscored section (relative-to.
ial securities law violations .. ) was superfluous
o
and could have been taken out without effect.

J.

-

~

---·"_"_

~~-

---·-----

.----~--.

from the order part of the C&D(what
.. STOP DOING") follows:
4.

on

erroneous, incomplete, misleading or inaccurate
any
nd to be included in public reports
Form
ring circulars, proxy materials
r publ
rmation. This order includes but is
rial ommisions regarding related or
reference to securities laws~

there is

--··-·-~

DID WRONG")
supported the
DOING") without regard to
ly expressed to Ms.
, and myself prior to the
r did not seem to like
all known to myself, Mr.
management in LA
at the time, Mr.

9

a previous SEC
sus
ib
to
Congress onal
was particularly

pressure
t

ing the order I
t I
rsonally
myself involvi
rain , RA Homes,
Southmark Corpor
. I
documentationm on
these transactions and in fact
Mr. Stelzer) junior
examiners xerox whole files rel
transactions and
index
page, a mammoth ta
in anticipation of an
court chal
ressional testimony
s in more detail. (
A-31 - A-42)
ised Mr.
lzer on
fif
assigned to Lincoln
an enforcement action was necessa
based on the Hotel
Pontchartrain transaction alone
he had concurred.
revi

ter drafting the order and discussions/disputes with LA staff
over documentaion I spent a whole day with Los Angeles
management at roughly the beginning of December going through
the order which I had footnoted with over 100 footnotes linked
to supporting documentaion, which I produced to the group, as
requested, that included Ms. Thayer, Mr. Sumimoto, Mr. Travis,
Mr. Shames, Mr. Stelzer , Mr. Mar, who left early and Mr. Davis
who came in and .out of the meeting. The footnoted draft C & D
congressional testimony and
was included as an exhibit to
included approximately 25 footnoted pieces of documentaion
dealing with the disclosure problems alone.(Refer to pages A-69
- A-83) ). The level of review at this meeting was extremenly
detailed.I was amazed that Mr. Mar wished to delete the whole
finding relative. to the $10,000,000 disclosure problem because
it was alleged to be a typographical error.
The attendees represented the whole LA chain of command and the
whole purpose of the meeting was to satisfy management that we
the documentation to support the order and move forward. My
.
impression WaS---that_ that __ waS----S_a_tis_fied- .and __ t-1~-..made
j~~~/g{
~ satisfy the group.
An E-mail from Thayer Ref
E:::::..
~~
to Ms. Sakamoto followed that meeting' w ich
1 somewhat
confirms that. The documentation was indexed in
~several files and filled a box. Every page in each file was
actually numbered
hand to totally organize the files and
facilitate the review. I sent a follow up memorandum to Los
taking except
ted minor changes that
to intentionally favor ACC.(Refer to page A-85).

e·

The issue of adequacy of documentaion was satisfied by CDSL
management before it went to the AG which is the normal
procedure.. It is obvious from contemporaneous memorandums
(
er to page A-86 ) that the intent all along was to take

10

CJ0886

::~1

:CJ:

r·::v·if;~,';r

\.j:.:-·c~

ir;.q
t.1a:: IFT result in
That was ~a~ticularly truu
s nature of llCC.

is

~~c~
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liU_-Jat~_::'·n(:·cr2n

~n

th.~s

c~se

rrc:c-:ju~e

ti~:e

b9cause of

and o~al statement~ made to Congress plus exhibits
to
test
(Refer to page A-87- A-·92 Letter t') ACC
spec f cally addressing disclosure problems) which clearly
i
icates my strategy from the beginning of using disclosure
problems
ACC as a means to put pressure on Lincoln/ACC as
well as
ORA,
and Department of Corporations tv whom
th
were provided.
It should be noted that out of 13
bits provided to
ress 6 exhibits referenced these
disclosure problems. The October 1988 FHLB interim report of
examination(draft) on the holding company included these
disc sure problems.
It should
particularly emphasized that ths "SEC Securities
----.l.i-=_violations issue which seems to be raised as the joint
sis for removing the ent_j,_r~ disclos~ue section
:i;;__~~okesc:ree9, and v1as argued internally
draft order even went to tha AG. Please draw your
ion, as to \-'Jhether the deletion of t!'ls wi10 le
section NBS justified by the "SEC SECURITIES LAW"
a written admission by ACC's own attorney of
error in disclosure on the Pontchartrain
that their was an error in disclosure at
a "slam dunk". I hope the cormnittee
a fatal flaw in the "SEC REGULATIONS

•

of the C & D preparation process was
were reluctant to issue an order and
r as much as possible. I
recall
erence c
th Mr. Harvey and myself,in SF,
Mr. Mar, Mr. Shames and perhaps others in LA
on vac ion. Mr. Mar and others argued to weaken
we prevail
in convincing Mr. Crawford that the
is
ing the section on disclosure .
differences of opinion with
ACC/Li~soln. Refer to
:re were other irstances of r,1r.
se the whole C&D process.2efer
become aware that other Thayer
favorable to industry have
on , including one related to
large institution specializing
r:vey and fils. Sakamoto about

OJ0897

'c

is
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cr o L' ;:

lear
C&D.
the o er
and would be

it Y,JaS
the

s(Pag0~jl-;?
~
l i veretrf:o the l~ifl
is, we will issue
to the committee
normal procedure

on
at

J
OF INTEREST

this testimony have
vi im of a deliberate
campaign
office to mislead and
distort
en
by the CDSL
Commisioner Crawford of
Califo
a Department of Savings
and Loan and
s assist
William Davis who have so far been
unwilling to issue correct
news re ases in spite of
admissions by AG.
rsonnel referenced i:1 newspapers that the
AGs' earlier statements about my testimony Here in error. It
appears t
:re is some Agency involvement.
It is clear to me
that there has been a breakdown in professional responsibility
and ethics by t
At
ral' s office due to the
conflicting
ir1vc.
AGs office in the
Lincoln
matter involving
AG's action3 may have
adverse effects on
federal litigation in
which I have been , am
called as a State or
ral witness. Nei
AG's office nor the CDSL has shown
any inclination to cor
erroneous new releases.
Prior to this inci
was
gh
regarded by State and
ral regulators
outstand ng
track re~ord that
included
involvement
in some of the most difficult
examinations anc1 enfo
actions in California. I invite
you to ask Mr. rilori Assistant Commisioner in charge of the San
Francisco office
my tr
reco
. I beli1.:;ve he also feels
I have been treat
unfair
this situation (refer to Page
A-99).
also at
r 29,1989 hearings.
To facilitate
providing the followi

•s

review of

On

this rna t ter

I

am

r 27, 1989{approx
9:00 1\.H.) I initiated a
telephone con renee a 1 to our Los 1\nqeles Off 3.ce.
Mr. H. R. Harvey SF S af
counsel and Ns. Sheila 3ukan~tG(S.F.
Staff Councel) were pres
(San Frnncisco) with Con,misioner
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s
legal Department als~
ieve Mr.
in l1A. I
on inion that I thought :i. t was
ina ropriate to
s office for my prOJOSeC briefing
office in LA relati V8 to m~r pend::.ng
on Tue
stood that r,1r. CraHford and r'Is. i3snder 11ad
I
test
ensive time with multiple AGs in preparation for
f

]

,,

my

that there was a conflict of interest
office
enting us. I advised that it would
ly come out in testimony (words to the effect) that the
and Desist order had been
weakened at their
tion based on concerns reportedly expressed by the
AG, Mr. Rheem, about his expertise to handle litigation
t
ght involve complicated securities issues.(This
rmation
been provided to me indirectly by Ms. Sakamoto
Mr.H. R. Ha
who had recollection of the December 1988
s. Ms.
to had very
specific recollection of the
r 1988 conversations with lYis. Shirley Thayer, Staff
el in LA and others. I would invite you to confirm this
these
tnesses to resolve the credi~ility issue.)
ause the weakening of the order may have
e
sses
subsequent purchasers of Subdebt,
ial conflict of interest
involving the CDSL
lity for the change. Mr. Crawford
because the AGs office frequently has
1

t
I was extremely sensitive about
of tampering
testimony. I then indicated
want
go to LA in any case because my
already well known from the congressional record.
(Nov.27,1988 approximately 9:15+ or
ral C.H. Rheem in Los Angeles
to remaining present. I advised
that
the modification of the
tion based on his lack of
expertise might come up in testimony on
tial
i
ica
he didn't recall it. Later he
have some recollection of it .I don't recall
t I was certain that he had confirmed the
(re:
rities expertise) I advised him
not see the purpose of traveling to LA to
. As we
ft it, if the AGs office had any
call me the following day. Mr. Rhecm (AG)
of
of the conversation if I had any
tions for the Corporations people(which I
er to Department of Cornc:ations Personnel
ay.) I advised him," Yes prny"
13
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When we hung up Mr.
his response anG t
confirmed seeing t
1
of securities

elf discussed
felt he generally had
C&D because of his

That l;·<as my last di
to this matter.

date

th Mr. Rheem relative

On Wednesday mo
I delivered, with Ms.
Sakamoto present,
to your committee and
one copy of the (Ha
attached draft of the
C & D. Page A-58-A-68)
at Mr. Johnsons office.
On Wedne ay November 29,1989
it ve
clear in my oral
testimony that I was testi
been informed by SF
counsel relative to Ms. Thayers comments relative to the AG's
role in influencing
rtment to weaken the order. The
counsel were in fact Ms.
and Mr. H. R. Harvey both of
'i1hom
had
confirmed
recollections of the December
1988 events Re: the
ich they also understood
to be at the AGs suggest
r advised me that I had
Shortly after the
, no I testified to what Ms.
mistated what
to me in December 1988
Sakamoto and Mr. Ha
and which they still recalled. I didn't say you had told me
we confirmed it with C.H.
at directly. As a rna
r of f
i
and I left. Ms.
Rheem Monday.
I don't recall
r
Sakamoto was pres
On Thursday morning I read
in the S. F. Chronicle
attributed to At rney general Van De Camp that, "Newsom was
wrong" or words to
t.I have seen even more appalling
quotes attributed
Mr. Duane
rson , Mr. Van De Camps
Press Secretary, that Newsom " either doesn't knovJ what he's
talking about or is a liar". As I recall, the reader of these
stories would be 1
lieve
no draft
order or
documentation had ever
to the AGs office nor
wou
it have been
to do so. Mr. Davis
advised me on Thu
was claiming that I
perjured myself
a ring. Davis agreed
that I had not,
r
red that I very
clearly advised
received my information
indi
ly.
is
ttees own transcript
(Page A-6-A-21)
r 30, a statement (Page
to Channel 2 and 7 by

At 11:15 AM on Thur
A-5 ) v1as repor-ted
Thayer which stated in part

"Mr. Richard Newsom at the hearing yesterday before the Finance
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IV- urar.ce Cocul!:
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::::.:a s; z:- t :.n ·~::isr: "!G i::'tdi :::::a tEld
t he was info
i
irec
througn myself ;hat ~he Deputy
torney General felt
t he lacked securities law ~xpertise
o effective
al with with any cou t challenge by ACC of the
arbnent'
o
r, M7:. Nett1som on
repeated wh ~- he NuS told
what he was to
was not a.ccurate ...... " It snould be noted
1.\lr. Davis advised myself, Mr. Harvey, and Ms. Saka:noto of
t
s and provided us a copy of this on Dece~ber 13, 1989. This
statement is far less misleading than the earlier AG's news
release or the CDSL news release(Drafted by AG and CDSL) issued
4 hours later, but still contains inaccuracies.

Heated discussions occured all day on Thursday November
30,1989, in which myself
Ms. Sakamoto and Mr. Harvey were
generally involved in conversations with Mr. Crawford , Mr.
Davis and Ms. Thayer in the Los Angeles office.
At one of these Ms. Thayer related to us the substance of
Thayers November 29,1989 conversation with C.H. Rheem , wherein
r rela
several reasons why the order was changed.
Thayer related to Newsom, Harvey, Sakamoto, in San Francisco
a
Crawfo , and Davis, in LA that she had spoken with C.H.
and he had to
her that he recalled his concerns at the
time he reviewed
C&D were:
\

1.

DSL's lack of jurisdiction/authority to issue orders based,
on securities law.

2.

The C&D only all
potential violations of securities
laws and specific violations should be alleged.

3.

His

rsonal 1

of background in Securities laws.

sufficient factual basis or documentation for
ause we were back again to the initial
1
of specific securites. expertise by the ~~
a
·
cto-r-irl modif:~ting the
_statement read to
.(page A-5). I believe Mr.
surprised from their comments .
lease ask r~J:r.
testi
about
(On
Ms.

. Ms.
r, Ms. Sakamoto and Mr. Harvey to
conversation.

13, 1989 two

later Mr. Davis made myself,
aware of the short statement that
r noted above . Mr. Davis indicated also
r call all people she had talked to on
to correct her statements.)

a
t 2 ~ OOPr1 Thu:::-sd
me (no one else p
draft
the at
to me the dr,aft inc
documentation was prov
indicated was being ta
assLmed that clause
consistant with alleged
office that they even saw
indicator that •someone"
documents never went
contra
which also

89 , Mr. Davis advised
release Nas being
fo
CDSL. As read
i
icated that, no
ffice,
Mr. Davis
's request. I
AGs office to be
newspapers by the AGs
It is a
very serious
firmative denial that
t
re was evidence to the
was the intent to do so.

I put Mr. Davis on ho
Ms.
and Mr. Harvey on
the conference call
them and continued the
conversation. (On
1989
Mr. Crawford , Mr.
Travis, Ms. Thayer, , Mr.
, and Laura present Shirley
Thayer confirmed that
press re
se was drafted by the AGs
office with editing
rley Thayer. Mr. Mori and Ms.
Sakamoto were present
San Francisco in addition to myself).
I objected to the fact that
the press release was carefully
crafted to avoid ment
all corraborating evidence
including the corraborating memo and Draft C & D which was the
exhibit provided to
on Wednesday that clearly
indicated that a
at the AGs for review.I
stated that the press re
to emphasize that I
had in fact accurate
i rect sources of
information( Mr. Ha
th of whom offered
to testify that they
i
me to that effect).

The press release also failed to mention our Monday morning
confirmation with C.H.
no
previous
and the lack of
return calls from
's off
release referenced only
"a call " to the
office and emphasized alleged inaccuracies
in my testimony. I advised
t my
timony clearly stated
that I was advised
and that Mr. Harvey and Ms.
Sakamoto
specific recol
of what they heard and
related to me. Thus my
t
was not inaccurate. Mr. Davis
did not dispute
of
said nobody in LA could
remember taking
's office. These alleged
inaccuracies are in
not inaccuracies in my testimony but
appear to be subsequent
di
recollections between Ms.
Thayer , Mr. C.H.
S
and Mr. Harvey.
Subsequent events
inaccuracies in the
recollection of Ms.
. These disputes did
not affect the accu
testimony.
As indicated earlier,
carefully and art 1

in my opi on
the press release was
cra:ted by the AGs office to give the
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s
in;J impressi::
, ia ccn:; :.;;.nct:i.o::1 v:i :L ,:,~~5 deni.:~ls quoted
in the newspape::s that I "'"'as a know notning or a liar. In
reviewing both releases I believe that !:he insertion of
"Federal SEC regulations"in both press releases (page A-1 and
A-3), which appears nowhere in either the draft order or the
final order was a red herring possibly included to divert
attention from the fact that in December 1988 a department of
state government had provided to a Deputy Attorney General a
document alleging unsafe and unssound
actions, conflict of
interest , disclosure problems as lvell as po..t;ent:i,al securities
law violations that presumably might involve referal of the
matter internallly in the Attorney Generals office to Law
enforcement officials, not·Ni thstanding any separate c & D
action taken by the CDSL . Since Department of Corporations
personnel had already been advised of these specific disclosure
concerns in November, 1988, it added to the Attorney Generals
problem with conflict of interest, as the AG is defending the
Department of Corporations against the "shark victims".

The implications of this are rather negative as the Attorney
Generals office joined the Department of Corporations, the SEC,
and the FHLB as age~cies to which we sent specific information
on disclosure problems while subdebt was still being sold .
On December 1, 1989 the Los Angeles Daily News and on December
2, 1989 the San Jose Mercury News, and the San Francisco
Chronicle published alleged
recanting statements by AG
officials, location of a memorandum from Mr. Rheem to Ivis.
Thayer that documented Mr. Rheems review of the draft order,
which he earlier denied seeing and other information.
On December 4, 1989 Mr. Davis confirmed to Mr. Harvey, Ivls.
Sakamoto, Mr. Mori and myself his October 27,1989 statement to
me(telephone) relative to his telling Janice Brown at Agency,
that tampering with testimony was 11QJ;;_ ok because of the
sensi ti vi ty of the matter. He added that agency wanted my
t
"toned down". Mr. Harvey described the brief "reign
that had occured whan I resisted the tampering
r 5, 1989 a series of events occured which triggered
ssion of the December 5, 1989 clarifying testimony to the
cumul ive effect of the tampering
last few days led me to believe
was being made to cover up
ions.
events include but are not limited to:
earlier approved a press release on
that
racterized my tesU rnony and
naccurac es in my testimouy, and
1
li
in sworn testimony, even when

7

t

ac

-v1ere
get

ion of Mr. Davis.We
Mr. Davis) that we
t
out.
I cal
back
day, and the

:e
t

.!,.

to

and Crawford to
self serving

2.

I was unaware of any
ion ta
stop the dissemination of
s
information by
office.

3.

The press release p
included nothing that wou
releases adverse reflection
newspapers broke cor
i

4.

Mr. Crawford on December
it" i.e.the additional
faxed him a draft. I was
time Crawford ever obst
Ms. Sakamoto sounded equal

5.

I later that day became aware that Davis and Crawford
contacted Mr. Sutchel , which I took to mean that they were
trying to shortstop my testimony going to the committee.

rd and Davis on the 5th
correct the earlier press
credibility, even after
about 9:30 said " don't send
the committee after I
because that was the first
my testimony. Mr. Mori and
surprised ..

(On Dec. 13 Mr. Davis advi
me, Mr. Harvey, and Ms.
Sakamoto that they did call Mr. Sutchel and Mr. Johnston of
this committee and requested that information going to the
committee should be channel
or funnelled through
Crawford or Davis so they could see it. Mr. Davis indicated
he did not know that Crawford had told me not to send it,
and I assume tQe committee was not told that in fact I sent
a draft to Crawford that morning just for that purpose of
_..;ny-·own-voli1:ion./Davis also indicated that he had spoken to
Chairman Johnston who Davis reported (EMFSHASIS INDIRECT)
~c.a.t.ed- that
that was a reasonable request. I assume
something was lost in relating it as I can't believe the
committee would take that position given the sensitivity of
the information ..

r;J (

I asked Davis words to the effect "why did you go behind my
back to the Committee when I already volunteered and faxed
a draft to Crawford? why not call me direct and discuss
it? Unti 1 that day and these facts occured I had never
given you any reason to believe I would go behind your
back" Mr. Davis advised us that if he knew the facts as I
saw them (Knowing that Mr. Cr
ord had said not to send
it) he probably would have made the same assumption(cover
up} as I had although he said Mr. Crawford would not cover
anything up from his knowledge.
I stated that evidence for
the last 2 weeks has been to the contrary.

18
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It shou
particularly emphasized that requiring
sensitive information going to an assembly committee to be
"funneled" th
Mr. Crawford and ~r. Davis is
inconsistant
th Regulations established by Mr. Crawford
r the Savings and Loan industry which guarantee
confidential access by Savings and Loan staffs to the CDSL
or the institutions outside auditors.(see page A 113-A 114)
This is another indicator of an attitude change since
November 29,1989.
6.

Mr. Crawford's draft memo See page A-100-102),if approved
would have restricted access to the committee contrary to
Government Code 19251.5 (See page A-103) and been in
essence a gag order. I understand that Laura, Commissioner
Crawford's secretary, advised Northern California CDSL
personnel that the decision not to finalize the gag order
came from Mr. Geoghegan • s office or staff on December
5,1989 which seems very strange.
In a meeting on the 13th Mr. Davis declined to identify who
made the decision to Ms. Sakamoto, Mr. Harvey, and myself.
He also confirmed that he had ordered 25 LA staff members
to write down their recollections of everything they knew
about the C & D. Mr. Harvey advised him that under the
tense circumstances(Harvey referenced a "Reign of Terror"
that
ght be viewed as intimidation, i.e. pinning down
people
stories that they might be discouraged from
changing if their recollections improved or if they
wished to
Davis stated he hadn't thought of that,
which seemed strange to me since I understood Mr. Stelzer
had protested that it was intimidation. At this meeting
with Mr. D
s, Mr. Harvey also discussed a conversation he
had
Mr. Stelzer which I understood addressed
intimi tion felt by Mr. Stelzer.

TAMPERING WITH CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY
me on October 25, 1989 that he had been told
ing congressional testimony could not have
ts,
ch he had planned to insert. Since thB
ing my
timony were so numerous and -so
the c
lity and the documentary support
I inc
a" poison pill" clause in my
lieved would discourage attempts to remove
from or otherwise make other than typographical
my
timony.

19

This clause stated :
"A draft of this testimony has been provided to senior CDSL
officials and I understand to the state attorney general's
office, as well as our parent. agency in Sacramento however I
have requested by inclusion in this letter that any material
changes or requested changes other than typographical or
clerical must include the name and initials of the requestor
along with any reasons to avoid tampering with testimony."
It should be emphasized that rumors of tampering with testimony
were widespread because of the "whistle blower" nature of the
witness panel and Chairman Gonzales had made it very clear in
newspaper quotes that he would not tolerate tampering with
testimony. I also understood that changes had been made to
Commisioner Crawfords earlier testimony 'at the request or
suggestion of Agency (This is indirect information and I invite
you to confirm it directly with Mr. Crawford.- I have no direct
knowledge as to whether there were changes or if so that they
were substantive)
On October 26, 1989 the tampering incident described in my
testimony occured involving a bitter argument with Ms. Thayer
who told me that I would not be permibted to include exhibits
with my testimony. At this time I had not yet faxed my
testimony to LA, but I believe I may have warned Mr. Mori that
I was including the "Poison pill" clause because of Mr.
Stelzer•s warning to me.
I told Thayer that the exhibits were critical to my testimony
and absolutely essential. She told me that she would decide if
exhibits were to be permitted and ordered a copy of the
exhibits and a draft of the testimony to be sent to LA for
her review and also the review of Agency, which I took to mean
editing, "Toning down" as Mr. Davis described on December 13,
1989. Ms. Sakamoto was present in SF and on the squak box and
argued against the tampering attempt. I advised Thayer that,
Do you understand that what you're doing constitutes tampering
with congressional testimony? It is me personnally supenad, not
the department and the testimony will be mine. Gonzales has
made it clear -no tampering with testimony- If anybody makes
changes I will advise Chairman Gonzales of the changes and who
changed it.
She argued but I do not recall her citing a legal defense for
her position. (The commisioner had been permitted to include
exhibits with his testimony.) I advised
that the testimony
described such bizarre events that I felt that the credibility
of the testimony was totally dependent on placing the hundreds
of pages of
contemporaneous exhibits in the congressional
record for public scrutiny. I later faxed the testimony to LA
with the " Poison pill" clause described in exhibit 20 which I
20

understood caused considerable
management and with Agency.

consternation

with

CDSL

I believe Ms. Sakamoto had arguments or discussions(defending
my position) with CDSL personnel in LA relative to altering the
text including deleting opinions and conclusions, however you
would need to discuss that with her.
Mr. Davis and Mr.
Crawford supported me the following day, however, if I had
caved in it would have been too late on Friday to revise the
testimony. Mr. Davis advised me by telephone on October 27 that
he had called Janice Brown at Agency and advised them that the
matter was too sensitive and that no tampering could be
permitted. It was extraordinarily traumatic having to challenge
Ms. Thayer,who I believe to be operating with Agency
instructions, that neither she nor anyone else could take out
exhibits or make substantive changes. As I mentioned to Federal
examiners in Washington, I thought a Royal Dog House would be
prepared for me in Sacramento. Mr. Stelzer was eventually
permitted to include exhibits to his testimony after I took my
stand.
After returning from Washington, D.C. I became aware of an
unusual letter to the Commisioner (See page A-104-A-108) from
Corporations Commisioner Bender dated November 2, 1989,
inquiring as to what proof the CDSL might have that the subdebt
sales were a "scam" as I described in my congressional
testimony on October 31, 1989.
I was amazed. Seeing this letter at this point in time led me
to believe that Corporations approach was to totally deny
history. Refer to page A-9 . The date stamps (page Al08 for
example) into the Department of Corporations were also
suspicious as were mismatched exhibits.(See page A-47 ). I felt
that
the
tampering
attempt
with
congressional
testimony(countenanced by Agency) was linked somehow with
Corporations approach to denying the obvious and I decided that
if they would try.to tamper with our testimony at CDSL , they
almost certainly would try at Corporations. I prepared a
memorandum briefly summarizing the event and eventually
ted Mr. Harvey to send it to the F.B.I. (refer to page
109-112). As I told Congress, I did not intend to be part of a
cover up. The following is an excerpt from that memorandum.
"Given

a subsequent letter from Corporations Commisioner
dated November 2, 1989, whom my testimony seems to have
in an awkward position, I am requesting a discrete( if
ssible) investigation by you to determine whether the actions
of Thayer,
ce Brown,and perhaps others potentially violated
state or f
ral laws or regulations."

~~ .. ~~r,

21

It was my opinion that this was a serious tampering attempt and
that the text and all the exhibits would have been gutted
without my personal and harsh stand. State employees should not
have to fight so hard just to tell the truth.
With all due respect to the committee and the seriousness of
referring to a Government coverup, I believe the facts indicate
a probable coverup and warrant referral to whatever Government
agencies monitor govermental and political abuses for further

~J;t;;~~

-

Richard E. Newsom
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Mr. Richard Rewaom at the hearing yeaterday before tbl Finance
and !nau~ance Committ•• ~••4 1 atatement tn which he indicated
that he waa infor.-4 indirectly through mraelf that the Deputy
Attorntf General felt that he lacked aecuritiea law eapertiae
to effectlvel~ deal with any court challenge br ACC of the
Department•• Or4tr. Mr. Bewaom onlr repeated what be bad been
told but what he had been told waa not accurate. After a
4lacuaaion between mrae1f and the Aaaiatant Attorney General
C.H. lebm, baae4 on a letal technicality the Department Made
the deciaion to remove the reference to tbe potential
aecuritiea law vlolatlona. Thia daoiaton waa made entirely by
tha Department and not br the Attornar General •

_ ·--· - ..
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ASSDBLY P!lWtCI llfD IHSUJWICI
SUBCOXJII'l"l'll ON SAVIIIGB AJID LOAM LAW .IJfD UCJULA'l'ION

Bov.mber 21, 1111
State capitol, Room 4202

CHAIIUCAJI JOJOISTONI

Jb: • .BeW8011la

D. I.XCIWU> 1. DWSOJia

H•v•om

and

X am a

IR.

you.

Xy

•.ft.U\8 ia

JU.aha:rd

1.

aenio~

D. ROBIJ\'1' JIIU..ZR.I

witneaaas7

'l'~nk

Do you want. to swear the

11r. Chairman.

Do you want th.. to ta1tify under oath?

JODI~ I

'l'el.

D. XILLD. I Would aach Of f0\1 Z'Aiaa you.r s:ight Jumcl plaaae •
Do

•

you solaftlJ' swear that the taatillony you are abo'Qt. to giva

befon thi1 coaitt.M will be the trutb, tbe vhol• t.wth and
nothing but the tnth7

\

D. DWSOH (Mar and. C:rawford?) I

xa.

lllu.D •

X

do.

\

Would rou at.ate you naM and title for the

::eoorcl, pl••••·

...

009914
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MR. NBWSOMa

Richard Hew1om •. examiner IV

Special!•~

with tha

California Department of Saving• and Lean.

My name ia Richard E. Rewaom an4 I am a ••nior field examiner
with the California Departm.nt of.Savinga and Loan baaed in San
rranoiaco, California.
••~•d

•

yeaterday.

I

am here pursuant

to

a aubpoana which waa

copy
the Houae

I underatand the committee hAl a ca.plete

•
of my teatimony and all attached exhibits provided

to

Banking Committee on OCtober 31, 1989, an4 I will attempt to
briefly augment thia teJtimony to avoid V&ltinq thia committee'•

valuable time.
My firat contact with American continental corporation, the
holding company of Lincoln Savinqe and Loan Alaociation occurred
on September 1988 which I wa1 aaaiqned to act &I the examiner in
charge of the holding company examination of ACC.

&a moa-•

•pacifically detailed in my Con;reaaional teatimony, % rapidly
changed priority with the approval of Mr. ltelaar, the

Department•• examiner in charge of Lincoln after I had identified
a seriea of maaaive loan problema.

One of th••• problem loan• vaa

Lincoln'• Hotel Ponchartrain loan.

It was readily appazent that

was a $20 million loa• on thi1 loan and

~hat

it involved

flaqrant, unaafe and unsound landinq practice•, evan

mo~

flagrant

violations of federal conflict of interaet regulations and ACC•a

0 Q091 ~}
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di•••mination of inaccurate, inaompleta and erroneous information
ancl public

d.t.aclor~ure

atateaanta.

Baled on the docu.ntl

available, 1t was my opinion that the Jlonahartra1n tre1a.etion
repreaented the willful misappropriation of 820 million in company
••••ts, almost cu

qu~er

of x:c•a net wonh •• of 1/30/18 for

the benefit of inaider• without a prarer of collection and

w1~

·groaaly aialeadin9 diaolo•ur•s to the public. The docuaentation
•
vaa over:whel.ming and cl•u to • , to atate aftd federal savinO• and
loan regulators and eventually to tha PDIC who uaed thia
transaction in part

to

•upport a atco lait.

l •••

unable to

determine tbe difference between the Hotel Ponchartrain
tran•action and what a.ount•d to outright theft of $20 million,

followed

br lring

to th• •hareholdera and areditore to oonaeal the

theft which l felt to be ;rounds for aecur1t1et r•;ulatort taking
action to stop aubord1nated debt aalea.

lt waa

mr

opinion that virtually no

pruden~

and

info~

investor would invest in ACC if aclvi11ed. of tM apit.ude of the
mi•appropriation of company aaeet1, the willful nature of t.h•

violation of regulations and breach of fiduciary duty

~

inlidera.

My concern• were immediatelr conveyed to Lincoln ACC aanagement in

a letter (lxhib1t 2 to

Con~llional

teatiaoey), dated OCtober I,

1188 to managaaent, l conveyed 'llfY oonc•m that

invol~nt

J

"involve.ent of ao many officer•, directors and affiliated parties

0009i6

in auch a blatant violation of

~onflict

of Lntereat

~~Qlation

reflect• unfavorablf on the integrity o! the whole inltitution."
AI an 1ntereat1ft9 lide note, one of the ACC officer• involved in
the tran•action turned up •• a propoaed 23'
pa~t

•

ac~ir.

Liftcoln •• a

of the Rouaaelot group after t had referred the

transaction to the nx

I

P~nchartrain

The Hotel Ponchartrain trauaction

involved what appeared to be clear cut er.rora and aaterial
adm1aa1one in public diaclolurea addreaaed•in detail in lxhibita
1, 2 and 4 to

fll1

Con;rese1onal teatimony.

copiel ot the •••

docwaM~nta

'.l'hel&

exh.ibita wen

that I had provided to a Deput.Mnt

of COrporation• official at the concluaion of the November 10,
1988 meeting between Department of

Corporation~~

Department of lavinq• and Loan per1onne1.

per•onnel and

The purpoae of thia

meeting vaa to eonvey to tu Depe.t'tlllent of ccrporatiou ..-r&l.
concern• about the viability of ACC aa well •• apecifia

aoncerDa

about the Ponchartrain traneaot1on and to aeak aseiatance in
•=pplng the euborcU.nated C$el>enture ealea.
I

I

ad.viaad the Co:r:porat1ona Pf»:tlonnel, JIOJ'ton l.ift, Robtlrt

Rifkin and Ken Indo of the epecific diaclo•ure probl..a on the
Hotel Ponchartrain tr&Daaction and hoped it would 'ultlfr
Corporation•' curtailaent of aubordlnate debt aal••·

fn addition

to the document• provided at thi• ..etinr, Corporation• offioiala

ware 1nv1te4 to

rev!ev~the

box of doaumente aupparting our

oro . ,.~

. . t"1"1
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crit1ciea of tha Ponchartrain

t~anaaction

located in our Loa

An9elea office•.
The Departaaent of Saving• and

Loan

final cb:aft o! tu oeaae

and deaiat order agaLnet Lincoln and ICC wae eubaitted to the
Sta~• Atto~ey

The committee
included an

Qeneral'l office for final
hal

~rder

a

OOPf

~iew

1n

Dec~

1188,

of thia •• an exhibit •• ~11 d:aft

requiring lCC in

••••nee to atop aillaadtn; the

public in public dilcloaure ltat..enta baaed on the finding that
inaccu~ate

and a1eleadin;

diaclo1uza•1 docu.ente.
were deleted from the

•~•t

...nta appeaztd in ACC'a pUblic

Thaae ftndingl and the

o~r

pzopo1~

order

finally ieeued, reportedly at the

nque•t of the Deputy Attomar General aaai;ned to thia utter.

%

wa1 infonaed indirectly through Sh.lrl8f 'l'harar in our Loa .&.aplee

le;al division that the Deputy Attorney General felt that he
lacked aecuritiel expertiaa to effectively deal with

~

court

challenge by ACC of the departaent•a o:der.
I undez.tand the committee i1 conlidering chan;ing aavinga
and loan law.

I hope thil ·OOo~•

~oauee

one o! the cataetrophie

problem• with major expan1ion of aavinga and loan povera waa the
virtual deletion of all aignificant confliat of interaat
prohibition• f:r:om the savings Ae1ociation and Law.

Xn

ef~ect,

~

there 11 no apecif!e atate prohibition

a~ainat

inaidera atealing

OC:0918

Mr. Crawford and

Bill Davie' aeaiatanca

M~.

fo~

their

euppo~t

through the lalt 1everal monthe in bringing thie whole matter to
li;ht.
Thank rou vary much.
xr. Hew1om.

XR. JOHNSTOHa

TO put

your testimony in contaxt.

In November of 1986 the D•partment of corporation• approved the
•ale ot $200 million in eubor41nated dabenturea, aometime referred

to

01

junk bon41 by ACC through ita principal

Savin;•.

n.

aub1idia~,

Lincoln

Ia that correct?
NBWSOMa

I

am

not--mr knowledge of thia Lincoln

particularly relate• from Sept.aber '88 on.
MR. JOHNSTON•

I

understand.

I

believe that to

~

th• fact

an4 aubeequent to that in May of 1988 an additional $150 aillion
in aubordinated debenture• waa approved by the
Corporations for aal• through Lincoln

~avinge

~i·•·

Depa~nt

an4 ita

of

~nt

ACC.

I

You teatify about the period following that in late 11118 where in
....

your view there were ai9nificant probl.-a with Lincoln and tC.
Department ieeued a ceaee and deaiet

order~

Ie that corzeot?

they had no right to even be there and he alao indicated that

n

h~~

.fj,,

1~

.

felt that the holding campanr examination waa going fa: afield of
looking at matter• apacificallJ related to Lincoln.
he

indicat~

aomething to the effect that he thought aarbe be

would throw all the

the examination.

examLDe~a

examining. the holding company out of

X aek~ct hill 1a you threat applf to tbe state of

California aa much aa we didn•t.ai;n tha
yea. •

&t that point

So I aatcl vall I •h1elc ?Out>

xou.

He aatd, •wall,

••=!."MJ' .t.a f011l9

~

be •alk1n.t

t.o our attomar becauaa we haw tM zoight to auatDa the holding

.

companJ.

At that point he aga.in aa.id well why ue

rou even

examining it, ancl % naponclect to hia that aOMt.hiq,

VOI'CII

.

to tha

re&IO!ll we wera lookint at it vaa :beoau.••
people who va felt v.ce not accu~a~ly intozaed ~gazding tha

effect, that ou of

~he

cond1 tion of Lincoln, or ACC were 1nvaat1n; IIOMJ' 1rl auboJ:dinatad

debt there, which on the other aide vaa !Haing uaed to aupport
treaau~

atoak purcha••• fz:011 inaict..zoa.

being ralatiYalr high pricea.

&t vbat ve perceived aa

that waa raaeon anoufb !oZ' ua to

look at the vhola thing beca.uae it d.idft' t look ,right.
10\. JOIDIS!'Olla

Did you ad.Yiae the ·DaputaMtnt of Coz:porat.J.ona

in your Bovember Meting wJ.t.h Deputment of CorpozoatJ.ona pezoaonnel

of the impreaaiona that you had, in tha facta that you had at that.

time, which you hav•
D. DWSOXJ

~uat

taltifie4 to?

What I ncall t•lling

...

the corpo:tation• peraonnel
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waa that we had aerioua concern• that we felt the institution waa
probabl7

bu•~•cl,

in proceaa of

aA

•

lNt. lt would take

examination.

aCBM

tiM to

p~

it. · We wen

AI an immediate effort to perhapa

atop tba aubordinatad debt 1aln, we tel t the uae of a d.iacloaure.
iaau• would be a vehicle that they might ua• to aaailt ua in
stopping the aubd.ebt.

Some of the dieoloaure pro!)l.U related

back I beli.ve to Kay 'II and even earlier diaoloauree.
the problem• with the ACC diacloaure is that
•

one of

w• felt vaa many,

nearly all their public reporta, included a large number of
refer.ncea that were incorporatacl by reference to other documenta.

one of the probleau they had waa that they included a mialeaCU.ng,

.

and erroneoua atat.ment,

Very mialeading and erroneous 1tatement

to the effect on the Hotel Ponchartrain that the tran.act1on vaa
on the aame terms of conditione •• affo:ded the general public,
which waa pure 81.
D. 30BHS'l'O!fa

D. NIWSOJie

'l'hat is a technical term.

Yea.

(laughter)

We use it aoaetiMa in

euminationa, particularly at thia place.

aut it

IH81d

to ua

that the facta were overwheLming on thia tranaaction and while we

move forward and attempted to document the insolvency of the

.

inatitution, that would be aomethinq the Cor,porationa people ataff

could aaaiat ua with because we are not

espe~•

in eecU%it1ea law.

OC0921

we draftad. our c:•••• and. d.uiat order baaed upon unaafe and
•
unaou.nd. 1aauea that were within our coo and. our plan waa if ther
wanted. to take ua. to court on it, we felt the 9ublic: would. benefit

bec:auae it eftdAKI up in a pal>lie coGft., the public would
was oo1n9 on.

So a frankly

fel~

knOw what

,. ooulcSn •t loee, ptt1ng it. out

to the public.
KR. JOHHSTOH •

ftan'k you,.

Queatione

f~

the uabe.r.'a.

b.

sea•tZ'u.cl;
UIIJIBL'!'UJI, DI.C 8Ciiii'JIMDI

the 110ney

f~

You. aaid. tbat t.htQ' wen taking

the ealea of theae aubord·inatecl debentuea and.

buyin; tnaau.xr atook'l.

D. RIWIOitl

Ye•,·1 th.,.· W'lllfa, tmyin; atock fJ:Oil inaiclu'a.

'fha

tr•••·tu:Y etoolc ia ••••ntially the atock that ••• out.atand.ing in
I

the .a.marican continental tbat waa h•14 by 1u14ere, Jtut.in; fg!ly
~r•

and othere.

JIR. SBI'R»>Dt

MR. DW80Jh

it

i•.

'!hat ia not

=•••UZ'f atock.

After it WAI acquired ·by AMX'iCU COntinental 1

btarican eontine.ntal waa acqu1r1nQ that atock bact from

JDt. ltBWSOX 1

We loolatd at that in at leaat one or two

1netanoea. we aav

~hat

the quotes didn't aake aenae1 that they

were paid the actual cloee -price was 1li;htl7 over the ctuot.ci hiqh

for the clay on the information we had.

we wecen' t. axperta at

aeeuritiaa aattara and eo we called up tbe IIC,

app~x.t..ately

oetober 17, ancl explained to thea what va thou;ht we vera !in4.t.n;

and we weran' t that a kill*' aa far nuance• of aecuri tiea law and

obvioualr we

need~

help bacauaa tbeae people

we~

the atata ot

the art and ..,. vere thia waan•t our place, but % think that

anawera

rou~ ~e·~~ona &bou~ ~~•••urr •~oak ~b&·~··

Tha~

11

what thel' vera d.oin;.

IIR.

SBASTaARDt

Well, they vera buying atocJc to be traaaury

atock, then, and not buyinG tt:eaauxy atook ••••
JOt. NIWSOMa

It vas alaa ;anerally re1trictecl atock.

inaidera atock vaa aub,ect to apac1fic

~~t~iction1

t.t'ha

10 it val

aublect to limitation• and open aa:ket 1alea, 10 the 1ala back to
ACC waa a perfect way to ra1o1v. the probl. . becau1e if ACC bought
it what they war• doinq, we aa:ac.ct

the~~

wait a second, how coaae

you're paying top dollar for re1trictad atock..
~

'l'bara 1hould

~

a
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dieeount for re•trioted 1tock relative to aarket atock and the

reeponee wae well we are retiring it all 'eo it doeen't matter,
whiah 1•

I

peaa zatioul.

But it

•-ttel like the treaaw:y atoc'k

purcha••• o..r time were heavily weighted

ineidere,

tow~d•

aal•• from

It eeemed like when they wanted to go into the aa%ket,

when the 1naidera wanted to aell vaa when American Continental
•eemed to want to go into the M&'ket to buy a lot of ltook.
wae addreaac in detail in federal
eXA~Aiu.tion

told

~·

int.e~ill.

hold1ft9

'l'hat

Coap&nf

nport. in atd-October whiah Kevin o •Con.n.ll of OIA

waa pzcvided ev•ntually to the s•c in Bavember.

D. JODSTOltt b. Wright.
ASSD.BLYWOKAH CA'!HII 111\IQJft' 1

Yea •

I would lilca you to

•laborate a little mox. on baa1cally ita your aecond full
paravraph in which you mentioned the fact that you took your final

draft of a ceaaa and de•i•t order to the Attorney General?
D. Rn80Xa
aouthe~

I didn't paraonally, but Shirl.y Thayer, our

Cal1fozn1a attorney did.

u. WRIGH'l't

Had the Attorney General

vent forward on

the

e•aaa and deaiet order th1e whole thin; could ha¥8 been at lea•t
brought up publicly

1~Decambar

of 1188.

I• that correct?

00092,.,

JUt. ltBWSOMa

It vaa

my

f•ling and I think ahazoec:l br

CNZ'

internal northe:n California attorney• that thil would have
dropped an atomic bomb on their eubdebt ealea

hav• been very, very

diffic~lt

pro~a.

in terms of a pot•ntial criminal

exposure to •ecuritiel fraud to continue to sell

•

It would

lubo~nated

debt after an ord•r vaa outatanding againet th.. telling them they

wer• misleading the pul>lic ancl o"cla"ift.O t.h• to atop.
that. ve ve%'41ft't ••curitiee expert.e, but.

cextainly cauae them

aa~or

We felt
v• felt that it would.

delay and ha•e to

~.diaaloa~

and

frankly, we d14n' t te•l that the7 could tell. the tzouth and really

;•t anybody to buy thie 1tuff if 1t came out.
MS. WRIGH'la

And you' r• telling thil

committee that the,

Attorney General vu de Kup,

u.

'

HIWSOMt

No not ••• but a deputy attorney general.

xs. WRIQHTa

He i1 re1poneible for the O.pa&'taent, correct?

KR. D'lfSOile

I

MS. WR.ICH'!a

Would ••Y that becauae they dic:ln't have th•

•••wae ao,

78••

expertise they would not ;o forward with thil?
~

000925

--·--··

, D. DWIO!h

what

I

Well 1 % waen •t then for that, and I a relayin;

wae told from a ...ting from our

no~hezn Cal1fo~ia

counael that beard Shirley '!hayer reepol\4 ))ack to the
Commi11ioner.

So what I

auq~t,

it aouftda incredible to ae also,

but •••

d • DIGH'l' 1

It ew:e doea to ae ••• ,

(!'PI 8-2)

KR. DWSOBI , •• But it you want to

pu~

that I

~ink

it

ai;ht b8 worthwhile for J'OU to talk to }*"-,.people 1 both people

Lnvolved who actuall7 discussed •hat.
liS. WRIQH'l' •

Becauae th•n my next queat1on would be to you,

if the Attorney CJaneral, hia office 1 eaye to rou that we don •t

have the expertiee, ao therefore n
with thia

p~aal,

ana not tolnt to go fonard

what otMr avenue do you have? How elae would

you get a ceaee and deaiat order if it would not be through the
Attorne, General?
KR. JdWIOlh

'1'he queation

would be isauing

Cha oz:cler ancl %

think it ia vetting into tbe area of 111uin; an order without the

0('0£.~

complat• support of the agency that has to defend
th•r challenge 1t.

am not a complete

I

expe~t

rou

in court, if

in that area but I

falt this waa important enough to atteM,pt to delivec it.
KS.

MR. HBWSOMa
thia

!!~ ~diAlf)

w

WRIGHT~!.S§Mf ;~9d'&iif further with
I didn't sign the order.

happanad.~~~ing ove~

I

it?

vaa on vacation when

the 10 z'waa bazned out and I

figured we had it done and thia happenad while I vaa on vacation,
I

aqrae with you that I wae very upeet at it becauae I felt that

indirectly it would 1.-.diataly atop the
for example in January

I

aubde~t

aal•• and that

believe 110 aillion wae 1old and 1oaabody

from the Houaa Banking Committee told me that the aalee continued
thJ:ou;h hbnuy.

MS. WRIGHT•

I certainly would like to hear the Att.oi.'IUiy

General'• reaponee to ·•omethin; auoh aa thi• beaauae J .t.hlnk it'•
unconacionable.
lb:. Lai\Oaeter.

D. JOHHITOB 1

HR. L.UCASTIRa
back to the

Thank fOU, Mr. Chairman.

~ketin;

exactly what they

% would like to 90

of tbaae high riek inatrua.nte and that••

war~

It' • in effect been called junk bond

but

000927

they had a very low
pa~ticular

and the only thing behind tbe••

1natrumenta were a,uppoeedly the ability of

Continental in
paid.

px1o~1ty

o~der

&me~iaan

to regain them half of everything alae were

You could equate, I gu.aee, to a eecond mortgage.

~!he fi~•t

ha• !izat claim, in affect.

monga;~

Dap~nt

The

allowed the•• kinds of iftatzumenta to be aold

on the pzaai••• anct thfiY J.aauacl
Conti~antal

to ooma on the

pa~.f.aaion

~!•••

for .&aerioan

of Lincoln 1avin91 &ftd Loan

'

and i~ •om• inatancee according to aOMe taatimoDr allowed the
peraon 'aelling thaae 1nat1:WD8nt• to tet Hhii\CS
.

Lincoln .Savin;• and Loan.

tu

oount.ar at

Row there ia oJ:wioualy an Ulpreae1on

'·

ca:eatecl. . '!'hey vue buying inetz:umente that were fully ;uuantHcl
and inau:r:ecs..

t~i•

type of

~hi•

~ctivity
\

a. BDSOX•

coaon practtaa for the
to 90 on in our aavin;•

Dap~nt

and~

to allow

! am probably th8 wrong pezaaon to auwar that ••

a field epminea:.

D. JOIUII'l'ONa

lt would prot»ably be better •••

xaybe we could hold that

~or

Mr.

Crawfo:d,. if

we could, xz. Lanoaeter.

xa.

LA.RCUTD•

l raiae the queatJ.on, Jlr. Chairman, to thia

gantl...n, becauae he La

~he

peraon who •aiel he had all tuae

**586 P17

cJ.rcW'Ilatancee

that

au~J:OuncU.ng

whethe~ ~be

anything, the
.

thaae

dU.nture~

and •o it , . . ., to

Attorney General d1d anything

De~rtment
~

o~

A

questicu.

-

M

anybody elae d1d

had tha ab111 ty to go in and 1ay • Stop

aelling the•• ..a.. L1racoln Savino• and Loan. •
D. JOIDISTOHI

-

Again, l thinlc thoae

U'8

.
the

app~p:riat•

What I would like to do if that •i1 all the que1tiona

for thJA w1tneaa, 11 to a1Jc Jtz'. Jlal' to teat1fy ancl theft Mr.
c:rawforct on the policy iaauea and tb• ponaaa of the .Departaant. ·
think we ought to aalc the kind of que8t1ona that you have.

z

'l'haftlc

•
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(

,
To: Kevin O'Connell
FHLB
From:Dick Newsom
Examiner
State of California
Department of Savinqs and Loan
Nove~ber

1,1988

Attached are our tentative findinvs on Southmark which appears
at least substandard and which appears to be up to S48 million
in excess of'Federal unsecured lendinv limits to a sinvle
borrower.(S63.9-3) Please advise us if you don't avree with
our evaluation of leqal lendinq limits. Attached is a copy of
current National Bank law and revulationa.State laws are more
liberal and less clear however we are wqrkinv on it.

•

We.not•d a pattern of discrepancies in the real estate schedule
of the Southmark 6/30/88 10-K.
our review of your preliminary Lincoln loan comments doesn't
include either the Southmark line as a criticized asset or the
apparent sivnificant requlatory violation.
r

I
~

Was this an oversight or is the State voinv alone on·this one.
If an oversivht can we assist you in any way.?
Attached also are our RA Homes tentative loss classification as
presented to manavement on the whole 130.000.000 line.W. have
pot as yet received a response. The tentative federal
ciassication is substandard. Avain. do we have a difference of
opinion or is there any way we can assist you?
I am a new comer on this job however it appears to me that this
institutions lendinv practices vo beyond unsafe and unsound and
that there appear to be major diffe~ences between tentative
asset quality findinvs by State & Federal examiners warrantinv
discussion between the avencies.
·

(
000930

To:Mr. T1m Kruckeberq
Lincoln savinqs and Loan
November 1,1988
From:R.E. Newsom
Examin•r
State of California
Department of Savinqs and Loan
Attached are tentative f~ndin9s on the Southmark concentration
of credit, most of which is considered a problem·•sset and
which appears to involve additionally well over S40 million in
unsecured exposure in excess of the loan to one borrower
limits set by federal insurance requlation 156'3. 9-3 •
We have attached a copy of the relevant• Federal insurance
r-egulation and a copy of the applicable referenced federal
bankinq laws and regulations.
We are also reviewinq this transaction for compliance with
State loan to one borrower limits.

..

.

Please advise of the associations POsition reoardin9 these
transactions and State and Federal unsecured loan to one
borrower limits and include manaQment~ plan to 9et this
concentration of credit in compliance with State and Federal
Laws and Requilations.
Please provide a written resPOnse to these findinos within 7
days.Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

I

(
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Parkoate
#91174{partic1cpation purchased with
rePUrchase aoreement by Southmark)
(1) 8.929.222
.
Southmark Life Group,Inc.
Loan #s 00003.00024.&3011
(2)25.000,000
(3)24,500.000.

Problem asset
8,929.222

*
*

25.000,000
24,500,000

*

18.723.232

Southmark. Corp.
#00004
(4)18,723,232

/;"J;)_/

~~~ark Corp.

1,450.000

(5)1,450,000
Southmark. Acceptance Corp.
. #1 0004
(6)5,175,000

"1 ~'(

5,175,000

Insurance Corporation
5,875,000

(
'

.

..

ational Realty Limited Partnership .
#2022 &2023
18,000,000
(8)18,000.000
Servico, Inc.12 1/4% Sub notes
(9)19.860,224

Total Southmark Related Problem
Assets

*

•

19,860,224

$128,962,278

denotes aggregated under FSLIC Regulation #563.93.

Southmark. is a diversified financial services company that
incurred a large net loss in ita year ending 6/30/88
operationa.Continued concerns regarding abilitY to meet
intermediate and long term debt maturities resulted in the
discontinu•tion of both common and preferred stock dividends 1n
1988.The companys abilitY to genenerate cash from asset sales
has been adverselY affected by depressed market conditions in
the Southwest which have also increased cash demands on the
company.(Reference page 6 and 7 on 6/30/88 10-K).The 10-K
references a number of other problema facing the company
including losses at ita Texas S&L subsidiary San Jacinto
Savinoa which is facing FHLB enforcement action.
Southmark Corporation consolidated financial Statements dated
June 30,1988 indicate total assets of $9,161,307,000 with a ne~
worth of $696.209.000. For year ending 6/30/88 company had a
pretax loss of $226.182.000 with after tax loss of $164,916,000.
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It appears that due to continued softness in real estate
markets the company will continue to face earnings Problems.
and as noted in the body of these comments in a number of
instances the carrving values of company assets appear far in
excess of market values with previouslY syndicated projects
returning via foreclosure to the companies books. The company
has been scrambling to offset cash flow problems by sale and
refinancing of assets howeve~ as noted there appear to be a
number of. apparent factual c:Uscrepancies in Southmark • s 6/30/88
10-K report and enough intercompany transactions between
Liuncoln and Southmark that do not stand on their own merits to
warrant a complete exptanation by Lincoln management and
related explanations by Southmark regarding apparent factual
errors in the 10-K.
Until this borrower turns itself around it warrants
consideration as a problem borrower.
( 1 )This loan participation purchased f·rom Southmark on June
30,1988 is a wrap around third deed of trust with a balance of
··approximately $17,809,126(wrapping a 17,633,433 first and a
$102,997 second with other lenders.) Collateral is a 688 unit
apartment in Houston operating at a large deficit cash flow. ·
Borrowing entitY has a $21 million deficit net worth as of
6/30/88, resulting from operating losses. Interest rate is 8
3/4I.The property appraised at $18,500,000 on June 20,1988. The
propertY is overencumbered by a fourth DT of 12.500.000 with
Southmark and a S13 million 5th DT .with a Houston
bank.Southmark has agreed to repurchase this loan or replace it
should the underlying loan default.
The junior lien POSition and deficit cash flow of the subject
provide little effective collateral protection and the subject
clearlY is in substance predicated more on the repurchase
agreement with Southmark which is itself incurring operatin9
losses. This loan is considered a problem asset due to peor
collareteral protection and reliance on the uncertain ability
of Southmark to perform under its repurchase agreement.
(2)& (3)These loans to Southmark· Life Group, Inc.("Southmark
Life .. ) a whollY owned subsidiary of Southmark are
collaterallized by 1,200,000·shares(Aprroximately 100%) of
Pacific Standard Life Insurance Coaapany,("PSLIC") a whollY
owned subsidiary of Southmark Life.The collateral doesn't meet
the testa of national banking regulations to qualify under
secured lending limits to one borrower and these loans are
considered unsecured for regulatory purpoaes.Collateral is
reportedly valued at approximately ISO million dollars however
according to Best's(Inaurance Comp[any Rating service) a B
rating on PSLIC was maintained due to parent contributions
offsetting operating losses since 1983.
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Page 51 of the 10-K refers to .a definltive aqreement by
Southmark to sell its 89% interest in Inteqon a larqer and
profitable subsidiary of Southmark Life which accord1n9 to paqe
54 of the 10-K is already Pledqed along with other Southland
Life assets to other lenders.Paqe 28 of the 10-K references
the projected decline in ~•venues and expenses that will
follow.Page 67 of the 10-K refers to a premium deficiency in an
unnamed insurance subsidiary ranging from $18.8 million to
$51.7 million for which additional reserves of only $21.6
million have been established.
With many of Southland Life's profita'>le assets pledged to
other lenders it appears that Southland Life lends less than
substantive support to these loans. Moreover. it appears that
operations of Southland Life will be adversely effected by the
sale of a maJor profitable subsidiary and that the future
capacitY of Southmark Life or Southmark to support capital
drains of PSLIC is uncertain.
Loans (2) & (3) are accordingly considered problem assets due
to factors noted and the ultimate reliance on Southmark which
is unprofitable and a questionable sQurce of ultimate repayment .

(

(

....

. (4)Reduced balance of 128 million loan originally used to
acquire atock(collateral).Collateral is 1.75 million shares of
Servico stock moat of which carries a restrictive
leGend.Southmark owns directly 491 of Servico plus indirectly
through National RealtY an addition 141 of Servico per page 5
of the Southmark 10-K.Servico operations have deteriorated
steadilY under Southmark ownershiP with Subordinated debt of
Servico classified substandard by federal examiners ikn the
current examination.
~
Page 11 of the 6/30/88 Servico 10-K reflects a deterioration
from a S9 million profit in year end 1985 to a 16 million loss
in year end 6/30/88, while lonG term debt increased from
approximately 1164 million to$235 million durinG the same
period.Page 15 of the Servico 10-K also refers to deficit
working capital of $16 million at 6/30/88.Tbis loan is
considered a problem asset due to the weak and deteriorating
financial condition of Servico. the restricted nature of the
collateral supportinG the loan, and the weak and deterioratinG
financial condition of Southmark.Due to the restricted nature
of the stock the loan is considered unsecured for purpeses of
loan to one borrower limits.
Note: Loans (5),(6),& (7) have as additional collateral
2.571,429 shares of Pratt Hotel Corporation stock. Southmark
owns 371 of the stock of Pratt, which would apparentlY impair
the liquidity of the stock which in any case reportedly had a
9/13/88 market value of 11.625 per share(For total value of
S4.2million). Pratt is apparentlY losinG money which adds
uncertainty to the collatera:value.

(
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(S)New loan originated June 29,1988 secured by a first deed of
trust on a 122 unit apartment complex in Lafayette Lousiana
appraised for Lincoln on 6/6/88 at S1,025,000.In 1981 Southmark
sold the property to a limited 'partnership for S3.6 H1llion.In
May 1987 Southmark took the property back in lieu of
foreclosure.The property is appararently reflected on the
6/30/88 Southmark 10-K(Page 76) with a book value of $3.084,000
with no liens reflected.In view of the distressed nature of the
project. the appra·ised value only 1/3 of the Southmark book
value and the ·erroneous free and clear status r·eflected in the
10-K.the reliabilitY of Southmark financial exhibits appears
open to question and warranting explanation by Southmark.
This loan overencumber• the Project by approximately $425,000
even uatng the associations appraisal. This loan is considered
a problem asset due to the overencumbered and distressed
history of the project and ultimate reliance on secondary
collateral of closely held penny stock in Pratt Hotel which may
or may not provide a viable source ol repayment.
· (6)Loan dated June 29,1988 is secured by a 1st DT on a 513
unit distressed apartment complex in Houston ,Texas with May
19,1988 appraised value(Lincoln)of. 13,700,000 . Subject loan
overencumbers the subject property by 1.475,000. The property
was acquired by the borrower in 1988 via a complicated and
distressed Process. Page 76 of the Southmark 10-K apparentlY
reflects a $3,995,000 book value of the subject with no liens
which raises further questions about·the accuraey of the
Southmark 10-Ks.Loan is considered a 'problem asset due to the
weak financial conmdition of Southmark, overencumbered status
of the project.apparently large deficit cash flow, of the
Project, and reliance on questionable support Provided by the
secondary collateral(Pratt Stock previousl:y noted).
(7)New loan dated June 29,1988 secured by a first deed of trust
on a 376 unit apartment complex in San Antonio Texas appraised
for Lincoln 6/30/88 at 14.200,000.Property was apparently
acquired bY the borrower in foreclosure approximately two years
·ago.There is evidently a repurchase agreement by Southmark in
case of default.This loan overencumbers the Project by
$1,675,000 acording to the associations own aPPraisal. The
property is apparently referenced on page 76 of the Southmark
10-K as havinG a carrying value of $5,830,000 with no liens
against it. As noted in (5) and (6) there appears to be a
pattern of erroneous information provided in the Southmark
10-K.This loan is considered a problem asset due to the
overencumbered status of the project, dependence on
questionable secondary collateral previously noted(Pratt
Stock), and ultimate dependence on Southmark which is
financially troubled.
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(8)Loans dated June 29,1988 to acquire 1,500 acres of land 1n
Goodyear Ar1zona form a L1ncolri Subsidiary for a purchase Price
of $24 million, with cash down of $6.000,000. National Realty's
net worth declined substantiallY in 1987. The land is not
reflected on the real estate schedule(paoe 81 &82) in the
6/30/88 10-K of Southmark which raises further credibility
problems reoardino the substance of the whole aeries of June
1988 transactions with Southmark. Given the problems at
Southmark. the purchase of Goodyear land in Arizona appears
inconsistant oeooraphicallY with Southmark activities.
(9) This represents Servico, Inc. Subordinated notes classified
substandard by FHLB examiners. These are considered as problem
assets for the reasons noted by FHLB examiners and the
deteriorating condition·of Service previously noted in this
presentation.These appear to warrant incluaion under Ins. Reo.
563.9-3 in loan to one borrower calculationma.

I

Jn overall terms this laroe concentration of credit in apparent
violation of loan to one borrower limits and involvino a
borrower that is known to be havino serious financial
difficulties appears at least imprudent.

(

000936

EPAitTMeNT Of SAVINGS AND LOAN

•

~-•

Rlobard Roth, Deputy Inaurance CO..iaaioner
O.partaeftt of :uu&-anoe
3410 Wilabin llo\ll.vai'CI, lui~• 201
tea ~-~··· Cl t0010
.
Ml

WHIR COLLU c:aDII 'l'Uit I'ORCB
aequ••~ tor xntoraation and

Poaa,ble •ntoraeaent Action

· Dear Riqhal'd•

Pacific ltandazd Life Inauranoe C08Pany, Int.qon Lite Inauranoe
and other lnaurance aUblidiarlea ot louthaark Corporation
(•aouthun•) •Y be at eoonoaia tiak.
Integon Life Inauranoe,

tbroufb Kark•tinv one Inoorporate4
ha• been autborlzH to aell
ina~ance produota, inoludlnv tax deferred annultlea,
a~ many
•'•'• and f~ra1 1avlnwe and loan lnatltutiona and throu;h
thai~ ••rvloe oorporatlona. ·
(another

lautlUiark

aubaidia:y),

louthllark (nov in banknptoy) 11 known to beve •nt•9•d in
recip~cal
tran1actiona with ~rican Continental corporation
(allo in bankrQptcy) and with aany ot ita own IUblidiari••·
~••e
tranaactlona aay have lackad eoonoaio reality and aay
have aarioualy daaa9ad the aubaidiari••· Pacific ltandard Llfa
Inauranoe Company, in particular, baa had an inordinate volume
of tranaactlona wlth aouthmark att111at••·

Althou9h tbare 1a pr•••ntly no 1paoltlo lntoraat1on to ahow
that the lnauranoa aUbeidiariea of loutbaark are in financial
troUble, tbere 11 euftlclant inforaation to ~u.tlty an
i..adiate earetu1 review ot the aatety and aoundneaa of thea•
IU~Ildiazolaa.

It would ba ;reatly appreciat.414 if t.he Dep6ri:Mn~ ot !n•u.rance
would review tbe condition of ~· naaed louthaark .ubaid1ar1e•
and any other known eUba1diar1aa and npon any veam•••e• or

probleaa dlaoovered to the aavlnv• And Loan CO..ie1ioner, in
addition to taJtint any appropriau np1atozy aotion.
w#
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aichard Roth, O.puty

aea

Ineu~anca

Ocmaie•ioner

White collar Cria• Taak •oro•

Aupat 1G, 1111

Page 2

The

DeDart.ant
with a i•ational
an uuination
aavincJ• u4 loan

of Iavin;• and Loan ia preaently cooparatinq
TeaaM ot federal ••ving• and loan axaainera in
of the tJ:auact.ion• of southaark, wbioh ia a
holdift9

ooapa~y.

·

The oepart.aent of !nauranoe 1• requ.eate4 ~ ebare ~latory
information with thill team directly or tbrOufb the savings and
Loan Comaieeioner.
Kevin O'Conn•11,
Director
of
lpeoial
supeniaion, Offioe of Thrift luperviaion (0'1'8), Waab.intlton,
D.c.
may ~· oon~acted at (202) 331•411'' B4war4 lo44an,
Bxaa1ner,
OTS, Dallaa Dietriot, . .Y be oonaot.ed at (713)
874•00881 Alex Bardolak, riald Bxaainer, 0'1'8, Cl\1oato Dlatr1ct,
be contacted at (312) 16!•111a.

••1

1 am available to diacuaa thia matter with you at any tlae.

Ver:y truly your•,

~

W%Lt%1K D. DAVIS
Chief Deputy savinq• and Loan eoamissioner
WDD:ta
001

Kevin O'Connell, 0'1'1, Waebiftt't.onl D.
ldvard lo4Cien, OTI, Dalla• Dl•tr ot
Alex Bardolak, 0'1'8, Chioawo Dilltr1ot

c.
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.....
Mr.

Chairman and

I

xa1~ara

cpportW"Ait.y
!. Newsom.

for the
•

n... is aiohard

I am a

Department

of savings and LOan baaed in

.California.

after J:)ein; aaaig'ned ae the

lhortly

of the exuination

of American continental corporation

Septaba~,

of avant. a occurred

1981, a Mrie•

ae t.o bel iwe that the

Ped.eral Haae Loan Bank examination of

was

My

lavint• and Loan

of zy stay in

tavora~ly ~iaaed

in Phoenix relating to the·

•cover up" were almoat atandin;

red.•ral •xhinua on

Lincoln loan examination, among
e1ta.
Jb:' e

loott 1 the

tft...eftJa'P!f!ltllill

YIIIIIB.Ii.\i!

lank Board, adv!aed. u

in Phoenix tbat

l\l!llftl!''ll"'l'"'r'

total loan loss cliiUIIificatione

am:rra1cra~t:.ad

I rempondet.S at

•

t10 aillion.
effect, "What

about the Hotel

aillion

obViously a loaa•.

not require

of Lincoln :far t.h

Qft8eGUre4

loaD - it'•

it vae only 40\lbttul, which
~~·•·

I vaa 1..-41at•ly

co~~arned a~out

the poa~~111ty of a ~itevaah •• tha~l
Ponc~artrain app.are4;a loss tbe day it was tund~~d
deteriorate4 since and was perhaps the moat flagrant aelf-4aalin;
A9Ulatcey violation :z: have ..ver aeen.

1
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.

federal
Lincoln loan examination waa auppoeedly virtually
.

complete at

~at

tiae.

Ac:lditicnally, my testimony i:nolud.ell'clOOlJ.i\Snte

i:ncludin~

an

extensive written analyllil ot loans described ae the Betel
Ponchartrain

tao ail11on unaeaured loan, the lA Bema $30 •1llion
and. a aer1ea of loaM ud junk bonds to louthaark

and related entitles tota11nt an incredible

o (

wu

to on• borrower

Blal08 W'M"~Wil ·~

vu eo

'

~ad

in taot

stataaefttl to see if
•

I 414 not believe anyone

vera 41•o1oeect..

It. ia

d<Sreaaed in
. EXhibit 2 aa a "willful divareaion.ot aaaociation
•••~• benofitin~

affiliated partie• in violation of

•tJU.lationa•.

be diloloauroa appeared inadequate and mieleadin; to me and I
aallenqe4 nu1nagaent in aevual written exhibit• whioh are

,clu4e4 in this testimony.

fta11e

ar~

axhibits 1, 2, an« 4.

We

, 110.

'

: appeared incomprehanaiblo to a. tor OIA to permit •ontinued
ba~ed

tb••• 4iaolosuroa.

~ebt

aalea

~tinq

"invoatora tet auake4.1nto probable or certain loa••••

on

ln effect, ORA waa

.

ich waa absolutely contrary to wy OCtober 14, 1111

comm•ndation (IXbibit 3) and I underatood contrary to the
commendations of the hol4in;

o~any

exaainera to ORA.

ana to RA Ho:ma1 were almost 1u1 appallinv.

.b referenced in

1ibit 6, RA Homea financial atat.menta ·reflected total aaseta

$210,ooo,ooo with total 11&b111ties of t20I,OOO,ooo with a net
~

•

of only $2 million.

Lincoln had provided •30 million,

Jecured loan to RA Homes t.h&t

war~

actually aubor41natecl to Ill.

.ar creditor• and not evan eupported by penonal ;uarant••• ot
1

principal•.

L1neol.n 1 a loan toM Homu totaled approxb\ately

o •1llion whioh actually exceeded lCC'a own net worth. Gene
lzer and I 4iacu•••d potential 1oea.e additionally in RA land
na that clearly needed an appraisal.
.....

I un4eratood bu4qeted

000941

atate fun4a tor appraisal• were running out.
In approximately seven weeks I .Yaelf reviewed approxtmately
$220, ooo, ooo loana all ot which were co:naidued ao bad they were

uaed aa evidence of unaate and unsound lending activity in a

cease and Deeiat Order iaaued by the comaiaaioner in December
1911.

•
curtail wuaafe and unao\md action, our intention
also wa• to
force ORA to taka action particularly to
vhioh had beooae ou p¥'1M objaotive.

.

~11

aubdebt aalea

linoe ou order inclu4a4

findin;a that·d..cribed preferential ter.aa and exceaaive riak
oharacteriat1a•, oontrary to pUblic 41aoloauzea, it

appea~

to me

that ORA wae 1d.llin; to take no action to 'atop What appeaNCt to
u

probele

•~1tiu

fftUd.

Thank you very aueh !or: your tiM.. I ·bava been waitin9 a year
tor tbie oppportunity to

~.

000942

tJ

:_)

.

)

''":

'\

•''

··)

.'

( ;:7 0-;>.-)

'

•

~.

STA'l1!!11mift OF RICHARD B. JIEWSOII
SAVIBGS ABD LOAII SDIOR EXA'MIIIER
STATE OP CALIPOUIA
BEFORE Tim U.S. BOUSE OF UPRBSDTATIVBS
COJIIII'1"'l"EB OR BAIUUBG, PIIIABCE ARJ1 URBAR AFFAIRS
-

MASHIRGTOB, D.C. - OCTOBER 31, 1989

000943

Loan Senior Examiner
Examiner In
for the State of California. I was
on (ACC) Group in
Charge of American continental Co
annnn
ing exhibits are
September, 1988. This testimo~y
subpoena
dated
provided to the Committee pursuant
October 26, 1989, which was issued on matters related to the
and Lincoln
American Continental Corporation
Savings and Loan Association (Linco

My name is Richard E. Newsom,

to hear my
I wish to thank the Committee
during the
testimony relative to experiences
its parent company,
examination of Lincoln Savings
American Continental Corporation
ing the fall of 1988
and relative to other matters requested
your letter. I hope
the Committee will forgive the brevity
this written
testimony as I did not anticipate being called as a witness
until a week ago. Nevertheless, I have attempted to prepare
testimony and supporting exhibits which I. submit to you.
I wish to thank you Mr. Chairman and each member of this
committee for your courage, independence and desire to learn
what happened ~t Lincoln.
I particularly wish to thank Commiss
Crawford of the
California Department of Savings and
Chief Deputy
Commissioner William Davis for their leadership, support, and
unswerving commitment to protection of the public.

•

In September, 1988, I was assigned to
Lincoln/ACe
examination as the Examiner in Charge
the examination of
American Continental Corporation initial
in Ir•ine,
California, and then in Phoenix. The
gnment was, I
believe, based on my general speciali•ation in matters
involving asset quality evaluation and
licts of interest
and almost 20 years banking and regulatory experience. For
reasons I will describe later I became
ly involved in
certain areas related to the examination of Li~coln. Because
of the situation I observed at Lincoln, I made it a practice to
attempt to commit important matters to
ting and leave a
record of what we knew, when we knew it
who else knew it •
My intention was to leave an audit trail
to accordingly
encourage others to take appropriate
These exhibits
are arranged in chronological order.
The question of whitewash
come up and I will attempt to let
the exhibits speak for themselves as much as possible. I
believe records of what we knew then
we did with it
are more valuable than testimony created
the fact.
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ion.

an
prepared
more serious
8, 1988,

Hotel
of

of
officers and
benefiting
in related party
and the
• The letter also
sources of repayment, the
lost its $20,000,000
2

(

I provided a
holding
curtailment
direction of
securities law v
uninsured subordi
the public under
source of cash
disclosures that
inaccurate and mis

federal
aware of the
at the
potential
tting
ly to
primary
public
known to be

I raised my concerns
Barabalak (FHLBB
or about October
Kevin O'Connell
attorney. Elements
interim report of
3) which was transmi
at Lincoln, and
Phoenix. Cali
sub-debt sales was
be a reluctance
SEC, .which I

Ale:
arranged on
• Scott,
ties
in my
, (Exhibit
our EIC
in
ing continued
appeared to
matter to the
possibly "a
as December
by

This interim
liquidity cris s
1988", and noted
the FHLBB •••
inaccurate and
Registration
and Lincoln
insure that this
avoid even the
additional
losses."
Concur

II

presented to ACC
we have to
effort to
permitted
or certain

with

the October
, counsel at
party

6, 1988 letter,

ACC,
my concerns
disclosures re
followed up
1988 to Mr. Kie
errors and omiss
material errors
an investors
exercise of

•

r

At approximately
authorized
Exchange Commiss
Stelzer,
Gunn, an
disclosure
purchases.

t

I

October 18,
detail the
be

relevant to
and
insiders."

ioner Crawford
and

ra
treasury stock
3
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small

a

0 946

I decided with the
the holding company
expertly by other
federal) and concentr
unsafe and unsound
classified far too lenient
classified at all. Mr.
individual loans to Southma
prepared by our examiners in
having problems based on di
recent federal examination.
supported by poor collateral were
after Southmark disclosed cash
problems in its 10-Q.

largely ignore
conducted
ners (state and
or loan losses and
had been
or not
iminary findings on
that had been
was ~own to be
own 10-Q's and a
was that new loans
by Lincoln even
and other serious

Loan and junk bond exposure ~o Southmark aggregated almost
$129,000,000 and my analysis cont
work of our Irvine
examiners. This is an incredible
ion of risk in one
entity and substantially exceeded Acc•s
worth. These loans
were in my opinion all problem assets,
afe and unsound, and
apparently exceeded the federal loan
one borrower limits by
over .$40,000,000. This analysis was
to Lincoln on
November 1, 1988, with a cover memo
ln requesting a
response. I forwarded my memo and ana
is to Kevin O'Connell
in Washington on
same day. These are all included in
Exhibit 6.
My memo to O'Connell described the f
the Southmark
loans were not classified at all
iminary federal
loan comments. I stated that "I
comer on this job
however it appears
me
ion's lending
practices go beyond unsafe
that there appear to
be major differences between
quality findings
by state and federal
war
discussion between
the agencies.• Southmark subsequently
led a Chapter XI
bankruptcy proceeding. This memo also addressed the difference
in classification on RA Homes
considered a
$30,000,000 loss and
considered only
substandard.
On or about November 4, 19
Scholer, Fierman, Hays, and
my letter to Mr Kielty rega
provided this response to FHLBB
response was inadequate

(

from. Kaye,
t 7) responding to
problema. We
Kaye, Scholer

On November 10, 1988,
personnel
Department of
personnel
raised our disclosure concerns rega
for assistance in stopping, if
Copies of the Ponchartrain
provided to them. Co
Riff, Robert Rifken,~
Ken
Mr. Mar, Mr. Stelzer, myself
personnel attended this
ing.
5

luding myself, met with
our offices. We
~uu~uartrain and asked
sub-debt sales.
2, and 4) were
were Morton
Mr. Davis,
CDSL

000947

a package
sible
was sent to the SEC

4

On March 3, 1989, we sent Exhibit 12 to the F.B.I.referencing
Hotel Ponchartrain, RA homes, and other Lincoln matters
including a document that identified one of the principals of
RA Homes as a long time former employee of U.S. Senator
DeConcini.
Approximately the end of April, 1989, we became aware of a
probable violation of our cease and desist order involving a
wire transfer and violation of conflict of interest regulations
that related to the repurchase of an unusual loan participation
involving Gascon Development that benefitted ACC. This
$6,000,000 problem occurred on March 31, 1989.
Approximately July 18, 1989, a follow-up package (Exhibit 13)
was delivered to the FBI relative to possible dissipation of
assets through charitable corporations possibly involving u.s.
Senator Cranston. The documents also reflect the involvement
of Ms. Pelosi on the board of one of the charitable
corporations that apparently indirectly received ACC
contributions. Please review the documents yourselves as we
are not an agency that over sees political practices .
.

I am sure I have left out part of the Lincoln Story but time
constraints existed in preparing for and providing you this
testimony.

7
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DATE

Board of Directors
American Conti
al Co
ADDRESS
Irvine, California z

r

Gentlemen:
have completed
Co-ntinental Corpo
pursuant to the Savings
ACC • s major asse is i
Savings and Lo
(Lincoln)
concurrant exa nation,the
a separate De r
nt of S
Directors of Lincoln.

Iu

,

pH~B
6().--~bo/ qk_

We

•

ary Lincoln
ect of a
addressed in
to the
the Securities
i
condition with
30,1988 totaling

is less
the concurrant
Loans.Further
have been a
~~.uu~u.This raises
company , the
and the ability
from continued
the companies
relies on
dividends,the
tax sharing
, its
as the

of Lincoln
or asset
TOTAL $140

n

dependent on 0 0 9 5?
reserves an~
~
reported
numerous large
f
ally weaK
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Very tru
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GfOitGf DWkMf.JIAN. Gowfllor

STATE .Of CAlifORNIA

"DEPARTMENT OF SAVINGS AND lOAN

I'

- . ; · COMMONWEALTH AVENUE. LOS ANGELES. CA 90005 f2l3) 736-2198
ANSOMf STREET. SAN fRANCISCO, CA 94104 (415) 557·3666

san Francisco
November 1'j 1

:M •

'""'"

VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS

•

Ms. Barbara L. Gunn, Esq.
Staff Attorney
Mail Stop 4-7
Securities and Exchange Commission
450 5th Street N.W.
Washington D.C. 20549
Re:

Lincoln Savings and Loan Association and American
continental Corporation - Your Pile Ruaber so-2028

Dear Ms. Gunn:
The enclosed materials concern· possible securities violations
which have previously been discussed . with you. 'l'here is an
ongoing investigation by our Department. In the future you may
receive a duplicate of this package with further investigative
materials or summaries which are not pre~ently available.
'

I

Because time is important, I believe 'it is necessary to place
these materials in you hands as soon as possible whether or not
they are incomplete.
In the materials you will find two letters addressed to Lincoln
Savings and Loan Association and American Continental
corporation, one is dated October 6, 1988 and the other october
18, 1988. 'l'hese letters provide a summary or overview of the
issues.

•

If I can be of assistance please do not hesitate to call me or
Richard Newsom, Examiner rv, of this office. I believe you are
aware that commissioner crawford and Chief Deputy commissioner
Davis, of our Los Angeltu'l, office, are also very interested in
these transactions.
Yours very truly, ' · ·

?./-;RH~ .,/

H.R. HARVEY

counsel

HRH:kaw
cc:

Charles Deardorff, FHLB-SF

000954

z
To: Gene Staltzer
E.I.C. Lincoln savings and Loan
From: R.E. Newsom
E. I.C. ACC

'
October 14, 1988
We discussed the material contained in thi

repert with FHLB
people including Kevin o•connell .at al on October 13, 1988.
FHLB people working on the holdinq company a're equallY
concerned about the issues and serious iaplications addressed
herein and we are sharing the finGings in this memo with the
P'HLB.
financial OVerview
While there are a number of
variables involved we
believe.a liquidity crisis at the Holding
could occur
as early as December 1988. Primary variable& are not financial
factors directly but are POtential events:

1. At what POint doea the FHLB make a permanent decision on the
tax sharing arranqement triggering a PYblic disclosure by ACC
that may reduce subdebt sales to 0 and lead to a holding
company failure?
,
2. At what paint does the Ponchartrain disclosure problem burst
with POtential adverae
The
to these people
if they don't sell ia
a hi9h
probability that they will
The structure of
tha sale will be aimed at deferring loaa and d..age controllinv
the d1scloaure problem. Even the propeaed Stroh •a deal
involved only a sz.s million downpavment and there are still
disclosure problems bY virtue of the ACC vuar~teea. If one or
three occur it could kill thia peasi
deal by sympathetic
d•tonation.

what

do•• the

SEC

get involved. who briefs them,

and what impact does that have?

wa are assumin9 that an

individual or
entitY would not provide
money to this C:OIIP&nY and
that an 1ndet~ln'111nate combination of one,· two or three wtU
moat. likely occur in Noveaber or December creating a crisis.
Since much of this aubdebt was sold in the branches. we should
confusion and serious liquidity pressure on Lincoln
i.e a run.
is a rather bleak scenario, however. they are runninv out
of mirrors to create aarninva. Because of the serious asset
tty
at Lincoln, we should anticipate that it would
be extremely difficult to sell Lincoln. We should also
that contingent l1ab111tv probleaa in cas• of a
comp~y
lure would go'through the holdinq company
structure like
the qoose and fall on Lincoln.
le f"f! s _ at the Holdin9 Company.
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Man~Qement

Response to Qur October 6. 1988 Letter

We have received and reviewed the ACC response dated October
13. 1988 to our letter dated October 6. 1988 addressing our
concerns
the Ponchartrain. There are no surprises in the
response
9enarallY ignores the·facts, detail, and
findings specific,llY referenced in our letter. Attached to
this rePOrt is an exhibit addressing their resPOnse. The facts
for themselves.

'

advises that subordinated debt sales are currentlY.
about
.ooo par day with management advisin9 that
las typically involve saall investors. (many
tizans) who presumablY can i l l afford the loss of
tax 1111harin9 NYIM!lts SWIIPOnd.ed by the nn..B on
• 1988 and knowin9 what we know about. 1NIIdequate,
jnaccurata and aislaadin9 information in 10-Ks~ s-2
Re9illlltrat1on Statements and proxy aatartal as pr~1111anted to ACe
and
managaRHnt. in our October 6th latter we have ·to
insure that this aatt.ar vats a coordinated sPeedy effort to
avoid even the appearance that revulatory a9anc1as permitted
additional investors to oat aucked in to probable or certain
losliles.
We recommend that. at. the Monday meatinv with PHLB personnel at
our
ice• that these hard issues ba raised and further
di•cussed
the JI'HLB people. They
t. be surprised
because we iliiCUIIIIIiled thea 9enerallY with Eevin at.al. yesterday.

These disclosure issues include what. appear to be aatarial
in the 10-K for Deceabar 31, 1987~ the April
8, 1988 proxy atat..Mnta and the April 14. 1988 S~I:.C.
Registration stat86Hnt SUPPOrting the sale of the 8300~000,000
subordinated debt issue in which the holding coapany is in the
early stage of sales. W. also noted a FSI..IC Current RePOrt
H-(b)12 for the aont.h of 3una 1988 indicating that there have
been no other aaterial
important events requiring rePOrting
si
Robart J. Kielty. Executive Vice President and Vice
Chairman of AOC and Robart s. Svaas. Chai~ of First Lincoln,
s
of as11111stant secretary as of July 14, 1988.
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Major concerns revolve t und the nondisclosure of ' Jor
negative issues surroundinq the Ponchartrain
million
unsecured related party transaction
our letter
dated October 6. 1988 to AOC and
in the
attached exhibits
ic rePOrt
and the specific
Treasury Stock

•

'

Actiy~ties

our review of this area is in process
tentative. Because of the appearance.
serious breach of fiduciary
this up now.

findings are
• of another
bringing

To explain it crudely. sub debt is
uold to ill informed
and unsoPhisticated investors to suppert
stock
purchases frequently from. insiders (
timed to benefit
the insiders and not ACC in at least one instance)) and forMer
insiders of "control stock"' that would otherwise be subject to
SEC rule 144 restrictions and that would obvioUflY depress a
thin market.
6

•

our concerns involve the
a
stock
purchases, questionable disclosure issues in proxy aaterials
reqerding these activities. and the appearance at least that
treasury stock pUrchases are often
the desire of
insiders to diapoae of control stock often
and prices
that appear detrimental to
company.
edviaes
that 100 percent of
treasury stock
ia to be
retired.
The April 8. 1988 proxy statement (page six) advises that:
"Pursuant to a decision by the Board of Directors and aa
py.rchaaed Common
previously announced. in 1

Shares in the open market and in
transactions. 11\e Board of Directors
that
Common Sharea are
end a good investment for the
Company. end has authorized aanavament to continua to purchase
Common Shares in the open
end in Privata transactions at
such times as it deems appropriate,
to certain
restrictions. up to a maximum of
000.000 Common.Sharea.
In
1987 the Company purchased a
768,460 Coamon Sherea;
approximately 351~460 Common Shares were purchased from the
ic and approximately 417,000 Common Shares ware purchased
from certain officera. directors end their
lY •amber•." We
did not see specific
that
1
stock acquired
would be retired. as
to us
inq, a reaiqnin9
We read later on page seven
A.
officer sold $2,500 000 in stock at $8.20 par ahara to the
company in 1987. The
was based on the
price on
the date he resivned.
trans
to
305,000 shares end accounts for most of the
This stock would have bean control stock.
Unusual trading
1987 with numerous small
brokers occurin9 within
of a 300.000 share block
that wont up about
.SO

noted in ACC stock in J'~~nuery
treasury atock purchesaea throuoh
the two week period prior to pyrchase
froM Charles ~eatinq J'r. at a price
during
two week

have noticed that the
ion
process for the timin~
treasurY stock
18
in writino. The
U
advises us that he is advised
either an ACC .Boa rei
or a member of the
Executive Committee to enter the

00 957
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market. There is no refer.nce in the minutes (until a November
1987 purchase) of either Board or Executive Committee specific
approval of treasury stock purchases. Further. there is no
evidence of anything provided in writinv to the trader and no
written guidelines or POlicies to provide consistency. This is
a matter of considerable concern because aa noted in at least
one instance a 1"\i,f\ up in price two weeks prior to PUrchase of a
block of stock from the Keatinvs (the stock price went down
subsequentlY in the followinv two weeks).
This is an area
that we need to be able to Pick sse peoples' brains on to learn
more about what to look for.
Counsel here advises that the company will not acquire stock
from insiders for a time after the company has been acquirinG·
treasury stock throuvh brokers to prevent maniPUlation which
appears inconsistent with tha January 1987 trad1nv activity ..
In amy cue. we know that over 95 percent of 1987 treasury
stock PUrchases were from insider or former insiders
See attached for our request to aanavement.

I
\
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EXniBIT 1
Supporting Exhibita Ragardinq Non-Disclosure 1D 1Q-Ks and Other
Public Reports.
The December 31, 1987 rorm 10-E on
continental
Corporation indicat~s on the cover
Incorporated BY
Reference" includtnv the .. Proxy Statement·dated APril 8, 1988
relating to Re~Jistrant*s Annual
in9 to
held on May 5,
1988" to be incorporated into Part II of Form 10-k.

'

Part !II of Form 10-K includes aection
34 titled
"Certain Relationships and Related
which includes
one sentence, .. The information
the Proxy
Statement. in the section entitled "Traruull.ctions with
reference. ••
Hana.~Jement .. is incorporated herein
The April 8, 1988 Proxy statementWith
Manaqement•• paqe six includes· in
five the followinq
vague reference to the subject Hotel tran.action:
"DurinCJ 1987, the
and one of its subsidiaries advanced
funds for.the operations of three apartment complexes and a
hotel owned by limited partnerships, the units of which were
offered to members of the PUblic and in which certain officers
and directors purchased interests. The Company and the
subsidiary advanced a total of 86 million to the partnershiPS.
The Company retains
interests of 301 to 401 in each
of the apartment limited
•
to the
return of capital with respect to one of the partnershiPS and
to a cumulative preferred return to the limited partners of two
of the partnerships. With respect to the hotel, a subsidiary
of the Company retains a
interest of 15%.
subordinate to the limited
' return
capital and a
cumulative preferred return.
1. The $20.000,000 unsecured
2. The ACC warantees of the
favor of San Jacinto
were not disclosed including:
A. A $9,000,000 non recourse
edged securities {Memorex
approximately $9.000,
This
February 29, 1988.
B. A

ss.ooo

wu not even cU.sclosed •

•ooo.ooo
)

first

mortqa~e

whic~ e~cumbereci

loan in
the hotel

collateralized by
with total value of
executed on

000 unsecured recourse guarantee dated .January '16,

1986 •

. The reader was not
ly informed that Crescent Hotel
Group of Michi~an. Inc.,
id
was the 9eneral
partner in the transaction or that POr notes in the March 31,
1988 partnershiP financial •tateaents
referenced in more
detail in our October
1
that the partnerships
mana9ement (the qeneral pa~ner) has indicated a coMmitment to
providinq further financinCJ
$20 million.line amount
cover future
losses of the partnership.
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1beral
5 year

in

to acquire

for
certain of the
aooraoata ownershiP
8PPrOX111AtelY
ranovat.tona to

n.~ceasbe:r· 31,

1987,
the C~y, had
uncxer a 120. 000 ~ 000 line
been. uaed to f'Wld cash f 1ow

" ~ noted that
four
the previous section
iaauea in thia 10-X aeetion.

ooo9SO

CONCLUSION
The reader of the 10-K and the Proxy statement would have had
no chance to ascertain the true risks. potential financial
impact of loans and guarantees or the preferential terms
afforded t'o the related parties on this transaction.
Contrarily. he would be led to believe by specific Manaqement
representations that this transaction involved terms as
favorable to the company as transactions with unaffiliated
parties and that it had resulted in larqe profit to the com~~y.

\

(
\.

'
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COIIP&nY

concluaiorus
S-2

there ia no ••ntion
with another
in

own

on noneccrual
increased to over

000 62

Exhibit 2
Management responses to our October 6. 1988 letter.
In overall terms management either did not answer the specific
questions in the~letter or categorically denied the issues.

'

1.Willful violations of regulations
Manaqement claims that this transaction was covered by the May
20,1988 agreement. FHLB says it wasn't.
Management dispUtes the affiliated partY status of the
transaction which is absurd.
2.Breach of fiduciary duty
The affiliated parties clearly intended to benefit from the
transaction and they clearly benefited from the loan proceeds

•

-3. Willful diversion of Association assets.
Management comments ignore the questions raised in our letter.
4.Haterial ommissions

(

Management denied tha facts but ignored the documentation.Thare
are numerous sound reasons for denying this application to
transfer the nota to the holding company.
S.Potential conflicts
The holding company will fund future cash deficits.(lf the
holding company goes under Lincoln will still have contingent
liability.
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the princi
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repee
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0 million loan

tho equivalent
any partnerahip -- whether
affiliated
reoaa -- to ...................
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tbt

unfortunatolr, the
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Newsom called me thh morning to aslr nbout the sta.lus of subj~ct.
I 1 nformed him that the "final L.A. version" wu delivered to the AG yesteruay

ui~..k

dfternoon. This "version" incorporates the standard 1anguage adopted several
years ago ln the first two pages. This was done at Shirley Thayer's request,
~nJ 1n no way alters the substance of the findings.
I am including a copy of the final version with this package 1n case
Dick wants to review 1t and comment. I expect 1f the AG passes on this, we
will issue 1t next week. I w111 make certain that you get a ~opy.

Thanks to you and Dtck for you help on this monumental task.
hs

12115/88

cc:

GLT, TFH. SHT
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STATE

Of

CAliFORNIA

BEFORE THE

COHfiDENIIAl
In the Matter of:

)
)

liNCOLN SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION

Ca11fornta F1nanc1a1 Code

18200 VON KARMAN

)

IRVINE, CALIFORNIA 94714

)

-AND-

)

EAST CAMELBAO::: ROAD

)

______________

PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85016

HHEREA$:

DESIST

Sectton 8200

)

AMERICAN CONTINENTAL CORPORATION
2735

ORDER TO WSE MD

)
)

Pursuant to Section 8152 of the Ca11forn1a F1nanc1a1 Code <CFC>, the

C:O.iss1oner of the Depart.nt of Savtngs and loan, State of Caltforn1& <the
•C0111111hs1oner•) hu received tnfon~~~t1on nsu1t1ng frOIII the exam1nat,ons of
the practices and operat1ons, of lincoln Sav,ngs and
(AL1nco1n") and Amer1can Cont1nental Corporation (ACC).

Loan

Association

("Uncoln" a.nd "ACC"

sha.ll be understood to 1nc1ude all of the'r subs1d1ar1es unless a. contrary
mea.n1ng

h

apparent.)

Included

1n

the

tnfonu.t1on

received

by

the

C:O.hs,oner wen the following' facts:

.,
1.

Lincoln

is

author1zed to operate a. Ca.1tforn1a savings

a.nd

loan

assoc1at1on under the supervtston of the ComMissioner;

2. ACC, an Oh1o corporation, 1s a. reg1stered Sa.v1ngs and loan loan Holding

...

Colpany under the superv1s1on of the C0..1ss1oner;

C00968
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•'
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,•
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(:•

t

rf·.
l
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3.

Charles R. Keattng, Jr. 1s

cha1r~~~.n

of the board of dtrectors of ACC,

owns 22l of 1ts stock, and ts a director of a number of subs1d1ar1es of
Uncoln; and

4.

Charles R. Keattng III h

executhe vtce prestdent of and owns 131. of

the stock of ACC, and h. an offtcer and/or director of a number of ACC' s
subs1dtar1es.

1nclud1~g

l1nco1n and tts substd1ar1es.

Based on the above-referenced exu\nat1ons and reports, the CoM1ss1oner f1nds
that the fo11ow1ng practices and operations, when taken as a whole, result tn
lincoln and ACC engaging in unsafe and unsound business practices.

0.00969
·~·
;.

:.•

-2-

'·
,.

·.·

Transact1oo with Affi11Attd Persons

..

Through 1ts subs,dh.ryl, lincoln funded a $20 mi1Hon unsecured loan to a

'
,,

111111ted partnershtp (Hotel Pontchartra1n l1a1ted Partnership, hereinafter
•Pontchartra1n"), Jf which ai'!Other Unco1n subsidh.ry2 was the only general

''

partner and of which the lim\ted partners tnclude Charles Keating, Jr.,
Charles Keat1ng III (hh son and then d\rtctor of Phoenician Financial

.i..

/•

Corporat1on>. and other. officers and d1rectors of l1nco1n, its parent (First>
:

and afftltates.

•'·

.

'

This loan 1nvollles a nU!Ilber of unfavorable characteristics

which de1110nstrate unsafe and unsound practices or violations' of SAl Section
7450 and Federal Insurance Regu1attons (•I.R.w) Sections 563.43 and 571.7 (lZ
C.F.R. Sections 563.43, 571.7), 1nc1ud1ng but not 1taited to the following:

1. Below aarket rate of interest. g1ven the r1sk character1st1cs and terms

wh1ch requtre no pr,nc1pa1 or 1nterest payments for f1ve years;
2.

Pontchartrain had a negative partner's cap1tal when the unsecured loan
was coam1tted and funded;

3. Pontchartraht had a h1

of operating losses pr1or to' and after the

Joan was funded;
4. The

loan represents, a conflict of tnterest transact,on 1n wh1th

af'filhted persons of Uncoln personally benefitted, 1n v1o1at1on of
I.R. Sections 563.43 and
Phoen1c1an F1nanc1a1

571.7~

Corporat~on,

a wholly-owned subs1dtary of L1ncoln,

incorporated 1n Ca11fornia.
2 The Crescent Hotel Group 'of H1ch1gan,

Inc., a wholly-owned 2nd tier

subs1dtary of Ltncoln, 1ncorporated 1n M1ch1gan.

'·

<
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5.

The purposes of this unsecured loan vera to cover Pontchartra1n's

,,

operat1ng losses 'and cash flow deftc:hs:

,.
7

asset, the Pontchartra1n Hotel, was already encumbered by ,: securid loan

~,,

w1th another lender. ·The U!Ount c:c.itted under the unsecured loan when

••J

·Pontc:hartrah'lts ·only JMjor

added to the uount of ·,rae secured loan subshnt1a11y exceeded the
appraised value of th;s asset; and

t~.

6.

,.

t>
..

Lincoln estab11shed a loss reserve on tt,e Pontchutra1n loan for accrued
1nterest which exceeded $3,000,000.

~;

~~~~

;t' ....
;.

....

~- .·

Furthermore,

pub11c d1sc1osure

stateaents3

lacked

complete

and

accurate

dhclosures regardtng the above-referenced POOtchartratn transact,on, wMch 1n
add1t1on to be1ng potential secur1t1es law v1o1at1ons, aay result tn 11ab111ty
to ACC, and thereby may adversely affect the safety·and soundness of l1ncoln.
Matertal om1ss1ons and/or 1naccurac1es tn these reports 1nc1ude:

1.

Failure to d1sc1ose that the Pontchartra1n Hotel was heavily encu.bered
by a $35 M111ion mortgage with another lender;

2.

Fa11ure to dhclose a $5 M1111on guarantee by ACC of the $35 111t1Hon
f1rst mortgage held by another hinder on the Pontchartra1n 'Hotel.

(An

add\ttonal $9 11U1ton secured guarantee was later provided by ACC 1n
1988.)

3.

Fa11ure to disclose the below Mrket interest rate, the preferentfal
teflls.

and

the

unsafe

and

unsound

rhk

character1stfcs

of

the

above-referenced Pontchartrain loan.

3 Proxy uterh1 dated AprU

a.

1988, a 10-K report dated December 31, 1987,

and offer1ng circulars for $300 a1111on 1n subordinated debt filed w1th the
SEC on Aprt1 14, 1988.

,;;

-..
~~;

,....._,

J: .
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4.

Investors and potenth1 1nvestors w~re advhed 1n one report4 that:
•M&nageaent belteves that tht

te~

precedtng paragraphs were· u

favorable to the

Th1s stateBent 1s ats1ead1ng

5.

tC~~Pany

as those which

llr tnnntUons with unaffi Hated parties•.

be obta1ned 1n

could

of'the transact,ons set forth \n the

the far ts of the transact\ on: and

Due to an error (described u

" by Act's counsel), ACC's

proxy stateeent ~dated Apdl ~~ 1988 erroneously dhc1osed that Act and a

•

subs1d1ary advanced a toi:a1, of $6 anHon to a Ha1ted partnership 1n

wh1 ch off1 cers and en rectors had

11.11

1ntenst, when t n fact the tota 1

llllOunt advanced was $16 11111H1on under the $20 111UHon Hne of cred1t

•

here1nbefore referenced.
Other

tUgb R1 sit l£;11'!

loans to

toncti.Uratlons

RA Kalis.

Inc.

On June 30. 1987, l1ncoln made an unsecured loan (No. 91077) 1n the amount of

•,,

$30 million to RA Homes, Inc.

Under the terms of the note. lincoln agreed to

subordinate

virtual

its

loan

to

&11

unsecured

other

cred1tors,

notwithstand1ng the fact RA Homes' ftnanciat cond1tton was extremely weak.

RA

Homes had a nom1na1 stated net worth of $3.2 m\111on as of October 31, 1987,
1n relation to stated Habt11ths of $134.2 1111t1Hon.

F1nanc,a1 state111ents a.s

of October 31, 1986, also reflected a noBina1 net ~rth of $1.2 a1111on, w1th
stated 1h.b1Ht1es of $80.5 111l1lion.

•

Net ~rtll u of April

3o:

1987 totaled

$2.2 m1111on. 'Due to operattng losses, the tOII!Plny's ftnancial cond1tion has

deteriorated, w1th stated net worth of $2.4 m1111on coapared to 1tabi11t1es of
$208 111111on as of July 31, 1981L

The HaMHthls of RA Horaes represent

In spite of the weak financtal condition of the

primarily secured creditors.

guarantees from the company's

ltncoln d1d not obtain

company,

pr1nc1 pals .

...

.,#

extr~Rtly

The loan teras are

11bera1 ca11tng for interest only payments

quarterly principal

start

and

subsequently hcnase. wUh a $20 1111111ton balloon payaent due h 1997.

The

through

1992,

stated source

of

at

lfflh:h

t1~~~e

repayaent on the subject loan was

,'
4 ACC's Aprtl 8, 1988

Stat~Rtnt.

7.

P4.YI"I'Its

-5income of RA Homes.

However, the historical 1nc011e from opent1ons of RA

Homes, as was known or should have been known to Lincoln at the t1me the loan
was made, was not adequate to Met the interest and scheduled pr,nc\pal
payments on the $30 m\111on at the stated rate of 131.
loan No. 91087 to RA H~es. secured by land ,n Arh~ona, was extended and
increased fr011 approximately $27 llidl Hon to $46 1111t1Hon on July 11, 1988,

..

whtch resulted tn an unsafe' and unsound 1oan-t~v&1ue rat1o of 100'1, ghen the
financial cond\tton of the borrower and the s1ze of exposure to.l1nco1n.
As of June 30, 1988. total lo&ns to RA Homes equalled apprbllhi'ah1y $79.5
111111l1on, or about one-third of l1nco1n's net worth, wh1ch represents an unsafe
and unsound concentration of unsecured or thinly co11atera11zed loans to such
a ftnanc1ally weak company.

Loans to Soutbmark Corporatfon ind AtfJ ltdes
Uncoln and/or \h subs1dtarhs ude a series of loans to and tnvestments 1n
Southmark Corporat1on, 1ts subs,d1ar,es, and aff11,ates tota11ng approx\mately
$108

111t111on.

Of thh

a1110unt,

approximately

$49.5

Million

has

been

collatera11zed by stock 1n clos~ly held or wholly-owned subs,diaries and
aff111ates of Southmark.
lincoln made three of the above loans· tota11ng $12.5 aH11on on distressed
property owned by Southmark and its

...
l

are

apartment

bu1 1d1 ngs

in June 1988.

subs1d1a~ies

1n . depressed

parts

of

the

The properties

country

and

are

characterized by high vacancy,' cash flow problems, deferred maintenance and
detertorat1on accord1ng to lincoln's own analysis. According to lincoln's own
loan underwr\ting presentat1ons, the $12.5 a1111on 1n loans exceeded the
current $8.9 m1111on apprahed values of. the propert1es by $3.6 Million .
Stock wMch was pledged as additional security for. these new loans consisted
of restdcted and unregistered stock valued at $4.5 111Hl1on in a Southmark.

...

aff11tate and ,, of reduced and quest\onable aarketab111ty. according to
lincoln's own loan agreeaents.

The level of collateral protection afforded

these loans h unsafe and unsound due to the unfavorable characterht1cs of
the collateral, the tMn collateral margin, the known finanCial. diff1cu1t1es
·~

'

.

of Southlllrk, ..and the Jar9e L1,.co1n exposurJ to
4

~~

'

,_If

•

'

' •• ,

•

Sou~hlllrk.
'.

•

•

•

•

ooo973

'.l' ,,'

;

' ...

;

-6-

·,

l1nco1n's IIU1t1p1e borrower 1ht as of June 30, 1988 indicates an unsafe and
'

.

'

l

'

unsound concentrat1on of loans to SoUthiH.rk·. t ts aff1 nates and subsidt ar1es
1n the a.oUnt of $98.8 •11T1on.' ~arttcularly 1n 11ght of lincoln's knowledge
of

South~~~&rk•s

detertorat1ng financial cond1t1on IS evidenced by Southmari(.'S

Fona 10-Q 'report dated March 31, 1988. .

..

c~~ J!'~~' r.-J'·
Based on the forgoing f1nd1ngs~_·a~d a1.1,.gaUons, the Cllalhstoilers concludes

•

that l1ncoln, ACC, and 1ts

nued

sl.lbs1d1ar1es havl engaged , tn . unsafe and

'·'

unsound bus1nesi pract1ces.

'0 p_,~t fL,
THEREFORE. pursuant to the provts1ons of CFC Section 8200, the Com1ss1oner
orders Lt nco 1n, ACC. any of their subs1 d1arhs. and the1 r d1 rectors, officers
eaployees and agents, to CEASE AND.DESIST frOM the fo11owtng:

1. Making

loans,

representfng e1ther new or add1Uona1 extensions of

credit, to Pontchartra1n,'R. A. HOllies, Inc. ·and Southma.rk Corporation,

,.

or any of the1r subs1dtar1es, directors, offfcers, or other affiliates.

'

2.

Hak1ng loans or creat1ng concentrat1ons· of cred1t to any borrowers
contrary to CFC Section 7450.

..

3.

.!.

Making loans or enter,ng 1nto transactions of any kind that violate I.R .
Section 563.43 or

4.

I.R.

Penn1tttng erroneous,

Sectt_on 571.7 dealtng with conflicts of interest.

1ncC~~p1ete,

fnfor~~~at,on

lllh1ead1ng or 1naccurate

of any k1nd to be 1nc1uded in pubHc reports <1nc1ud1ng Fon11 10-Q),
offer1ng c1rcuh.rs. proxy uter1ah

:Or

any other pubHc 1nformat1on.

This order tnc1udes. but h not H1111ted to, matirhJ 01111u1ons regarding
related or affi11ated person transact1~ns.
;.

'

s.

Maktng unsecured loans to.borrowers wh1ch have ~ef1ctt or tnadequate net
~

worth

to

prudently

.

suppert

reasonable

expectations

of

rep&y~~~ent

consistent with CFC Sect1on 7450.

'i

\

000'974
I

..

.,

.

·:'·

·.
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FURTHER, the eo..tss1oner orders .the board

o~ directors of L1n~o1n and

fully exerche their f1duc1ary duty conshtent: w1th CFC Sectton

\

~150.

ACC to

_)

FURTHERMORE, Lincoln and ACC are d1rected to apply to the C:O.hs1oner for
exceptions, wahers. adjustMents or relief fr011 any provhton of thh Order

•

wMch they beHt!ve h detrhtental to the best interest of the Assoc1at1on or
detrimental to the best tnterest :of· the public.

:'

. !

Thh Order shall be effective 1..1adtate1y upon service.

·DATED:

HILLIAM D. DAVIS

Chief Deputy Sav1ngs and Loan Comm\ssioner.
600 South Collonwealth Avenue.

S~1te

1502

Los Angeles, CA 90005

HDD:hs

cc:

Darrel H. Dochow, ORA

'

'I'

Recetpt h hereby atknowltdged by: ·

Hame (Typed or Pr1nted>

.
Signature
'.

Corporate ntle

>
•I

Date

nno975

..

STATI: OF CALIFOUIA
SAVIRGS ARD LOU

DEPA:R'DJDT

(

In the Matter of:

)
.
)
ASSOCIATION,)

LINCOLN SAVINGS AND LOAN
FIRST LINCOLN FINANCIAL CORPORATIOR

ORDER

California Financial Code
Section 8200

)

AND AMERICAN CORTINDTAL CORPOIU\TION )

------------------------------->
To: Board of Directors and Managing Officers
of American Continental Corporation

To: Board of Directors and Managing Officers
of Lincoln Savings and Lban Association

.

.

is
california-licensed

savings

and

loan

association

under

a
the
;

(

supervision of the California Savings and Loan Commissioner (the

'

a

[state of incorporation] COrporation,

is a aaYingl an4 loan

holding company under the supervision of the COmmissioner; and

•

American Continental Corporation ("Ace•), an Ohio COrporation, is
a savings and loan holding company under the supervision of the

C00976

Charles R. Keat

rman

()./(}6

ACC, owns 22\

[

ACC, Lin Fin,

f

i
D·ID7 iJ

Charles

a. Keating III

0

owns

the stock of ACC,

of ezaminationa and

f

Lincoln is a [wholly-owned?] subsidiary
in

a

[wholly-owned?]

subsidiary

f

ACC are in violation
(

tbe California rlnancial Code

)

lifornia or of the United States or are en;a;ing
unsound business practices as set forth below:

C0097

2The
/

Crescent

Hotel

Group

of

Michigan,

wholly-owned. 2nd. tier subsidiary of Lincoln,

Inc.,

a

incorporated. in

[STATE].

.

.

.•

000978

88

funded,
loan

through

•

a

1

to

Charles !teat in;, Jr..

(Chairman of the board

(his son ana

stockholder of ACC), Charles Keating

II

ita parent

a number of unfavorable

i

(

an

Financial

Corporation,

Lincoln, incorporated in (STATE].

a

wholly-owned

co

LINCOLN SANDLA
6

NOVEMBER 18, 1988

(

PAGE 4
characteristics

which

demonstrate

uzun1fe

and

unsound.

practices or violations of SAL 57450 and Federal Savings
~lt_ I

q_,

.0."30

P..l.t r

r.;~.11..

and

~>+)

8

Lf'lan

§571.7

Corporation

(12

C.F.R.-

Regulations

55563.43,

(•I.R.")

511.7)

5563.43

including

but

and
not

F;J~ t .;-;,."!~'-/ limi.ted to the following:

(q}-{p.)

;

(

13e Iu~)

h\&,

x:c-+

~~-·
...

c.~

d

"trk

t? ~ iP, rd"I)

J

fr~:pc(

s,\,D_ h
rl.,r

:"

. . ~1<..

c~~c..Yn·:-1~}:,..£

1~~~~ feyw-..'" f>

000980
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PAGE 5
B.

I'D~ ·t'· ,. , I'

Pontchartrain had

a

negative

when

D~WOTbh

unsecured loan was committed and funded.

"\"'·,.~
Pontchartrain had a history· of operating losses prior
4,..,. ,-a-c.,
~- .,_,<' . I".~

~!'·

fa.. 71

~;~

""'":

to and after· the loan was funded.

.
This

loan

represents

.

conflict

a

of

interest

transaction in which affilifte4 parties of Lincoln

(

personally benefitted not in conformity
with Insurance
.
Regulation 1563.43 and 5571.7.

The

unsecured

loan

operating loaaea.

waa

to

cover

Pontchartrain's
.

Pontchartrain • a only ujor aaaet,

the Pontcbartrain Hotel, was already enewlbered
secured

loan

with

another

lender.

The

by

a

amount

.

commit ted under the unrsecured loan when added to tbe

cro

LINCOLN SANDLA
DRAFT 6

NOVEMBER 18, 1988
PAGE 6

amount of the secured loan substantially ezceeded the
appraised value of this asset.

F.

Lincoln

loss

established

reserve

on

the

Pontchartrain loan for accrued interest wbich ezceeded
$3,000,000.

3.
';),..41

a;(

.(!)

Public disclosure statemants3 lacked complete and accurate

.t;:;,.-s'l .
"
disclosures

~;1.. ~ "2 7"' referenced
-:i. ::J• ~ e
1

(~~~potential

the

t

in Paragraph 4

Pontchartrain
.
which,

iD

transaction

a4dit1oa to beiDg

securities law violations, may result in

p~

~J."'!:.

:··

.~·\~

#~ ~3Prozy material dat_, April 8, 1988, a 10-X report dated

01·· · December 31,

1987,

and offering circulau·s for $300 million •;.:..·. •

subordinated debt filed with the SEC on April 14, 1988.

C00982
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liability to ACC, which in turn may adversely affect the
safety and soundness of Lincoln.

Material omissions and/or

inaccuracies in these reports include:

A.

Failure to disclose that the Pontchartrain Hotel was

• ,-s-

heavily

encumbered

by

$,

a

'!.

million mortgage with

another lender.

Failure to c!isclose a $5

(

I
the
,

.

J

til

e,'i-,:o; .ll.t:... t
. ,~ . ·~'

~· .~···

c.

guarantee by ACC of

$"

million first mortgage held br another lender

--~~

~,,'on

··

millie~.

the Pontchartrain Hotel.

(AD

ad~ltional

$9 million

• •a·c.c.)

a A I ""I CJ 0

secured guarantee was later provlc!e4 br ACC~)

Failure to disclose the below urket interest rate,
the preferential tenm,

anc! the unsafe

anc! unsound

risk characteristics of the Pontchar~rain 1oan~~:t:t;.9.c\;,.f
~ct!l'e+."'f.J~-· t -·. ~i~l~ ·,.. D~ f
....

.,

'

.

00098
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D.

Investors

and

were

potential

these reports4 that:

advised

in

believes that the

terms of the transactions set forth in the preceding
paragraphs were as favorable

the company as those

which could be obtained in similar tran1actions with
unaffiliated parties•.
given the facts of the transaction.

E.

ACC's proxy statement dated April 1, 1981 erroneously

advanced a total

disclosed that ACC and a subs

of ' ' million

the total amount
l ; '1"

uf

I ..;. 'f'i*) / a ,.P &)'1.(1
4. On June 30, 1981,

co .r 411

to

partnership

a

in which

was

Jl.: t ~r~r,...,,..41FJ'
unsecured

191077 in the

B-t
amount of $30 mill

to RA Homes,

the teras of

C00984
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~988

4Acc•s April 8,

Proxy Statement, Page 7.

Mict

Lincoln agreed

subordinate its

virtually all other unsecured creditors
the

notwit~standing

fact RA Homes• financial condition was extremely weak.

RA Homea had a nominal stated net worth of $3.2 million as

October 31, 1987, in relation to stated liabilities of

of

.

a:~· a;.&i~'K-

million.

$134.2

Financial

31,1986,

also

reflected

llion,

with

stated

a

statements
nominal

net

liabilities D~

$80

as

of

October

worth of

$1.2

~Jl\...,~ c.~trF Ai"";a i1i?'7

million.~

The

deteriorated due to operating los1e1 with a stated net
worth of $2.3 million in relation to liabilities of $208
mil
secure4

.

The

li&~bilities

creditors.

In

of RA Homes represent priurily
spite

of

tbe

(j

weak

financial

of the company, Lincoln tlid not obtain personal
from the company's principals.

C0098
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I

1988

B-1

The loan terms are

A·''>

only

payments

prin~ipal

A·

I'.

reme

through

al calling for interest

l

1992

at

which

tiM

quarterly

payments start and subsequently increase with a

$21 million balloon payment in

stated source of

A~C).;.

•

A-H.

A·' t
0-'i

repayment on the subj act

loan was

income of

Homes •

RA

However, the historical income from operations of RA Homes,
o,.,<:lw...Uiu,..,.., AtH.,..IC_..,
.
as was known to Lincoln at the
was
~

$30

Loan 191087 to RA Home's secured by land in Arizona, was
extended and increased from app:rozimately

million to

$46 million on July 11, 1988, which resulted in an unsafe
and unsound loan-to-value

t'o,.J,•tiw... oT

t4

,J'.rd~to,.....

s''(J~

of 100\,MLIF££2

e;,,.,~

"~" t..
]

+~t. c.·a.~#

fi'""'"' r- ~~ (

'' -

aJ<pr~s ..-D

lQ!a uadef!l"lng fi!SeR_e,lga.
't.,} L ~r,. c u t""'

,

C00986
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As of July 11, 1988, total loans to RA Homes approximately
G2J 6

..

enualle4 $98.5 million or one-third of Lincoln's net worth,
'lll

which represents an unsafe and unsound concentration of
unsecured

or

thinly

collateralized

loans

to

11uch

a

financially weak-company.

.
~incoln-and/or

.

ita subsidiaries made a series of loans to

and investments in soutbmark Corporation, ita llubaidiariea,
(

~-6-

',, j

,,:

and affiliates totalinQ approzimatel:r

B--~M

&B""#l :thiB
.... -.

I) ~-a.

. &IJ

amount

approximately

$68

million

llion ..
baa

been

'*""

collateralized

7 ; subsidiaries

by

and

atoek in eloeel:r held or wbollJ'-ouDed
affiliatea

of

Soutburk ..
1
'

exceeded the current appraiaed values of the propertiea" br

000

LINCOLN SANDLA
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AA

approzimately

AA -/?
c>;L1

according to Lincoln • s own loan underwriting

0-1'-017

•
G-•3

Lincoln's

multiple

borrower

list

as

of

June

30,

1988

···""'·

indicates an .. unsafe and unsound concentration of loans to
;

Southmark, ita affiliates and
$98. e

million,

·-<:c..:~'f'..\.L d~teriorating
. 0-.'' -....'1>of~'l;iv
::.

particularly
financial

aubaidi~riea

in the amount of

~... ·... ~~·I(,.~··· f.·

in

light

condition

of " SOutblurk • •

JUB

evidenced

Southmark•s 10-0 report dated March 31, 1988.

I

C00988

LINCOLN SANDLA
DRAFT 6

NOVEMBER 18, 1988
PAGE 13

The

Commissioner

orders

Lincoln,

ACC,

or

any

of

their

subsidiaries, cease and desist from the following:

lo

Making

loans

or

creating . concentrations

of

credit

to

borrowers contrar.r·to SAL §7450.

2.

Making loans or entering into transactions of any kind that
violate I. R. 55&3.43 or I. R. 5571.7 dealing with conflict

..
of interest.

(

3.

Permitting erroneous, incomplete, •ialeading or inaccurate
information of any kind to be include4 in public reports
including 10-Q, offering circulars, proxy materials or anr
other public infomation.
limited

to

material

This or4er 1nclu4es but 11 not

omissions

regarding

related

affiliated party transactions.

(

co

or

LINCOLN SANDLA
DRAFT 6

NOVEMBER 18, 1988
PAGE 14

'6.

S.

Makino uns•cured · loans to borrowers Jthich have deficit or
inadequate. net

worths

to

prudently ·support

reasonable

ezpectations of repayment consistent with SAL 17450.
;

(

Further,

the Commissioner orders the bQard of directors to

fully ezercise its fiduciar,r duty consistent with SAL 56150.

This Order shall be effective immediately upon service.

DATE

.
C00990

r

I I UO.:J

II!.. I Vl..t !.IIJ

V4., <-V

....,

,.

O.~t..

To:
Subject: lincoln C & D
01 s tri but1 on:

None, this item is In Progress

--------------------------------------------·---------------------------------From:
SHIRLEY THAYER
Date Sent: 12/02/88

To:
SHEILA SAKAMOTO
Subject: Lincoln C &D

Dick Newsom gave 1s presentation and 1nd1cated there \lfU docu~~entation to support the allegations. He h bringing back. to you the 11 Rster• copy for
preparation of Draft 18.

··

...

It 1s my understanding that since Tommy Mar had an emergency and had to.
leave after two hours that there \11111 be opportunity given to h1m to look.
at the supporting documentation before a-ftna1 ~ecis1on is made to prepare
a f1na1 draft and prepare and index a copy of the supporting documents.
for final review and contacting the AG.
·

..
..

Call \s you have any questions.
Shirley

~~,..~·.i~

$

• ,-.. - ~

-------------------------- Reply - - - - - -

----------

1 just spoke w1th Harvey Shames \lfho indicated that Draft 18 would be prepared
down there. Per his request. I am transmitting Draft 16 via CQ~Puter.

·<•'l:.' i~':#'

--~

'

C00991

CC:

From:

SHEilA SAKAMOTO
RICHARD NEHSOM

Subject: Changes to lincoln C &D

SF

Date: 12/13/88

Distribution:
Not Requested
- - - - - - -- · - · · - - · - - - · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ·

....

.

.

--------

Key points of d1sagre.-ent
Page 8-"Due to Typographical error• ts being 1nserted.Insert1ng this doesn't ma
ke sense. however, if you are gotng to insert 1t like it factual-i.e. •oue to a
.
. ,
alleged typograpM cal error•
Page 11- •and scheduled principal PI.YMrits• h be1ng deleted. Inc1ud1ng thh Ill
kes it more attftcult for lincoln to argua agatnst·as and I don•t understand th
· e rationale of deleting a fact that w111 support our argUMent.
Page 12-•Restrtcted and -unreghtered stock" ·h bei~Bg changed to publicly trade
d. It is iaportant that you understand the concept of •restricted stock".The ac
tual certtf1cates he1d as collateral are .arked as restricted. Turn the cert1f1
cates over<we have copies referenced)and read 'the: 1111\tation at the bottom of e
ach cert,f1cate.Our cert1f1cates ·cannot be •publicly traded" because of these 1
1m1tat1ons.· Incidently. the stock price deterr1orated to a new low for the year
r last week, e11m1nat1ng our cushion 1f you use erroneously the Alltr1can Stoc
k exchange quote whtch 1s for Marketable securttes<not restr1cted)

·,

Since the Lincoln loan documentation referenced ts Yellow ~~arked in the section
addressing the reduced marketability and u~reg1stered nature of the co11atera
1 I don't understand why we are 1gnortng a llljor and s1gntftcant negative facto
r that 1s documented •

'

.

:lliL - - - - - - . . . - . - - - - - - - - - - - ·

.

.....

~ ~=.-= ~/

If you have any further questions please ca11.I think '1t would be worth discuss
1ng the restricted stock issue on the phone.

~~~~~·<

~~~.;

-.~,

.•
>

,~·- '~
..

•
'f~;~*.J: ~

~:to
. "'! ........... ! . ~.

C00992

v ..J

Vf

r

.!. .._...

L. I t:O.,. "' 1Jtl I 1..

1'10. I I

To:
SHEILA SAKAMOTO
From:
HARVEY SHAMES
Subject: lincoln C &D

•

i

f

""""""J

' ..... , v .... ,

\,..''....0

....,..,.;

~....,.

~···

SF

Date: 12/02188

D1 stribution:
Not Requested
Shena.
I made a mistake. Shirley's arrangement 1s to have Dick come up with
Draft 18 in consultation with you and Harv. Once that 1s done. he can arrange
to forward it via E-Ma11 to me and I w\11 make the L.A. distribution.

Shirley also thinks it would· be helpful in dealing with the AG if Dick can
a brhf llelftQ <no more than bto pages) highlighting the major concerns
and safety/soundness issues 1nvo1v1ng the Pontchartra1n. R.A. Homes and
Southmark transactions. Together with Draft 18, we will then proceed to
hopefully finalize the drafting, vh1t the AC and present the C&D to the
Comm1ss,oner for approval.

·prepare·

H. Shames
~~~?~·2·:·~
--•"*:>">:ic

cc: WTS. GLT. SMT
------- .... - - - - - - · - - ·-------- Reply ---------

CC:
HARVEY SHAMES
Subject: lincoln C l D

-------------------

From:
SHEILA SAKAMOTO
Date Sent: 12/02/88

I just spoke with Harvey Shames who 1nd,cated that Draft 18 would be prepared
down there. Per h1s request. I am transmitting Draft 16 v1a computer.

----------~------------------~--Original Memo-----·----------------~-------To:
SHEILA SAKAMOTO
From:
SHIRLEY THAYER
Subject: lincoln C l D
Date Sent: 12/02/88
Dick Newsom gave 1s presentation and indicated there was documentation to support the allegations. He is bringing back to you the •master• copy for
preparation of Draft 18.
It is my understanding that since Tommy Mar had an emergency and had to
leave after two hours that there w\11 be opportunity given to him to look
at the supporting documentat,on before a f1na1 dec1s1on is made to prepare
a final draft and prepare and index a copy of the supporting documents.
for final review and contacting the AG.
Call is you have any questions.
Shirley

C00993

Mr. Robert J.

r

~ie

Senior Vice Pres
American Continental

18.1988

1

the Companies
Thank you for e~preaBln~ your concerns
(
response to our Oct. 6,1988
lettftr dated
13,
transaction.) may not
letter reoardino
H~tel
have 4ddressed adequately our concerns over apparent material
public 10-k. proxy
ommissions in
statement, and the
Subordinated debt
sales.

we

are attachinG as exhibit 1 the
onal information you
requested supporting our comments re
to material
ommissions in
ated partY disclosures. We are incorperating
by reference our October 6~1988 letter to insure there is a
complete
ino reoardtno our concerns in this
•
transaction.
The low and concessionArY rate
subject appears worthy
of special comment.A projection
by the accociation
indicates that
amount
lY payable at maturitY
including accrued interest
will approximate 129,837~207
absent any
principal OF interest which are not
required until
. The Nat
izable value calculation
conducted by association
on July 7,1988 estimated that
future accrued
tn addition to:the existing $2.8
million at the
,would need to be reserved unless these was
an improvement
operations.This certainly appears
material.The
of a
luap sua payment of
interest five years
of a loan discounted for as
(as the est
funds)
$6.7 million whiCh which
would result-1«.
a ·1/3 ~1scountia~ from the note rate of
10%. which is
th the management representations
in both April 1
Years PrOXY material which
advised
transactions with
management were on
and conditions with those
afforded the oeneral

•
(

In short , -cQntrarv
company subsid
concessionary
draft suppartino a
the FHLB (
43-44 indicates
cash flow
i
and condi
credit 1

(_

000994

(

This also appears inconsistant with prevtous disclosures.
While we have additional
key issues

question~

this seems to address the

These appear to be material errors and omissions in past
disclosures relevevant to an investors perception over both
financial matters and exercise of fiduciary respansibilitY by
corporate insiderL.
Thank you for·requastin9 this 1nfor.ation and followin9 up on
o~,c~ce~

.

~e.
RiChard E. Mewaom
Examiner.
State of california
Department of Savinva and Loan
CC:niLB

-

(

r-

...

I

·I

...

l
•

JJ

..

•

00099

1
SuPPOrting Exh 1 b 1 ~· -•fubl1c Reporta.
""<~>

R•aardipq Npn-Discloaur• in 1P-Ks and Othtar
·

inental
Iru::orporat.od By
APril 8, 1988
held on May 5.

The December 31
Corporation ind

Reference'" inclYdinO' the~

relating to Registrant's
1988" to be incorporated

10-IC.

page 34 titled
which includes
ProXY
with
The April 8, 1988 Proxy atat...nt-·
With
Management" page six include• 1n Para9raph
the followinsJ
vaoue reference to the subject Hotel transaction:
"During 1987, the
funds for the
hotel owned by limited
offered to members
and directors purchased
subsidiary advanced a
The Company retains
of the apartment 1
-eturn of capital
(. .o a cumulat.i ve preferred
of the partnerships.
of the Company
subordinate to the
cumulative preferred

advanced

cosplexes and a
which were

c.rtain officers
and the

the partnershiPS.
t.o 401 in each
to the

Nrtnerahtpe and
partners of two
, ·a subsidiary

of 151,
cut tal and a

1. The $20,000.000

aortnve loan in

2. The ACC guarantees
favor of San Jacinto
were not disclosed

enC\UDbered t.be hotel

A A $9,000,000 non recourse
pledged securities (Me.c,re~
approximately S9~ooo.
February 29, 1988.

a.

A

1986.

by

value of
on

ss.ooo.ooo

3 . The reader wu
Group of Michigan.,

partner in

Crescent. Hotel
a

wu

general

transaction

per notes
the March 31,
1988 partnershiP
(as referenced in more
·~tail in our October 6.
letter) that the.P&rtnershiPS
\ .ma9ement (the general
has indicated a commi tJNnt to
providing further financing beyond the SlO million line amount
to cover future
loaaea of the partnership.

C00996

was not informed of the extraordinarilY liberal
subJect loan including but ~ot limited to:

$20 million revolving l
terms requiring no payment
to maturitY in five years.

c

it with S year
principal or

in relation to risk.
demonstrated ability to repay the
appreciation 1n value

only
letter.

on pave .seven, P&ravraPh four of the Proxv Stat.-.nt
"ManacrMRent b«<U.evea that thG tenas of the
set forth in the precedin~ para.grChs were u
to the Company- as thoaa whieb could be obtained in
tranaact1ons with unaffiliated parties."
ncndiscloaure 1tams are obviously .aterial u the
or inv•tor who relied on the "Tnm.aactions W1 th
disclosures in this proxy atat...nt would be
that the company had placed 134 aillion in loans and
at risk sUPPGrtino a related party transaction
ready h19hlv loveraoad by a 136 mi ion secured
{ ACC' a exposure reprasonted onr 201 of net worth) •
would also not have been aware of the extreae risk
transaction u addressed in cur October 6, 1988 lett•r
Association and the Holdinv Coail~NDY. Also u ref•nmc..S
1 in our October 6th lett•r, on J'uly xxxx 19U, am
officer rec~ed the internal classification of
of the loan and a total r•erva of all acci'Wid
on the subject which UOW'lted to al110at. 13 llillion.
interest reserves total 13.2 aillton at 9/30/88.
reader of the 10-J: would find ac:a~Mfbat. aon
in a different. section on Ntre 2l of the 1 0-JC in
three:
Creacent Hotel Group waa fo~ ··in 1984 to accauire
proNrties aftd to develop new bot•l•. ln
, crescent acquired
Pontcbartratn Hotel in
•

The Pontchartrain is a

420~uni t

lWNI"Y

in the downtown business district near the
••~•~u Center.
The Company
The Pontchartrain for
to a vrouP of invHtonjl iDClw.::Ung certain of the
s officers and directors (with an agvravat• ownershiP
, reault.1DG in a groaa profit of approx1matalY
The Company completed substantial renovat1ons to
in February 1986. At Dec...,_r 31, 1987,
Corporation, a subsidiary of the COIIPMY, had
.ooo to tba partnerabiP unct•r a sao,ooo~ooo line
Such line of credit hu been used to fund cub flow
the partnership since inception." We noted that
items two. three and four from the previous section
as undisclosed issues in this 10-K section.

(

'

CONCLUSION

be reader of the 10-K and the Proxy statement would have had
.,o chance to ascertain the true risks. potential financial
impact of loans and quarantees or the preferential terms
afforded to the related parties on this transaction.
Contrarily, he would be led to believe'by specific mana9ement
representations that this transaction involved terms aa
favorable to the company as transactions With unaffiliated
Parties and that it had resulted in large profit to the company.

(

.

.
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VS OFFICE Electronic Ha11
'' CC:

From:
Subject:

RICHARD

RICHARD
lincoln C & 0

111

Distribution:
Not Requested

•
·; -~;: !.-~-'.·. :"' -:~_ .
·~:~-;:.;_..,_,.""1.':'

By the time you receive
s we assume
received a draft of the
asap to the exui ners at U n
proposed lincoln C&D. This should be
footnoting to the Revised C
coln to make any additional vorkpaper add1t1ons
7 D for court purposes.
More seriously I have
ved a copy of TOBIY.
• ~emo dated November 17,198
the propos~d C &D in par
8 regard 1ng hh analysis of the wort papers "'"""'"''"
tfcular support1ng.the
Homes, loan.
It 1s very clear to ae from reviewing thh
that TOM)' h totally com
.m1ted to thwarting and delaying the proposed
D,for unknown reasons. as he d
elayed the ma111ng of the board report of the. previous enm1nat1on. wh1ch was ne
ver delivered to the assoc1at1on~S1nce Tommy has· ~een adv1sing the comm1s1oner
<even before Tommy saw the work.papers> that there is no basis for enfocement ac
tion. I believe this also 1nd1cates m1ndset.
· · ·
·Examiflat1on and legal has put 11tera11y thousands of-hours into this exam1nat,
on and the outcome 1s too important to have 1t wasttd due to Mindset ~1ch 1s c
contrary. in any case • to the comm1s1oners attempt to take action to protect t
he public.
.
This memorandum addresses Tommy s memo wh1ch 1s attached.Under the circumstance
s I believe further 1nvo1ve.ent by myself or Northern C&lifornta legal would b
e an excerc1se 1n frustration and fut111ty ven the predi
on of Tommy to
delay or block C .0
on.Hhile it is a management decision that needs to be
made down there. I don•t be11eve any effect,ve act1on or report w111 come out o
f this examination unless a more objective and action oriented supervising exam
1ner is appointed
s case.
1

~·

. ..

Section 1 of the memo

c1

f1

on.

~--

~-~~'i-~::.::

Section 2 addresses •unusual and SetB1ng1y Inverted exa.ination procedures.•
The memo question how I could write a draft of the C 10 on November 10, while t
he workpapers support1
C &D were not
1y prepared and assemled unt1
1 November. The •emo suggests that unt11 I provide a stateaent explaintng how I
did this "we are vulnerable to counterattacks based on bias. prejudg1ng. lack o
f professional object1v1ty,etc.~ The answer is obvtous1y that I xeroxed the d
ocumenta1on weeks ago
I submitted the RA Hoaes wr1teup to aanagement on Oc
t.21,1988 wh1ch 1s attached. He received aanag~a~nts response this week and I
discussed the inadequacies
at a fon~al aeettng with management
in Irvine. ca1. which was
tzer, et a1.
Section 3 addresses
dressed this in
sk assessment as

and Expected Summary of ftnd1ngs" .I ad
ous paragragh. Our findings left no doubt about our r1
managment.

~Abscence

201000

ew

reu:::01111en

nonsubstantivt issues.
11

Erroneous

s

uns

ty k

01

1

From: Dick Newsom

Subject: Lincoln C & D Violations

This

is

a

follow

up

to

your

request

for

a memo on the

apparent C&D violations at Lincoln.

I have reviewed Shirley Thay•r's opinion regarding the C
and

:believe

it

is

in

error.

d-irective

against

J'errold

it

a . violation

Section 563.43.

violating

that.communication between our counsel
be cappropriate.

D

I understand that ORA people

have advised Jerrold that ORA -eonsiders
its

&

advises

and

that

advis-ed two days before the pur·.J..~-~ · Lt

I believe

Washington
ORA

lean

of

would

personnel were
officer

Randy

Conte ·t:hat Lincoln woula not fN4 rd··.qf'l ·f. J... i~ f;t -ticipation.

•

The
an

oblic;ration

opinion
ACC

to

ri~Jht

had

repurchase
to

identified
a

participation

the P:irt i·; ~ ;~~

repurchase.
it as a

a ric;rht, not

LincolTJ • b

attorney's

nonrecou~ par~icipation.

contractual

responsi bi 1 i ty

from

European

Saudi

_cr.l was

to

uppn

l·epurchase
demand

European (pursuant to the put agreement), this
represented a contingent liability of ACC.

put

by

Since
the
Saudi

agreement

...

~

Further. with Lincoln's
in

nonrecourse

a

was

s

the

of

ion

senior

i

ch

)

essence

.

posi

1 en

cons

to

Section

a

fi

~e

responsi

its

ACC

loan

·a

or

to
t

d

ili

loan partie
a payoff

on.

liability
ously

is

li
ACC,

i

an

prior

indirect

represents
to

detrimental
1

was

i

transaction

'·.be

(that

by

the

bankruptcY
to

Lincoln

conservator

court.

c 1

in

(

Additionally

\.

prelimary

evidence

suggests

that

violated the C&D by advancing additional funds
Pontchartrain

partnership

subsequent

Lincoln/ACC

to

the

Hotel

to the issuance of the

C & D.

I
For· example loan payable to
the

and

1/31/89

show an
period

in
(see

from

attached).

Lending

reflected

on

• statements
Pontchartrain financial

2/28/89

crease

Crescent

20,802,825

These

would

to

21,777,825

appear

in

the

to be specific

violations of the C & D.

would recommend a meeting

I

Harvey,

Sheila,

on

Shirley(by

Monday
squack

with
box)

yourself,
to

foregoinc.;;.I would also recommend a follow up call
c.;;

these

at

issues

resolved

and

H.R.

discuss
to

the

ORA

to

conmfirmed.

I

I

continue

to

have

concerns

that

southern California personell against
Lincoln.

is

unreasonable

and

the

predisposition

taking

action

warranting

of

against
review.

001004

.._,,_, ...

-------

-

25, 1989

1

Hamil ton Homea,
Inc. - Loan 'No.
11090

Inc.

, (ACC)

P&%ticipant

elect•

. Participant
•a .
\

'• intereat also

~cquired

-

~t!U!maent

,
~

Lincoln

not.
exerc~cef

repurchase r.;;hen SF..B r-r: :·~i::?ed

Thi.s -.:~n:1ot
an affiliated p·-<i~ B•)fl.

encumbrance..

C01005

State of

i
oalU~a~o,_

Street
94104-1398

DATE:

TO:

SUBJECT:

'

I

On November 29,
of Lincoln
Finance and
compliance .with
with the Commi
committee.
As aoon as the
testimony was
publicly by the
to Mr. Van. de
"'either doesn't
the days that
impression that
On Rovember
Department
release to
particular
credibility ..
it was apparently
rney General's
fyin; matters,
only
his
certain nna
I
mly
Department•s
until your
I understand
Assistant
state for
entitled. to

on the· matter
the Assembly
was ~iven in
in compliance
fully with the
Ill'.. llewsom• 1
later that 4ay
A quote attzoibuted
newspapers -- &ewsom
about or is 1 liar .. • In
created the clear
the co.Uttee.

of

CODftu:ence call betnu
to 1saue a pzoeaa
in tM p»eal,
affecting 111'. Bwaom •a
the Depart.ent, but
• D. Peterson of the
releaae..
I:auatead of
the probl• ..
or attempt to
41ligent work
the

OM:kaw
cc:

C01006
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~-.
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BUIBG~ft!AL II IDf aclrnD,

...

,.._•

'

~ftJ-•t....._:;>lilrllllll........_ _ __

IU''R CALL
.
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-
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C01007 .

- The cnse and
that wae iaaued on uec,._Del' 3
lavinqll llnd :Lo&ft

lVII;

AIWII~I.I.S

..

and

continental corporation (.leC)·

-"~

to Linooln

a~es..C

~loan

California linanoial Code

section 1200 aa
by'Williaa
D. Davis, Chief Deputy
....
. . --.
0- .
savinc,a and· Loan Coaiaaiot'er, a :copy of vhiob. ne aent to .
~·

•

· the Office

of

bqulatoey

"'~

Activit.~~ l~ ·vallhin~n,

.

examinations ot
.
.
ACe by the Commiaeionar'• office and
"-,

California.

Th!a waa a

'"Ulli'l!'llffA?

.

product based on the )eat

judgment of

time and was

D.. c., ia

·on . infomtioh:'result.11\f .tra the
practioes and. operations ot Linooln and

an Ol'dar 1S8UM

..

~

axruancaea

usin; facta available at the
it waa issued and wa• never

challen;ed.

Ra;anU.nq the

-aia611

transmitted to the

•

referred to
letter•
1989,

we bel

... _.~~.,,.,.,. of the workpaper• vue
November 1111,

:regulator.

~8f&~int

potential

l'nn tbo\ifb the exam

ia~suact

until renary

tha C'D 1eaued withoUt

delay.

c

1008
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Staff.
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.

cornntttee .COntacts. .

.....
..

hereto fs J memo regarding the Cease and Desist Order that was
Ltneoln Sav1ngs and Loan Aasccfation and American Continental
Decllbtr 21, 1188.
.
w'th the press or the Assembly Finance and Insurence Committee
through W1111e~ D. Davts, 1f avai1Ab1•• or W1111am ~. Crawford.
1 speak to the press without the •~press perm1sa1on of the
the Chief Deput1.

COlOO

f*

'

•..

GO
i

§ 19251.5.

•

Communication with members and employees of the
legislatwe
All state employees· and employees of the University of California and the California State University and Colleges shall have the
right to communicate·with Members and employees of the Legislature. .
A state employee, employee of the University of califomia, or
· employ~ of .the California State University and Colleges may raise as
a_.defense,. at .a punitive· .action. hearing, the right to communicate
with Members and employees of· the Legislature as proVIded for in
this section whenever
believes that the basts· for such punitive ac·

tion is.. retaliation
for
. . .
(Added by Stats.1974, c.

communication.
8127, § 1.)
-

..

·,·

.....
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Gun'~: 1\100
Al'I'Jilll<!!.-. GJU~~IOA GOOn'

's

were

have been able

on this file,
by federal regulators •
.

. ~ ' '\
• 4,'

I
I

C01011

The Honorable William Crawford
November 2, 1989
. , ( ~- ·.; ,
, ..: 't
Page 2

!

' i

~··

. , '''

1\ ·'

(

II·.

'

.,

I

;

,·.,.:''

As I am the regulator with responsibility for.enforcement of the
California Corporate Securities Law of 1968, I would be very
interested in any information that you may have now to support
the conclusion you or your staff members have expressed that the
sale of ACC's debentures was "a scam".
/

Very truly yours,

~w~,,.
CHRISTINE W.. BENDER, • . . • ,,
Commissioner of Corporations
CWB:ad

,

:· r--,·· ;» J ,:~:1t 1or:
r

i •·.

~. :, -. ~~
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cc:
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\

J

G. w. McDonald, Assistant Commissioner·
G. A. Crawford, Senior Corporations Counsel
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CRAWFORD·
loner of savings and Loan

.'~'<.'"':

.,,

',,f'l;;:'''.,_.".'·ll
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. . "..

May 4, 1988.'
(LA)

30'4 5211

AMERICAN OONTININTAI
CORPORATION
·"'~

ur~IN

... -·.

:

·,

Corpor.:~ t ion~. ~oun~~ ~· :- _(LA). ~· :· (; ,,
.

. I'

. ·'

hereto is a copy of the application and exhibits filed
rican Continental Corporation ,vi~h the D•partaent of
ions.

..

representations in conn•ction therewith 'should be aade as soon
since the applicant expects to go effective with our
nt during the week commenci.ng May 23, 1988 •
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Mail Stop 4

u.s.

. ',

Secur

Coaaission

450 Fifth

I

·,

Washington, D.C ..
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•
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American Continental Corporation
ansaction.s
your letter · of · October 19, 1988,
documentation in our possession
matter.
related to this matter was
Federal Home Loan Bank System
our initial belief that this
completed a field review of these
r of fact, we have generated no
concerning the transactions,

The

field
conducted
(
Depa

)

.

transact
s
f

have been in contact with FHLBS
we trust that your initial
been met.

,

'r ').

an Examiner
.;
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GfOIIGE DfUKMfJIAN, Oo--

(

RUSH
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TTAL RECORD, LEGAl DIVISION
_"""'!!-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

(Pacific)
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C01016

me that
•
exhibits
be
iminated from
a heated telephone
by s. Sakamoto
me that my exhibits
these exhibits were
g
the time frame.
th
drafts of
to do
ar;ument
she advised me
. testimony, the
screen out if she
for review and I
is essentially the
f members were present
occured.

G 1017

Given

letter from Corporations Commisioner
r,
·· 2,1989, whom my testimony seems to have
put in an awkwa
position, I am requesting a discrete( if
possible) investigation by you to determine whether the actions
of Thayer ,Janice Brown, and perhaps others potentially
vi ated state or federal laws or regulations.
If your investi tion warrants it, please make the appropriate
referalls to law
rcement agencies to insure that we are not
involved in a cover up. To my mind the mess warrants
rP.fP.rral.With
Phvsical assault that occured on Chief

•
to have
ry information in niy mind that might give
somon.e an
ive to eliminate information sources •. The
ial involvement in a cover up by the Governors office
9
me more concern than being •black balled•in seeking
employment in
ate service which is already a done deal. The
timing of the
rtments announcement relative to probable
mass layoffs at this department is another troubling
coincidence involving Agency •

...

C01018

VS OFFICE Electronlc Mail

CC:
SHEILA SAKAMOTO
From:
RICHARD NEWSOM
Subject: Congressional Testimony

Friday

11/03/89 09:53am
SF

Date: 10/26/89

Distribution:
Not Requested

------------------------------------------------------------------------------Pursuant to our earlier conversation, you are welcome to review my proposed s
testimony. provide tt to the AG. and share 1t with Business, Transportation and
agency and you are invited to review the exhibits which Ire being overnighted
however unless I hear to the contrary from the AGs office in the form of a sign
ed opinion identifying what we can•t legally provide to Congress, I am assuming
that the same verbal instructions provided to the comm1ss1oner apply • permitt
1ng me to testify and provide exhibits, assuming of course that the supena arr
ives. If you have any legal objections get them cleared with the AG. 1n writing
.At 4:45 tomorrow I am leaving to return after the clearings.

C01019

DEPARTMENT
- (21J)

136-2711

557-16&6

Associations, Savings Banks and
RE:

- Personnel Policies

responsibilities of financial institutions dictate the need for
a free exchange of eritlcal or sensitive information
and its statutory auditors, and regulatory agencies. This
some instances of unreported violations of law and
n 1""'"n.n..... Y which have contributed to significant financial losses.
to Section 8050 of the California Financial Code (CFC),
soundness, the board of directors or board of trustees
aaJe~a·uca Ulld aYiap blmt ~ball:
1

, 1985, adopt a resolution directing publication and

board's policy and information on how staff can
violations of law and regulations and other
statutory auditors and regulatory agencies. The published
least the name. local address and telephone number of
name of the official with whom eonfidential contact
information shall also be provided for contact of

ncJ.aeJnts

Telephone No.
1502

(213) 736-2596
-or(415) 557-3666

Commissioner
-a n d -

San Francisco

1-800-652-1646

20-7948

C01020
{OVER}

'

·'

(.

·,

2.

On or before December 31, 1986, and thereafter, upon hiring of new staff, Or
revision of the personnel policy as required hereby. distribute a copy of the .................,._
policy to each of its employees.

3.

Annually the association shall review Jts policy and recommend either retention as
written or changes as necessary for action by its board of directors or board of
trustees. The board's deliberations on the recommendation shall be recorded in its
official minutes.

To monitor compliance with the foregoing directive, pursuant to CFC Section 8151, we
have developed the attached report form (SL 104), which each savings and loan association
and savings bank shall file with the Department on or before December 31, 1986, and
thereafter as part of its annual rePor-t to the Department.

Attachment

..
C01021
DSL

10/86

650

Reproduced by DSL, Los Angeles

Department of Savings and Loan
600 So. Commonwealth Avenue, Suite 1502
Los Angeles. CA 90005-4085

TO:

SUBJECT:

(Name

ol Institution)

Report of P~ PoUeies

As directed by your Issuance No. 86-10. dated October 17, 1986, attached are two true
and correct copies of our published personnel policy as set forth and approved by our
board of directors (or board of tr~stees) at Its meeting held on _ ___,"'~""""!'_ _ __
<date)

•

As of this date. a copy of the attached publication has been distributed to each or
our employees.

•

We eertlfy (or deda.re) under peaaltJ of perjury under tbe laws of the State of California
that the foreactna 1.1 true ud eorreet.

Dated

----------------------

Signature
Typed Name
Corporate Title

Dated

----------------------

Signature
Typed Name
Corporate Title

Bote: This declaration must be signed by the institution's president or vice president
~ its secretary or treasurer or assistant secretary or assistant treasurer.

SL 104

C01022

